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 There is perhaps no philosophical thesis that has more often been thought to be 
most central to or most distinctive of the philosophy of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues 
than the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  In this dissertation, I interpret the 
Euthydemus with an eye toward what it reveals about Socrates’ views about the 
relationship between virtue and happiness.  In chapter 1, I survey the state of 
scholarship on virtue and happiness.  In chapter 2, I narrow my focus to the 
Euthydemus and offer a framework in which to place the passages I analyze in the 
following chapters.  In chapter 3, I offer a close reading of Euthydemus 277-282, 
arguing that it supports attributing to Socrates the view that virtue is necessary for 
happiness, but not the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  In chapter 4, I offer 
a close reading of Euthydemus 288-292, arguing both that it confirms the findings of 
chapter 3 and that Socrates conceives of virtue as a craft.  In chapter 5, I consider how 
my interpretation of the Euthydemus might be applied to related issues in the Platonic 




Chapter 1:  Socratic Virtue and Socratic Happiness:  Foundations for 
Interpretation 
 
There is perhaps no philosophical thesis that has more often been thought to be 
most central to or most distinctive of the philosophy of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues 
than the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  This “sufficiency thesis” 
amounts to the claim that no matter how things go in your life, if you are virtuous – 
that is, for Socrates, if you are wise – then you are happy, either because being 
virtuous somehow infallibly gives you the resources to become happy or because 
happiness just amounts to being virtuous.  But this is a deeply counterintuitive thesis; 
Aristotle famously wrote that no one would maintain it unless forced to it by his other 
philosophical commitments.1  Given the prima facie implausibility of the sufficiency 
thesis, before attributing it to Socrates we should like to have both strong evidence that 
he endorses it and a clear sense of his motivation for doing so.  The desired evidence 
is often sought in Plato’s Euthydemus, which has long been thought to be the place 
where the sufficiency thesis is expressed most clearly and argued for most fully.  
Contrary to this long tradition, which stretches from the Stoics to the present, I argue 
that the Euthydemus provides no evidence for, and even some evidence against, 
Socrates’ commitment to the sufficiency thesis.   
The core of my argument is a detailed interpretation of the two main “Socratic” 
passages in the Euthydemus (277-282 and 288-292).  In the first of these passages, 
Socrates says things that seem suggestive of the sufficiency thesis, such as “wisdom [= 
                                                
1 Nicomachean Ethics 1095b31-1096a2. 
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virtue] surely is good fortune” and “wisdom is the sole good.”  Statements like these 
understandably call to mind the sufficiency thesis.  Indeed, in one of the most 
influential books on Plato in the last half-century, Terrence Irwin makes this passage 
central to his overall interpretation of Plato’s ethics2.  Irwin identifies three distinct 
arguments for the sufficiency thesis in this short passage.  I argue that in each of the 
three arguments, there is decisive reason to reject any interpretation on which Socrates 
is arguing for the sufficiency thesis.  Instead, Socrates argues that virtue is of the 
greatest importance because it is both necessary for and conducive of happiness, 
though not sufficient for happiness.  Socrates explicitly identifies other goods besides 
virtue which contribute to happiness, though these goods are genuinely good for us 
only in conjunction with virtue.  He never argues that virtue infallibly secures these 
other goods (indeed, in many cases it is difficult to see how it could), and he leaves 
open the possibility that one who is virtuous could be so lacking in these other goods 
that she fails to be happy.  In this passage, Socrates appears to be more Aristotelian 
than Stoic, maintaining that virtue is necessary for happiness but allowing that 
happiness requires a minimal level of external goods.  
The second of these Socratic passages is often thought to mark a shift in the 
Platonic corpus away from the view that virtue is a craft:  Socrates assumes that virtue 
is a craft, but the discussion ends in failure, and there are clues that Plato thinks the 
problem is precisely the assumption that virtue is a craft.  I argue against this line of 
interpretation.  Rather, this passage, too, casts doubt on the sufficiency thesis, this time 
by highlighting the incompatibility between the thesis that virtue is a craft and the 
                                                
2 Irwin 1995. 
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sufficiency thesis, and subtly showing that the latter should be rejected, not the former.  
The lesson of this second passage expands on the first:  The craft of virtue uses, and so 
relies on, the products of the other crafts to produce happiness.  Just as in the first 
passage we learn that the virtuous person needs some external goods in addition to 
virtue, so in the second passage we learn that the craft of virtue requires some products 
of other crafts (e.g. health, the product of medicine) in order to produce happiness.  
But since virtue requires some things it does not itself produce or guarantee, it is not 
by itself sufficient for happiness. 
This, at the very least, forces those who would attribute the sufficiency thesis 
to Socrates to look elsewhere for their primary evidence.  But I believe my 
interpretation of the Euthydemus has much further reaching implications, forcing us to 
reevaluate the nature of and relationships between the most important concepts in 
Socratic ethics:  virtue, wisdom, and happiness.  As a first step in the direction of 
making these implications clear, in the final chapter of the dissertation, I apply my 
interpretation of the Euthydemus to a puzzle about Socrates’ happiness.  There is 
apparent evidence for three claims:  (1) Socrates lacks virtue (moral knowledge); (2) 
Virtue (moral knowledge) is necessary for happiness; (3) Socrates is happy.  These 
claims form an inconsistent triad.  I argue that there is strong evidence in the 
Euthydemus and other dialogues for (1) and (2), and that the apparent evidence for (3) 
fails to establish (3).   
In this first chapter and the next, I lay the foundation for approaching these 
topics in the Euthydemus.  The task of laying such a foundation is a complex one 
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which must be accomplished in several steps.  First, I make clear several background 
assumptions which will be operative throughout the dissertation.  Since some of these 
are contentious, it is essential to be clear about them from the beginning to avoid 
confusion later.  I then put forward two problems concerning virtue and happiness.  I 
spend some space explicating these problems, as they are meant to provide a 
framework within which we can attempt to locate Socrates’ positions.  Once this 
framework is in place, I survey various texts that are relevant to determining Socrates’ 
location within the framework, as well as various arguments scholars have given – 
largely on the basis of these texts – for settling on one such location or another.  As we 
will see, there is considerable scholarly controversy and evidence that apparently 
pushes us in incompatible directions.  This controversy provides the motivation for 
chapter 2, in which I offer a justification for narrowing our focus from a general 
account of Socrates’ philosophical commitments concerning virtue and happiness, to 
those commitments expressed in the Euthydemus.  Such an approach will pay the 
double dividend described above:  It will enhance our understanding of the 
Euthydemus considered on its own terms, as well as take us a good distance upon the 








1.1.  Some interpretive assumptions 
As scholars of Plato will be quick to recognize, any investigation into what 
Socrates thought will require making some substantive interpretive assumptions at the 
outset.  Here are some of mine.   
First, while I believe that Plato is our best source by far for understanding the 
historical Socrates,3 my argument does not depend on this.  I intend to offer an 
interpretation of Socrates as Plato presents him.  Though I suspect that this 
interpretation provides a more-or-less accurate view of the historical Socrates, I shall 
not be claiming anything so ambitious.   
Second, I do not intend to offer an interpretation of Socrates as Plato presents 
him in every Platonic work in which he appears.  Rather, I shall follow the majority of 
current scholars in calling a certain group of Plato’s dialogues ‘Socratic’.4  These are 
often thought both to have been written earlier in Plato’s career than most of his other 
dialogues and to provide a better view of the historical Socrates than the others. Again, 
while I believe this to be roughly right, my main argument will not depend on 
accepting these claims about the Socratic dialogues.  I will, however, limit my 
interpretation primarily to this group of dialogues.  That is, I intend to offer an 
interpretation of Socrates as Plato presents him in the Socratic dialogues.  When I 
                                                
3 Other main sources include Aristotle, Xenophon, and Aristophanes. 
4 By ‘Socratic’ dialogues I mean:  Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Gorgias, 
Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I. 
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refer to Socrates, in the absence of contextual cues to the contrary, it is this character 
of Plato’s Socratic dialogues to whom I intend to refer.5   
Third, I assume that the character of Plato’s Socratic dialogues is a systematic 
theorist.  Socrates is concerned to develop complete and coherent theories about the 
things he cares about, including, but not limited to,6 theories about virtue and 
happiness.  Anyone who rejects this will likely be unsympathetic with my approach.   
Finally, I am concerned with explicating Socrates’ philosophical commitments, 
rather than my own (i.e., rather than commitments I take to be true or plausible).  
Sometimes these will overlap, and I firmly believe that investigating Socrates’ 
commitments requires doing some serious philosophical work beyond just 
regurgitating a bunch of texts.  But ultimately both the problems and solutions should 
be understood as falling within the scope of Socratic philosophy. 
 
 
1.2. Two problems about virtue and happiness 
With these assumptions on the table, then, I put forward two problems7 to 
serve as focal points of our investigation.  To suggest that the subject of the present 
inquiry into Socratic virtue and Socratic happiness can be summed up in just two 
                                                
5 For a justification of the Socratic dialogues as a genuine class of Plato’s dialogues, the inclusion of the 
Euthydemus in this class, and some specific implications of this grouping for the interpretation of the 
Euthydemus, see chapter 2, section 2.3. 
6 Vlastos (1991, p. 14) famously claimed that Socrates’ sole concern was with ethics.  The 
implausibility of this claim has been demonstrated by a growing body of literature on Socrates’ 
epistemological and metaphysical concerns.  Leading contributions to this literature include Benson 
2000 and Prior 2004.  Even if one takes the view that Socrates’ epistemological and metaphysical 
pursuits are ultimately done in the service of ethics, it is plain that Socrates’ philosophical 
sophistication extends well beyond ethics. 
7 I mean ‘problems’ in the Aristotelian sense of questions or puzzles to be answered.   
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problems would be misleading at best, and I don’t mean to suggest any such thing.  
However, putting forward at the outset two problems about virtue and happiness will 
serve to focus the investigation to follow.  Both problems concern Socrates’ position 
on the connection between virtue and happiness.  But, as readers of Socrates will be 
well aware, achieving insight into the relationship between Socratic virtue and 
happiness will also require investigation of the nature of virtue, and of the nature of 
happiness.   
 
1.2.1.  Problem 1:  Necessity and sufficiency 
 The first problem can be formulated broadly as follows: 
 
Problem 1:  Is virtue necessary and/or sufficient for happiness? 
 
We can offer an initial restatement of Problem 1 into two parts:  (i) Is virtue 
always part of the explanation of happiness, whenever happiness obtains? and (ii) Is 
the obtaining of virtue enough to guarantee happiness?  Even this is somewhat 
ambiguous.  Most discussion of Problem 1 centers on whether, for some person, that 
person’s being virtuous is a requirement for his being happy; and whether that 
person’s being virtuous guarantees his being happy.  That is, a central aim of our 
investigation will be to discover the connection between virtue and happiness in an 
individual.  But even though Problem 1 is most often read in a way that restricts the 
scope of the relationship between virtue and happiness to its relationship within an 
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individual, Problem 1 can also be read in a way that does not so restrict the scope of 
the relationship.  In the course of a thorough investigation of the problem, then, we 
shall also find occasion to consider the following specification of Problem 1:  For 
some specific person, (a) is it a requirement of his being happy that someone’s (not 
necessarily his own) virtue be operative in producing his happiness, and (b) is 
someone’s (not necessarily his own) virtue being operative in the right sort of way 
sufficient for guaranteeing his happiness.  There is at least one piece of evidence that 
such a specification of Problem 1 is worth considering.  Socrates often likens virtue to 
a craft, and one paradigmatic example of a craft is medicine.  Clearly a physician can 
put his knowledge to work to produce health in a patient, even if the patient is not 
herself a physician.  Perhaps, then, virtue is like medicine in this respect, so that a 
virtuous person can apply his virtue in such a way as to make others happy, even if 
those others are not themselves virtuous. 
Put more formally, we seek to determine the truth value of the following 
claims: 
 
(i) For any person P, if P is happy then P is virtuous. 
(ii) For any person P, if P is virtuous then P is happy. 
(a) For any person P, if P is happy then someone’s virtue was operative in 
producing P’s happiness. 





Furthermore, if we determine that any of these claims is true, then we will want to 
know why it is true.  We will want to know, for example, whether the necessity and/or 
sufficiency relation is due to the very definitions of virtue and happiness (i.e., an 
analytic relationship), or to certain logically contingent facts about the world (i.e., a 
nomological relationship).  
 
1.2.2.  A challenge to Problem 1 
Problem 1 has been much discussed by Plato scholars.  Each of the following 
four positions on (i) and (ii) (above) is possible, and at least three of these have been 
attributed to Socrates:8  
 
(1)  Virtue is necessary but not sufficient for happiness. 
(2)  Virtue is sufficient but not necessary for happiness. 
(3)  Virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness.  
(4)  Virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness. 
 
 Recently, Naomi Reshotko has offered a challenge to each of these views by 
arguing that the text underdetermines Socrates’ commitment to either an analytical or 
                                                
8 See section 1.3, below.  The one that has not, to my knowledge, been attributed to Socrates is (2).  But 
it is easy to see how it might arise in the context of a dialogue like the Republic.  Perhaps the 
philosopher-kings, who are fully virtuous, are thereby guaranteed happiness.  But Plato also seems at 
times to allow that citizens of other classes, who presumably do not fully possess virtue, might 
nevertheless achieve some measure of happiness. 
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a nomological connection as strong as necessity or sufficiency.9  The text, she argues, 
is consistent with such a connection, but it is also consistent with the weaker notions 
of ‘tending to necessity’ and ‘tending to sufficiency’.  If Reshotko is correct about 
this, then there would seem to be possible interpretations involving ‘tending to 
necessity’ and ‘tending to sufficiency’ parallel to the interpretations involving full 
necessity and sufficiency above.  The notions of tending to necessity and tending to 
sufficiency can be defined as follows (more on this below): 
 
(TN)  P tends to necessity for Q just in case Pr(P!Q) > Pr(P!~Q), i.e. just in 
case Q is positively statistically relevant to P.10 
 
(TS)  P tends to sufficiency for Q just in case Pr(Q!P) > Pr(Q!~P), i.e. just in 
case P is positively statistically relevant to Q. 
 
On these definitions, if P is fully necessary for Q (and P is not a tautology), then P 
tends to necessity for Q.  And if P is fully sufficient for Q (and Q is not a tautology), 
then P tends to sufficiency for Q.  To distinguish probabilistic from non-probabilistic 
connections, define ‘merely tending to necessity’ as tending to necessity without being 
fully necessary.  And define ‘merely tending to sufficiency’ as tending to sufficiency 
                                                
9 Reshotko 2006 pp. 135-142.  It is not clear to me whether her claim is meant to be true of all the 
Socratic dialogues, or is rather to be restricted to the Euthydemus.  Either way, it is worth considering, 
as the Euthydemus will be the main focus of our investigation. 
10 A note on notation:  ‘Pr(P)’ is to be read as ‘the probability of P’, and ‘Pr(P!Q)’ is to be read as ‘the 
probability of P given Q)’.  See Skyrms 2000, pp. 134-135, for a discussion of the notions of tending to 
necessity and tending to sufficiency. 
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without being fully sufficient.  Now, using all these notions, we can fill out our list as 
follows, replacing (1) – (3) with more detailed theses: 
 
(4)  Virtue is fully necessary and fully sufficient for happiness. 
(5)  Virtue is fully necessary but merely tends to sufficiency for happiness. 
(6)  Virtue is fully necessary but does not tend to sufficiency for happiness. 
(7)  Virtue merely tends to necessity but is fully sufficient for happiness. 
(8)  Virtue merely tends to necessity and merely tends to sufficiency for 
happiness. 
(9)  Virtue merely tends to necessity but does not tend to sufficiency for 
happiness.  
(10)  Virtue does not tend to necessity but is fully sufficient for happiness. 
(11)  Virtue does not tend to necessity but merely tends to sufficiency for 
happiness. 
(12)  Virtue neither tends to necessity nor tends to sufficiency for happiness.  
 
That leaves a total of nine possible interpretations.  While Reshotko does not 
canvas all these possibilities, there is reason to conclude from her discussion that these 
exhaust the possibilities, and that we should begin an investigation with these in view.  
But Reshotko turns to other grounds, particularly the probability calculus, to argue that 
charity requires that we narrow the choices.  Specifically, there is reason to reject (5), 
(7), (9), and (11). 
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Reshotko is half right on this score.  The probability calculus licenses 
narrowing our list by excluding (9) and (11) (and, additionally, it licenses excluding 
(6) and (10)).  But it does not license excluding (5) and (7).  This is a crucial point for 
my interpretation, since I will argue, against Reshotko’s position that the text 
underdetermines the attribution of any of these positions to Socrates, that the most 
plausible reading of the Euthydemus supports (5).  So it would be a shame if (5) were 
incoherent given some basic axioms of the probability calculus.  Fortunately, it is not, 
and though the case can be made formally, the basic point is intuitive.  Oxygen is fully 
necessary for fire, and the presence of oxygen raises the probability of the presence of 
fire, but does not fully suffice for it.  This is a fully coherent instance of the following 
schema:  A is fully necessary but merely tends to sufficiency for B.  Since (5) is also 
an instance of this schema, there is no reason to rule it out on formal grounds alone. 
 
 
1.2.3.  Problem 2:  The nature of the relationship 
The second problem is related to the first: 
 
Problem 2:  What is the explanatory connection between virtue and happiness? 
 
It is difficult to put the problem both clearly and succinctly, so let me 
elaborate.  Suppose that virtue and happiness bear some explanatory relationship to 
one another.  The relationship is usually thought of in terms of virtue factoring into the 
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explanation of happiness, and this will be the direction of explanation with which we 
will primarily be concerned.  Such a relationship might take many different forms.  
There might be a purely instrumental relationship between them.  When a teenager 
mows lawns all summer in order to buy a car, there is an explanatory relationship 
between his mowing lawns and his buying a car.  Mowing lawns is an activity done 
for an entirely different, but explanatorily related, end:  buying a car.  Mowing lawns 
is not done for its own sake; it is done because of its instrumental value for obtaining a 
car.   
Alternatively, virtue might be constitutive of happiness, and constitutive in one 
of two ways:  partly or wholly.  To return to the previous example, consider the 
explanatory relationship between mowing lawns and making money.  It seems that 
mowing lawns is constitutive of making money.  That is, at least part of the activity of 
making money is constituted by mowing lawns.  Mowing lawns is only partly 
constitutive of making money since there are other ways of making money.  Besides 
this, we might think that making money is comprised of both the work and the 
agreement of payment for the work, so that the agreement and the work would each be 
partially constitutive of making money. But a clearer example of partial constitution 
might be the eggs in a cake.  The eggs are explanatorily related to the cake, but not in 
a purely instrumental way (as is the pan, for example).  The eggs are part of the cake.  
But they only partially constitute the cake; other constituents include flour, sugar, and 
oil.  Contrast this with H2O, which wholly constitutes water.  Indeed, it is quite 
natural to say that water is identical to H20. 
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So, if virtue and happiness are explanatorily related, they could be so related in 
at least three different ways:  virtue could be instrumental for, partially constitutive of, 
or wholly constitutive of (i.e., identical to) happiness.  Which of these one settles on as 
the correct answer to Problem 2 will partially depend on – or, more accurately, be 
partially interdependent with – the answer one gives to Problem 1.  But there is little 
strict logical connection between the answers to these two problems.  If one gives as 
an answer to Problem 2 that virtue is identical to happiness, then one is committed to 
giving as an answer to Problem 1 that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for 
happiness.  But with this single exception, though some pairs of answers – one to 
Problem 1 and one to Problem 2 – fit more naturally together, each pair is logically 
consistent.      
 
1.3.  Texts on and interpretations of Socratic virtue and happiness 
 It is undeniable that Socrates places extremely high value on virtue.  Consider 
the following passage from Plato’s Apology.  Here Socrates is in the middle of his 
defense, and he tells the jurors how he would respond if they offered to acquit him on 
the condition that he cease to practice philosophy. 
 
[T1] 
I will certainly not cease practicing philosophy ("! µ" #$%&'µ$( )(*+&+),-) 
and exhorting (#$.$/0*012µ0-23) you and pointing out (4-50(/-%µ0-+3) to 
whomever among you I ever happen upon that – speaking in my usual way – 
“You, good man, are an Athenian, of the city that is greatest and most 
esteemed for wisdom and power (063 &+)7$- /$8 6&9%-).  Aren’t you then 
ashamed of your taking care to possess as much wealth as possible, as well as 
esteem and honor, while you take no care or thought for wisdom ().+-:&0'3) 
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and truth and the best condition of your soul (;<3 =19<3 >#'3 '?3 @0*;7&;A 
B&;$()?”  And if one of you disputes this and claims to care, I will not let him 
go or leave him immediately, but I will question, examine, and test him 
(4.:&+µ$( $!;C- /$8 4D0;E&' /$8 4*FGD'); and if it doesn’t seem to me that 
he has acquired virtue (/0/;<&H$( I.0;:-), as he claims, I will reproach him 
because he treats the most valuable things as the least, and the inferior as the 
greater.  I will do these things with whomever I happen upon, both young and 
old, and stranger and citizen, but more so with citizens because you are nearer 
relations to me.  For the god commands these things – know that well – and I 
think there is no greater good for you (+!5F- #' JµK- µ0KL+- IG$HC- 
G0-F&H$() in the city than my service to the god (;"- 4µ"- ;M H0M 
J#A.0&7$-).  For I go around doing nothing other than persuading you, both 
young and old, to care for neither bodies nor wealth before or as zealously as 
for the most excellent condition of your soul (µ:;0 &'µE;'- 4#(µ0*0(N&H$( 
µ:;0 9.AµE;'- #.2;0.+- µA5O +P;' &)25.$ Q3 ;<3 =19<3 >#'3 Q3 
I.7&;A B&;$(), saying, “Virtue does not come from wealth, but wealth and all 
the other goods for men – both private and public – come from virtue” (R!/ 4/ 
9.AµE;'- I.0;" G7G-0;$(, I** S 4D I.0;<3 9.:µ$;$ /$8 ;T U**$ IG$HT 
;+K3 I-H.V#+(3 W#$-;$ /$8 657X /$8 5Aµ+&7X)11.   Ap. 29d-30b12 
 
 In this passage, Socrates makes it clear that we are to attach greater importance 
to virtue (the best/most excellent condition of the soul) than to wealth, esteem and 
honor, and the excellent condition of the body.  That is to say, virtue deserves the 
highest place among the things we care about.  Socrates is so committed to the 
overwhelming importance of virtue that he spends all his time going around exhorting 
and persuading people to care for virtue above such things as wealth.  He goes so far 
as to claim that virtue is not only more important than wealth and other goods, but is 
actually the source of them, while they are not in turn a source of virtue.  
                                                
11 It is also possible to render this with a somewhat different sense, as in the Grube/Cooper translation:  
“Wealth does not bring about virtue, but virtue makes wealth and everything else good for men, both 
individually and collectively.”   
12 Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.  I follow the texts of the Oxford Classical Texts 
volumes unless otherwise noted. 
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Dozens of passages could be marshaled from all over the Platonic corpus 
which reveal Socrates making similar claims on behalf of virtue, but this one suffices 
for now to show his commitment.  Moreover, virtually all scholars agree that virtue is 
importantly related to happiness in Socratic philosophy.  But different scholars come 
to very different conclusions about just what that relationship is.  That is, they answer 
Problems 1 and 2 in a number of different ways.  And they appeal to a variety of texts 
to support those conclusions.  Here I survey some of the prominent texts and 
arguments.  As the interpretation of the Euthydemus in chapters two through four is 
intended to shed fresh and crucially important light on these very texts and the various 
interpretations of them, I save the task of adjudicating between these interpretations 
primarily for the last chapter of the dissertation. 
 
 
1.3.1.  The necessity of virtue for happiness 
 A number of texts across several dialogues suggest that Socrates thought that 
virtue is necessary for happiness.  For the moment, an examination of two of these will 
suffice, though we will encounter others, some of which we will examine in detail.  
Consider the following passage from the Crito.  Crito has come to persuade Socrates 
to escape prison, and Socrates is arguing against his assertion that they should pay 
attention to the opinion of the majority when deciding on the right course of action.  





Socrates:  So with other matters, not to enumerate them all, and certainly with 
actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we 
are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or 
that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things and before 
whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others?  If we do not 
follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is 
improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions.  Or is there nothing 
in this? 
Crito:  I think there certainly is, Socrates. 
Socrates:  Come now, if we ruin that which is improved by health and 
corrupted by disease by not following the opinions of those who know, is life 
worth living for us when that is ruined?  And that is the body, is it not? 
Crito:  Yes. 
Socrates:  And is life worth living with a body that is corrupted and in a bad 
condition? 
Crito:  In no way. 
Socrates:  And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that 
unjust action harms and just action benefits?  Or do we think that part of us, 
whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the 
body? 
Crito:  Not at all. 
Socrates:  It is more valuable? 
Crito:  Much more. 
Socrates:  We should not then think so much of what the majority will say 
about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, 
that is, and the truth itself.  Crito 47c-48a  (Grube trans.) 
 
This passage suggests the following Argument for the Necessity of Justice (ANJ): 
 
(ANJ-1)  If we fail to follow the directions of the one who knows about justice 
and injustice, then we will harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is 
improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions. 
(ANJ-2)  If we fail to act in accordance with justice, we corrupt our soul.  
(restatement of ANJ-1) 
(ANJ-3)  Life is not worth living for us with a corrupt soul. 
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(ANJ-4)  So, if we fail to act in accordance with justice, then life is not worth 
living for us.  (from ANJ-2, ANJ-3) 
(ANJ-5)  So, if life is worth living for us, then we act in accordance with 
justice.  (from ANJ-4) 
 
(ANJ-1) is supported on the basis of an analogy with health and the body.  (Some of 
this support comes in the lines immediately preceding the text quoted in [T2]).  
Following the direction of the expert on bodily health facilitates the good condition of 
the body, while failing to follow the expert’s direction leads to the deterioration of 
bodily health.  Just so, following the direction of the expert on justice facilitates the 
good condition of that part of humans which is affected by just and unjust actions, 
while failing to follow the expert’s direction leads to the corruption of that part.  While 
it is not explicitly stated in [T2], it is plain that the part in question is the soul.  And, 
clearly, to follow the expert’s direction is to act in accordance with justice, and to fail 
to follow the expert’s direction is to fail to act in accordance with justice.  So, (ANJ-1) 
can be restated more succinctly and forcefully as (ANJ-2).  (ANJ-3) is also established 
on analogy with the body.  Life with a corrupt body is not worth living.  But the soul 
is even more important than the body.  So, life with a corrupt soul must not be worth 
living, either.  ‘Worth living’ is plausibly taken to be equivalent to ‘happy’, but we 
need not admit this equivalence to see the strong connection with happiness here.  For 
it is surely true that a life that is not worth living is not a happy one, and so (ANJ-3) 
would entail that life is not happy with a corrupt soul.  From (ANJ-2) and (ANJ-3) it 
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follows straightforwardly that life is not worth living for us if we fail to act in 
accordance with justice.  (ANJ-5) is simply the contrapositive of this, but makes the 
necessity in question clearer:  Acting in accordance with justice is a necessary 
condition for having a life worth living, and so is a necessary condition for happiness.  
Since to act in accordance with justice is to act in accordance with (at least a part of) 
virtue, acting in accordance with virtue is a necessary condition for happiness.   
 Whatever we may think about the soundness of ANJ, it certainly appears that 
Socrates is giving something very like this argument in [T2], and this is strong 
evidence that he is committed to the necessity of justice for happiness.  This is not 
quite an explicit claim about virtue in general, but it is at least suggestive of the 
general claim.  Other texts support the general claim about virtue.  Consider the 
following passage, which occurs near the end of the Charmides.     
 
[T3] 
Socrates:  All this time you’ve been leading me right round in a circle and 
concealing from me that it was not living knowledgably that was making us 
fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the knowledges put together, 
but that we have to have this one knowledge of good and evil.  Because, 
Critias, if you consent to take away this knowledge from the other knowledges, 
will medicine any the less produce health, or cobbling produce shoes, or the art 
of weaving produce clothes, or will the pilot’s art any the less prevent us from 
dying at sea or the general’s art in war? 
Critias:  They will do it just the same. 
Socrates:  But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of these things well 
and beneficially done will have vanished if this is lacking.  Charm. 174b-d 
(Sprague trans., with changes) 
 
Here Socrates tells us that we “have to have” the knowledge of good and evil in order 
to “fare well and be happy”.  Without it, our chance of doing things “well and 
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beneficially . . . will have vanished”.  That the knowledge of good and evil just is 
virtue is clear from what Socrates says in the Laches: 
 
[T4] 
Socrates:  And now it appears, according to your view, that courage is the 
knowledge not just of the fearful and the hopeful, but in your own opinion, it 
would be the knowledge of practically all goods and evils put together.  Do 
you agree to this new change, Nicias, or what do you say? 
Nicias:  That seems right to me Socrates. 
Socrates:  Then does a man with this kind of knowledge seem to depart from 
virtue in any respect if he really knows, in the case of all goods whatsoever, 
what they are and will be and have been, and similarly in the case of evils?  
And do you regard that man as lacking in temperance or justice and holiness to 
whom alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly with both gods and men 
with respect to both the fearful and its opposite, and to provide himself with 
good things through his knowledge of how to associate with them correctly? 
Nicias:  I think you have a point, Socrates. 
Socrates:  Then the thing you are now talking about, Nicias, would not be a 
part of virtue but rather virtue entire.  Lach. 199c-e (Sprague trans.) 
 
Earlier, Socrates and Nicias had agreed that courage was a proper part of virtue.  
Socrates here shows Nicias that his definition of courage, which amounts to defining 
courage as knowledge of all goods and evils, violates their earlier agreement.  For 
knowledge of all goods and evils is virtue as a whole, but a correct definition of 
courage should pick out only a part of virtue. 
 This makes it clear that in [T3] Socrates is making a claim about the whole of 
virtue.  Indeed, he is explicitly making the claim that virtue is necessary for happiness.  
Though his commitment to this necessity claim is our primary concern right now, and 
though his argument in [T3] for that commitment is somewhat obscure, it is worth 
trying to extract that argument.  This passage (along with the surrounding parts of the 
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Charmides), suggests something along the lines of the following Argument for 
Necessity (AN): 
 
(AN-1)  With or without the episteme (knowledge) of virtue, the other 
epistemai (knowledges) will do their appropriate work just the same.  (E.g., 
medicine will produce health, cobbling will produce shoes, pilots will make 
safe at sea, etc.) 
(AN-2)  Without virtue, none of the work of the other epistemai will be 
beneficial to us. 
(AN-3)  Without benefit, we are not happy. 
(AN-4)  So, without virtue, none of the work of the other epistemai will result 
in our happiness.  (from AN-2 and AN-3) 
(AN-5)  Virtue is the episteme whose function is to benefit us. 
(AN-6)  So, without virtue, we are not benefitted.  (from AN-5) 
(AN-7)  So, without virtue, we are not happy.  (from AN-3 and AN-6) 
(AN-8)  So, if we are happy, then we are virtuous.  (from AN-7) 
 
Technically, the discussion of the other epistemai (AN-1, AN-2, and (AN-4) does no 
essential work in AN.  But it does function to contrast these with virtue as the sole 
episteme whose function is to benefit, for all the other epistemai can perform their 
work without benefitting us.  Again, regardless of our assessment of AN either with 
respect to our attribution of it to Socrates or with respect to its soundness, in [T3] 
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Socrates seems to be committed to (AN-8).  [T2] and [T3], then, provide strong 
evidence that Socrates is committed to the necessity of virtue for happiness.  In what 
follows, we will encounter more texts that bear on the necessity thesis. 
 
1.3.2.  Brickhouse and Smith against necessity 
 Most scholars accept that Socrates held to the necessity of virtue for happiness, 
on the above or similar grounds.  However, Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith 
argue against this position.13  It is a clear Socratic commitment that moral knowledge 
is necessary for virtue.  But Socrates repeatedly disclaims possessing moral 
knowledge.  It follows that Socrates himself is not virtuous.  But in the Apology 
Socrates claims to be good, and suggests that his goodness is sufficient for happiness.  
So, Socrates is happy.  But if all this is correct, it follows that virtue is not necessary 
for happiness. 
 The argument has prima facie plausibility.  Certainly Socrates thinks that 
moral knowledge is necessary for virtue.  Indeed, we can attribute a stronger position 
than that to Socrates:  Virtue just is moral knowledge (of a certain sort).  Evidence for 
that comes from all over the dialogues, where virtue itself, as well as individual 
virtues, is identified as knowledge of good and evil.14  Most scholars take Socrates to 
hold to some version of the unity of virtue.  Some15 take him to hold a very strong 
version of this thesis, according to which there is only one virtue, though it is called by 
                                                
13 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 123-134. 
14 See e.g., Laches 199, Charmides 174, Euthydemus 288-292.  For commentary on the Euthydemus 
passage, see chapter 4 below. 
15 E.g., Terry Penner 1973. 
 
 23 
many names:  i.e., virtue = wisdom = justice = courage = temperance = piety.  On this 
view, to possess knowledge of good and evil is to possess the whole of virtue, and to 
possess virtue is to possess knowledge of good and evil.  Others take Socrates to hold 
a weaker view on the unity of the virtues, such that the virtues are not identical, but 
one either possess all of the virtues or none of them.  Evidence that Socrates is 
committed to at least the weaker view comes from the Laches and the Gorgias.  At 
Laches 199d-e (see [T4], above), Socrates asserts that the person who has the 
knowledge of good and evil would have temperance, justice, piety, and courage.  At 
Gorgias 507c, Socrates says that the temperate person will also be just and brave and 
pious, and so completely good.  The implicit ground for this claim is that the virtues 
come as a package.  Wisdom, which is left off both the Laches list and the Gorgias 
list, is plausibly identified with the whole of virtue.  Two pieces of evidence for this 
identification are (i) the ready-made conceptual connection between wisdom and 
knowledge (whereas the connection must be argued for in the case of courage, etc.) 
and (ii) the easy slippage between ‘virtue’ and ‘knowledge’ in the Euthydemus16.  
Since Socrates thinks that virtue just is moral knowledge, and since he repeatedly 
disclaims possessing moral knowledge (e.g., Ap. 21b1-d7, Euthyphro 5a3-c7, La. 
186b8-c5, Gorg. 509c4-7), it follows that he does not take himself to be virtuous. 
 The crux of Brickhouse and Smith’s case is to argue that the Apology shows 
that one can be good and happy without being virtuous.  Despite claiming at Ap. 21b1-
d7 that he does not possess moral knowledge, Socrates seems to take himself to be 
                                                
16 See chapters 3 and 4, below. 
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 “Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more 
than yourselves.  Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he 
could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be 
harmed by a worse; certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or 
disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think to be great harm, but I do 
not think so.  I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is 
doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly.”  (Ap. 30c-d; Grube 
trans.) 
 




You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and 
keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or 
in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods.  What has happened 
to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for 
me to die now and to escape from trouble.  That is why my divine sign did not 
oppose me at any point.”  (Ap. 41b-d; Grube trans.) 
 
Since Socrates’ goodness seems to guarantee that he cannot be harmed, and since one 
who is never harmed (and generally attains what is ‘better’) is plausibly thought to be 
happy, Brickhouse and Smith conclude that Socrates is happy.  But since Socrates’ 
goodness does not consist in virtue, virtue must not be necessary for happiness. 
 We have surveyed several texts ([T2] – [T4]) which strongly indicate that 
Socrates held that virtue is necessary for happiness, as well as some ([T5] and [T6]) 
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which seem to indicate that that Socrates held that virtue is not necessary for 
happiness.  Since one of our assumptions at the outset of this study was that the 
Socrates of Plato’s Socratic dialogues offers a systematic and coherent philosophical 
system, we should attempt to reinterpret at least some of the apparently conflicting 
textual evidence in a way that resolves the tension.  But which thesis is the Socratic 
one – that virtue is necessary for happiness, or that it is not – and which set of texts is 
the most plausible candidate for reinterpretation?  I will argue in chapter two that the 
Euthydemus provides a key to answering these questions. 
 
1.3.3.  The sufficiency of virtue for happiness 
 In the preceding sections, we have been considering various texts primarily as 
they bear on one part of Problem 1.  That is, we have been considering the question 
whether virtue is necessary for happiness.  But this is not to answer the question why 
virtue is (or is not) necessary for happiness.  That is, it is not to provide an answer to 
Problem 2, which concerns the explanatory connection between virtue and happiness.  
If virtue is necessary for happiness, this is consistent with at least the following 
answers to the explanatory question.  
 
 (i)  Virtue is identical to (i.e., the sole constituent of) happiness. 
 (ii)  Virtue is an essential, but not the only, constituent of happiness. 
(iii)  Virtue is not itself a constituent of happiness, but it provides the 
constituents of happiness. 
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  These three answers to Problem 2 are also related to the sufficiency question.  
Generally, evidence for the sufficiency thesis is given in terms of evidence for one of 
these three theses.  So, if we find evidence that virtue is identical to happiness, we 
have thereby found evidence that it is sufficient for happiness.  And if we find 
evidence that virtue is an essential constituent of happiness, and that its contribution to 
happiness is sufficiently strong that it guarantees a share of happiness, then we have 
thereby found evidence that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  And if we find evidence 
that virtue is not itself a constituent of happiness, but that it infallibly provides the 
constituents of happiness, then we have thereby found evidence that virtue is sufficient 
for happiness.  Arguments for each of these have been given, and I will address each 
in turn. 
 
1.3.3.1.  The identity of virtue and happiness 
 I begin with the strongest of the three theses:  that virtue is identical to, or the 
sole constituent of, happiness.  This was the position of many philosophers of the 
ancient world, and among these there were many who took themselves to be following 
Socrates on this matter.  Antisthenes, an associate of Socrates, affirmed the identity of 
virtue and happiness and passed this view on to his philosophical descendants, the 
Cynics.  More famously, the Stoics affirmed both the truth of the identity thesis and its 
status as Socratic.  Anthony Long reminds us: “The Stoics’ hardest and most notorious 
thesis was that genuine and complete happiness requires nothing except moral virtue.  
And on this, above all, they looked to Socrates who had famously said at his trial:  ‘No 
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harm can come to the good man in life or in death, and his circumstances are not 
ignored by the gods’” (Ap. 41d; [T6] above).17  Further evidence for the thesis comes 
from the Crito: 
 
[T7]   
Socrates:  And now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, 
but living well (;C 0Y L<-) which we ought to consider most important. 
Crito:  We do hold to it. 
Socrates:  And that living well and living justly are the same thing (ZC 5O 0Y 
/$8 /$*,3 /$8 5(/$7'3 [;( ;$!;2- 4&;(-), do we hold to that, or not? 
Crito:  We do. 
Socrates:  Then we agree that the question is whether it is just for me to try to 
escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not just.  And if 
it appears to be just, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up.  (Crito 48b; 
Fowler trans. with changes) 
 
In this passage, we apparently find an identification of the happy life with the just life.  
This is strongly suggestive of the identity thesis. 
Mark McPherran notes that the Apology and Crito, important Socratic texts for 
the Stoics because of the exemplary way Socrates behaved in the face of death, were 
perhaps not even the most important Socratic sources for the Stoic identification of 
virtue and happiness:  “[T]he Euthydemus began to be seen as the locus classicus for 
the sufficiency of virtue thesis beginning no later than with the Stoics, for in its key, 
initial protreptic section (277d-282e) they found a Socratic endorsement for their own 
central tenet that virtue is the only good-in-itself.”18  In particular, Socrates’ claims 
that “wisdom is surely good fortune” (279d; Sprague trans.) and that “of the other 
                                                
17 Long 2004. 
18 McPherran 2005, p. 49. 
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things [health, wealth, etc.], no one of them is either good or bad, but of these two, 
wisdom is good and ignorance bad” (281e; Sprague trans.) have been taken to support 
the Stoic position.  As the Euthydemus is the central text of the present study, much of 
chapter three will bear on the question of just how closely Socratic and Stoic ethics 
align. 
 It is not only the ancient philosophers who attribute the identity thesis to 
Socrates.  Though it is not the majority view among current scholars, Scott Senn has 
recently made the case for such an attribution in a particularly clear way.19  Senn’s 
strategy is to argue that the Apology shows that Socrates considers virtue to be an 
intrinsic good, and that the Crito not only corroborates this, but shows that he 
considers virtue to be the only intrinsic good.  On the plausible assumption that one is 
happy if and only if he possesses enough intrinsic goods, it follows that one is happy if 
and only if he possesses virtue.  And on the plausible assumption that to be happy just 
is to possess intrinsic goods (of the right sort and to the right degree), it follows that to 
be happy just is to possess virtue.  That is, the identity thesis follows. 
 The argument from the Apology rests on Socrates’ attempts to console those 
who care about him in the face of apparent harms.  In [T5] (Ap. 30c-d), Socrates 
assures his audience that a better man cannot be harmed by a worse.  According to 
Senn, the statement carries the fairly plain implication that he is good and his accusers 
are not, and so they cannot harm him whatever they may do.  And in [T6] (Ap. 41d), 
after he has been sentenced, Socrates reassures his supporters that “a good man cannot 
be harmed either in life or in death.”  Again, according to Senn, here we find the fairly 
                                                
19 Senn 2005. 
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plain indication that Socrates takes himself to be a good man.  Senn takes this to imply 
that Socrates thinks himself virtuous, and claims that we should conclude from these 
passages that Socrates thinks that “some have a happiness that cannot be taken away 
even if all they possess is virtue.”20  Senn rejects attempts to draw contrary 
conclusions from these passages on the grounds that the competing interpretations are 
either non-literal or fail to qualify as a genuine consolation.  So, Brickhouse and Smith 
interpret these passages as meaning that no harm can come to a good man’s soul, 
though there are nevertheless harms that can come to a good man.21  And Vlastos 
interprets these passages as meaning that no great harm can come to a virtuous person, 
though he may suffer minor evils.22  But both of these interpretations must read 
Socrates’ claims in a non-literal way.  At face value, Socrates’ claims are categorical:  
No harm can come to any good person at all, whether while he is alive or when he is 
dead.23  Penner, on the other hand, interprets these passages as meaning that Socrates’ 
accusers cannot artfully harm him because they lack knowledge, though they might act 
in ways that harm Socrates accidentally.24  While this again seems to fail to read 
Socrates’ claims literally, Senn’s main complaint against this interpretation is that 
Socrates’ claims hardly count as offering consolation if they allow that Socrates’ 
accusers may well harm him, though if they do it will be due to chance rather than the 
skillful fulfillment of their intentions.  Senn concludes that his own interpretation, that 
the Apology shows that Socrates considers virtue to be an intrinsic good sufficient for 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
21 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, pp. 135-6. 
22 Vlastos 1991, pp. 218-221. 
23 More on these competing interpretations below and in chapter 5. 
24 Penner 1997, p. 154. 
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happiness, gains the upper hand because it can read Socrates’ words both literally and 
as a genuine consolation.  
 
1.3.3.2  Vlastos on the sovereignty of virtue 
 Vlastos attributes to Socrates a view which he labels “the sovereignty of 
virtue”.25  His view gets its primary impetus from three passages. 
 
[T8] 
Socrates:  Man, you don’t speak well, if you believe that a man worth anything 
at all would give countervailing weight to danger of life or death, or give 
consideration to anything but this when he acts:  whether his action is just or 
unjust, the action of a good or of an evil man.  (Ap. 28b5-9; Vlastos trans.) 
 
[T9] 
Socrates:  This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens:  Wherever a man 
posts himself on his own conviction that this is best or on orders from his 
commander, there, I do believe, he should remain, giving no countervailing 
weight to death or anything else when the alternative is to act basely.  (Ap. 
28d6-10; Vlastos trans.) 
 
[T10] 
Socrates:  But for us, since the argument thus compels us the only thing we 
should consider is . . . whether we would be acting justly . . . or, in truth, 
unjustly . . .  And if it should become evident that this action is unjust, then the 
fact that by staying here I would die or suffer anything else whatever should be 
given no countervailing weight when the alternative is to act unjustly.  (Crito 
48c6-d5; Vlastos trans.) 
 
The principle Vlastos identifies in these texts is this:  “Whenever we must choose 
between exclusive and exhaustive alternatives which we have come to perceive as, 
respectively, just and unjust or, more generally, as virtuous and vicious, this very 
                                                
25 See esp. Vlastos 1991, pp. 200-232. 
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perception of them should decide our choice.”26  Gaining any set of non-moral goods – 
life, lack of suffering, etc. – cannot offset the loss of a moral good, virtue.  As Vlastos 
puts it:  “Virtue being the sovereign good in our domain of value, its claim upon us is 
always final.”27 
 So, we now have the idea that the value of virtue is always greater than the total 
combination of value of anything else, but we have not yet answered the question 
whether virtue alone is sufficient to make us happy.  Indeed, we have not yet arrived at 
a view that is obviously different than the identity thesis, provided that we do not read 
too much into the idea that there are non-moral goods.  (Strictly speaking, an identity 
theorist would not likely countenance talk of non-moral goods.)  But Vlastos gives us 
several reasons to think that virtue is the dominating, but not the sole, constituent of 
happiness.  There are three main sorts of reasons.  First, Vlastos goes through the 
passages the seem to support the identity of virtue and happiness, and argues that they 
can all be read in a way that commits Socrates only to the mutual entailment of virtue 
and happiness.  (It is here that Senn will object to a non-literal understanding of what 
Socrates says.)  Second, Vlastos argues that there are philosophical reasons for 
rejecting the identity thesis.  On the one hand, it is implausible to think that non-moral 
considerations have no bearing on one’s happiness.  But the identity thesis implies the 
improbable view that, as Vlastos memorably puts it, it should make no difference to 
me whether the sheets I sleep on are freshly cleaned or vomit-soaked, nor should it 
make a difference to me whether I spend my life as an inmate of Gulag or as an inmate 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 210. 
27 Ibid., p. 211. 
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of a Cambridge college.  On the other hand, eudaimonism is supposed to explain all 
our actions in terms of their perceived contribution to happiness.  But many of the 
choices we make in life do not involve a choice between virtue and vice.  If virtue and 
vice are the only things that affect happiness, then we are left with no way of 
explaining, and no rational way of making, choices between things that do not affect 
virtue.  Finally, there is plenty of evidence that Socrates accepts that there are non-
instrumental goods other than virtue.  At Euthydemus 279a-b, for example, Socrates 
identifies the following as “good for us”:  wealth, health, good looks, noble birth, 
power, honor, self-control, justice, bravery, and wisdom.  And at Gorgias 467e-468b 
he seems to imply that these are things worth choosing for their own sake, and that 
things that are neither good nor bad are chosen for the sake of these.  But if health, 
wealth, and the rest are goods, it must be the case that they make some contribution to 
happiness.  And so, virtue is not the only constituent of happiness. 
 So, on Vlastos’ view virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness.  But 
since there is evidence that virtue is not identical to happiness, it must be the case that 
though virtue alone suffices for happiness, the presence or absence of other goods 
have at least some small effect on the degree of one’s happiness.  Virtue is the 
dominating, but not the only, constituent of happiness.     
 
1.3.3.3.  Irwin’s argument for necessity, sufficiency, and instrumentality 
 Irwin, like Senn and Vlastos, thinks that virtue is necessary and sufficient for 
happiness, but the explanatory connection he finds between virtue and happiness is 
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very different.28  Whereas Senn and Vlastos both interpret Socrates as holding that 
virtue is a constituent of happiness (Senn, the only constituent; Vlastos, the dominant 
constituent), and so that virtue is an intrinsic good, Irwin interprets Socrates as holding 
that virtue is a purely instrumental good.  On Irwin’s view, then, virtue is an infallible 
and indispensable instrumental means to happiness.   
 Irwin’s case that Socrates holds the sufficiency claim trades on considerations 
similar to those in Senn and Vlastos.  But Irwin gives special attention to Euthydemus 
280-281 in establishing the necessity and sufficiency theses.  He takes Socrates to 
argue as follows:29 
 
1. It is possible to use assets well or badly.  (280b7-c3, 280d7-282a1) 
2. Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness.  (280d7-
281e1) 
3. Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use.  (281a1-b2) 
4. Therefore, wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness.  (281b2-4). 
 
But, Irwin notes, the second step is open to objection, for we might lack adequate 
assets or be unlucky in our use of them.  So, Socrates follows up with the following 
argument to secure the claim that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness. 
 
                                                
28 See Irwin 1995, esp. pp. 52-77. 
29 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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1. Each recognized good is a greater evil than its contrary, if it is used without 
wisdom, and each is a greater good than its contrary, if it is used by 
wisdom.  (281d6-8) 
2. Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is in itself neither 
good nor evil.  (281e3-4) 
3. Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil.  (281e304) 
4. Therefore, wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil.  (281e4-5) 
 
Irwin considers that Socrates may have a moderate view in mind:  When he says that 
the recognized goods (health, wealth, etc.) are not goods in themselves, he means that 
they are not goods unless they are properly used by wisdom.  When used by wisdom, 
though, the recognized goods really are goods.  But the moderate view would not 
license the inference to (3) and then to (4).  For that inference, we must suppose that 
Socrates has an extreme view in mind:  When he says that the recognized goods are 
not goods in themselves, he means simply that they are not goods.  If Socrates has the 
extreme view in mind, he is licensed to conclude that wisdom is the only good and 
folly the only evil.  And if happiness is a matter of having good things, then it follows 
that wisdom (= virtue) is both necessary and sufficient for happiness.30 
 Irwin gives several arguments that virtue is purely instrumental for 
happiness.31  Some of these involve comparing features of Socratic philosophy with 
certain Aristotelian motivations and distinctions.  But probably the most central of 
                                                
30 For more on this passage, see chapter 3. 
31 See Irwin 1995, pp. 65-74 for the full details. 
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these arguments, and certainly the one drawn most directly from the Socrates 
dialogues, is as follows.  Irwin interprets Lysis 220a-b as committing Socrates to the 
principle that if we choose x for the sake of y, then we cannot also choose x for the 
sake of itself.  And he interprets the Euthydemus as committing Socrates to the claim 
that we desire happiness for its own sake and everything else (including virtue) for the 
sake of happiness.  But together, these entail that virtue is purely instrumental for 
happiness and not valuable for its own sake.  
 It might seem odd to think that virtue is sufficient for happiness, yet merely 
instrumental for it.  What conception of happiness would make sense of such a view?  
Irwin attributes to Socrates an adaptive conception of happiness, not unlike Epicurus’ 
conception of happiness.  On the adaptive conception, happiness consists in having all 
one’s desires satisfied.  Virtue can guarantee happiness on such a conception because 
at least part of virtue’s function is to regulate desire according to circumstance.  So, 
the virtuous person limits her desires to whatever can be achieved in the 
circumstances.  Since the virtuous person never retains desires that cannot be fulfilled, 
the virtuous person never has unfulfilled desires and so is never lacking in happiness. 
 
1.3.3.4  Brickhouse and Smith against sufficiency 
 Senn, Vlastos, and Irwin have very different views about the relationship 
between virtue and happiness.  Nevertheless, each thinks that, for Socrates, virtue is 
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sufficient for happiness.  As in the case of the necessity thesis, however, we again 
encounter a pair of naysayers on the sufficiency thesis:  Brickhouse and Smith.32 
 Brickhouse and Smith call attention to Crito 48b ([T7] above), where Socrates 
says that “living well and living justly are the same thing (ZC 5O 0Y /$8 /$*,3 /$8 
5(/$7'3 [;( ;$!;2- 4&;(-).”  This, they think, is evidence enough that Socrates takes 
living justly to be a necessary and sufficient condition for living well, i.e., for 
happiness.  But they make a distinction between living justly and being just, or more 
broadly, between living virtuously and being virtuous.  Living virtuously is necessary 
and sufficient for happiness; being virtuous is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
happiness. 
 The evidence for the former claim – that living virtuously is necessary and 
sufficient for happiness – is much the same as the evidence given by Senn, Vlastos, 
and Irwin.  But Brickhouse and Smith put particular emphasis on a passage from the 
Gorgias which suggests that someone is counted happy on the basis of his actions (the 




Socrates:  The temperate one is not one to pursue or flee from what is not 
fitting, but the affairs, and men, and pleasures, and pains he ought to flee and 
pursue, and to endure remaining where he ought.  And so it is most necessary, 
Callicles, that the temperate person, just as we have reported, being just and 
brave and pious, is completely good, and the good person acts well and nobly 
in what he does, and the one who does well is blessed and happy.  But the base 
                                                
32 See esp. Brickhouse and Smith 1994, pp. 112-119. 
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person and the one who acts evilly is wretched.  (Gorgias 507b5-c5; 
Brickhouse and Smith trans., emphasis theirs) 
 
Brickhouse and Smith take this passage to show that “what qualifies the good 
person as being blessed and happy is the fact that he or she succeeds in his or her 
actions.”33  Why doesn’t this make virtue sufficient for happiness?  Because even the 
virtuous person may find himself in situations in which it is impossible to act well.  In 
support of this idea Brickhouse and Smith point to passages that suggest that even the 
virtuous person’s life might not be worth living in certain cases.  At Crito 47e3-5, 
Socrates says that “life is not worth living with a diseased and corrupted body” ([T2] 
above).  There is no qualification to suggest that this is true only of the non-virtuous, 
and there is no reason to think that a virtuous person would not be susceptible to 
disease and physical corruption.  Apparently, then, even the virtuous may in certain 
circumstances find that their lives are not worth living, and lives that are not worth 
living cannot be counted happy.  And Socrates makes a similar point at Gorgias 
512a2-b2:  “So [the pilot] concludes that if a man afflicted with serious incurable 
physical diseases did not drown, this man is miserable for not dying and has gotten no 
benefit from him” (Zeyl trans.).  Brickhouse and Smith argue that Socrates has in 
mind cases where bodily disease prevents even minimally good action.  And so, they 
conclude, it is not virtue, but virtuous action which guarantees happiness. 
 As with the necessity question, then, we have encountered a variety of texts 
and lines of arguments that support a variety of positions on the sufficiency question, 
as well as a variety of positions on the question of the exact nature of the relationship 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 114.  
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between virtue and happiness.  Again, then, we are faced with the task of attempting to 
reinterpret some of the apparently conflicting textual evidence in a way that resolves 
the tension.  It is time to turn to the Euthydemus, which, as I argue in the following 
chapter, provides a key to resolving these disputes. 
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Chapter 2:  An Overview of the Euthydemus 
 
 
The major focus of this study is on Euthydemus 277d-282d and 288a-293a.  
These two passages together make up only about about a third of the dialogue.  Most 
of the attention given the Euthydemus in recent decades has focused on these two 
passages, and especially on the first.1  Rarely are the two passages read closely 
together, though some have rightly read the two passages as closely connected to one 
another.2  Even more rarely – usually only in book-length monographs – are the two 
passages read with much of an eye to the other two-thirds of the Euthydemus. Since 
the passages are embedded in a larger context, this chapter is devoted to giving an 
overview of the argument of the Euthydemus, and its place among the Platonic 
dialogues.  But first I offer an apology for placing so much emphasis in the first place 
on the Euthydemus as a source for Socrates’ views on virtue and happiness. 
 
2.1. The centrality of the Euthydemus to the debate 
 At the beginning of chapter 1, I claimed that this dissertation offers two sorts 
of benefits:  fresh insight into the Euthydemus, and fresh insight into the Socratic 
conception of virtue and happiness in general.  Whether these benefits are delivered is 
a judgment best saved until the investigation is complete.  And whether fresh insight 
                                                
1 Though this is a reversal of the trends in the literature before about 1980.  Prior to this, most of the 
attention given the Euthydemus was focused on the eristic passages.  See, e.g., Sprague 1962 and 
Keulen 1971. 
2 Parry 2003 is a noteworthy example of one who reads the passages as tightly connected. 
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into the Euthydemus is achieved will largely be based on an assessment of the specific 
details of the interpretation I offer.  But it may fairly be asked at this stage why it is 
worth starting an investigation of the Socratic conception of virtue and happiness with 
a close look at the Euthydemus.  Why start there rather than with a close examination 
of the Apology, the Crito, or other dialogues in which virtue and happiness are 
discussed? 
  Many scholars working on Socrates’ position on the relationship between 
virtue and happiness have recognized the Euthydemus as a central text, and even those 
who do not give it pride of place on this issue among the early dialogues are likely to 
reference it with some frequency.  So, as we have seen, Vlastos marshals passages 
from the Euthydemus in support of his Sovereignty of Virtue thesis.  Likewise, 
Brickhouse and Smith cite the Euthydemus to develop and defend their account of 
Socrates’ scheme of values, as well as his commitment to the necessity and sufficiency 
of virtuous activity – but not virtue – for happiness.3  Irwin not only makes use of the 
dialogue in arguing that virtue is purely an instrumental good,4 but spends an entire 
chapter of Plato’s Ethics on its exposition, claiming that it ‘offers the clearest account 
of the role of happiness’ in Socratic ethics.5  Reshotko, too, devotes an entire chapter 
of her recent book on Socratic ethics to the Euthydemus,6 as does Russell.7  And 
McPherran goes further, noting that it is not only our contemporaries who spotlight the 
centrality of the Euthydemus for determining the relationship between virtue and 
                                                
3 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, chapter 4. 
4 Irwin 1986. 
5 Irwin 1995, p. 52. 
6 Reshotko 2006. 
7 Russell 2005, chapter 1. 
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happiness in Socratic ethics, but also that “the Euthydemus began to be seen as the 
locus classicus for the sufficiency of virtue thesis beginning no later than with the 
Stoics, for in its key, initial protreptic section (277d-282e) they found a Socratic 
endorsement for their own central tenet that virtue is the only good-in-itself.”8  And 
this is not even to mention either the commentaries9 and book-length monographs10 
entirely devoted to the Euthydemus, which each have something to say about it’s 
commitments on virtue and happiness, or the articles devoted to explicating the 
relevant passages in the Euthydemus.11 
 An appeal to a number of scholars who think that the Euthydemus is a central 
text for Socrates on virtue and happiness is fine, as far as it goes.  And the Euthydemus 
is interesting in its own right, even aside from considering its implications for an 
interpretation of Socratic philosophy as a whole.  But we should like some interpretive 
principle beyond this if we are going to focus our attention primarily on the 
Euthydemus, even while affirming that our ultimate interest is not just in the 
philosophy of the Euthydemus, but on Socratic philosophy generally.  What specific 
reasons do we have to make the Euthydemus our starting point, aside from some 
assertions of its importance by a number of scholars? 
 Notice that in the various arguments canvassed in §1.3, much of the textual 
ground for the various positions was based on a line or two – or perhaps a paragraph – 
from this dialogue, and a line or two from that dialogue.  That is, much of the textual 
                                                
8 McPherran 2005, p. 49. 
9 Hawtrey 1981 and Keulen 1971 
10 E.g. Chance 1992 and McCabe forthcoming. 
11 E.g. Dimas 2002, Parry 2003, McPherran 2005 
 
 42 
evidence comes from very short bits of text that reference virtue and happiness but are 
located in larger passages that are not themselves explicitly concerned with the 
relationship between virtue and happiness.  Moreover, as evidenced by the variety of 
conclusions reached on the basis of such texts, these texts appear to provide evidence 
for different and conflicting interpretations of Socrates’ conception of virtue and 
happiness. 
 Given these features of many of the texts that inform interpretations of Socratic 
virtue and happiness – that is, given that the texts are brief and provide apparently 
conflicting evidence – we would do well to rethink our strategy.  The Euthydemus 
offers an extended and explicit discussion of the relationship between virtue and 
happiness that runs to ten or more pages.  I propose, then, an interpretive strategy 
according to which we examine the extended and explicit discussion first, and that we 
do so on its own terms (that is, without letting outside passages have a heavy hand in 
our interpretation) and in its entirety.  Then, with that interpretation in hand, we can 
turn to the shorter and sometimes less explicit passages.  When we face tough 
interpretive decisions regarding these, we should allow our interpretation to be guided 
by the interpretation we have in hand of the extended and explicit passage.  At least, 
such a strategy will allow us to read the Euthydemus profitably on its own terms.  And 
perhaps, as I think, such a strategy will reward us with a clearer way through the 
interpretive puzzles that arise across dialogues.  Whether we can profit in this latter 
way will become clear only by employing this interpretive strategy and evaluating its 
results.  To that task I now turn. 
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2.2.  The argument of the Euthydemus 
 The Euthydemus is divided into five main episodes:  the first, third, and fifth 
are eristic episodes governed by the brother-sophists Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, 
while the second and fourth are protreptic episodes governed by Socrates.  These are 
framed by a prologue and epilogue which reveal that Socrates is reporting his 
conversation with the sophists to Crito the next day.  This outer frame breaks into the 
second protreptic episode, as well. 
 The first eristic episode (275c-277c) gets started when Socrates asks the two 
sophists to demonstrate their skill by persuading young Clinias to pursue wisdom.  
The sophists demonstrate their abilities, to be sure, but do not offer the sort of 
persuasive argument Socrates wants.  Instead, they offer two pairs of arguments, 
yielding the following conclusions, respectively:  It is the ignorant, but not the wise, 
who learn; it is the wise, but not the ignorant, who learn; one learns what one knows, 
but not what one doesn’t know; one learns what one doesn’t know, but not what one 
knows.  These arguments are carefully crafted to refute Clinias no matter what answer 
he gives when asked whether it is the wise or the ignorant who learn, and whether they 
learn what they know or what they do not know.  Throughout, the arguments trade on 
the ambiguity of µ!"#$"%&", which can mean either ‘to come to know’ or ‘to 
understand’. 
Socrates accuses the sophists of not taking him seriously and engaging in mere 
play with words.  He opens the second episode, the first protreptic, by offering to 
provide an example of the sort of demonstration he wants from the brothers.  Socrates 
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begins his demonstration of persuasion to wisdom by asking Clinias whether everyone 
desires to do well (!" #$%&&!'() and, receiving an affirmative answer, whether the 
way to do well is to have many good things.  Clinias agrees, and they produce a list of 
such goods, which I will refer to as ‘conventional goods’:  wealth, health, good looks, 
a supply of things needed by the body, self-control, justice, courage, wisdom, and (the 
greatest of all) good luck (278e-279c).  But then Socrates reconsiders and argues that 
the last item, good luck, is redundant because wisdom is already on the list. 
Socrates goes on to reconsider their earlier statements.  Earlier they had said 
that the way to do well is to have many good things such as those enumerated, but this 
is now questioned.  First, it is agreed that having good things would make us happy 
only if they were beneficial to us.  Good things are not beneficial to us unless we not 
only have them, but use them.  Furthermore, having and using good things is not 
sufficient for benefit; the goods must be used rightly.  Indeed, if these goods are used 
wrongly, more harm will result than if they were never used at all (280e).  Since only 
knowledge produces benefit, only use of the goods which is guided by knowledge will 
result in their really being good.  If guided by ignorance, they will be bad.  So, Clinias 
should seek wisdom, the only thing good in itself, and eschew ignorance, the only 
thing bad in itself.  Only if he possesses wisdom will the things normally called good, 
the conventional goods, really be good for him.  Since rightly using conventional 
goods is necessary for happiness, and since wisdom is necessary for rightly using 
conventional goods, it is clear that wisdom is necessary for happiness. 
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Having shown the sort of thing he wants to hear from the sophists, he hands 
the conversation back to them, inviting them either to give a better version of the 
argument he has just given, or to pick up where he has left off and show what kind of 
knowledge must be acquired in order to attain wisdom.  They are happy to resume 
control of the discussion, but fail to comply with his request.  Instead, in this second 
eristic episode (282d-288a) they produce a number of additional arguments of the 
same sort they produced in the first episode.  It is sufficient for our purposes at this 
stage to recognize that the arguments of the second eristic episode center on the 
impossibility of false speech or contradiction.  Some conclusions in the episode are:  
Nobody speaks what is not; it is impossible to contradict; there are no ignorant men.  
Socrates highlights the fact that if these conclusions are true, then it is impossible for 
the sophists to refute him, for he cannot speak falsely and they cannot contradict.  He 
then takes control of the discussion again for a second protreptic episode. 
 Socrates takes up the discussion at the point at which the first protreptic ended.  
That is, it has already been decided that it is necessary to love wisdom, and it remains 
to discover what sort of knowledge one must acquire to gain this wisdom.  It is agreed 
that the love of wisdom is the acquisition of knowledge, and that the sort of 
knowledge that must be acquired is a beneficial sort.  Knowing how to acquire gold 
would not be beneficial, for it does not entail knowing how to use gold.  And it is the 
same with other sorts of knowledge:  finance, medicine, and even the (hypothetical) 
knowledge of how to make men immortal.  Unless we know how to use the products 
of these correctly, they will not be beneficial.  So what we need, Socrates declares 
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with Clinias’ consent, is a kind of knowledge that combines making and knowing how 
to use the thing it makes (288d-289b). 
 So we need not become lyre makers or flute makers, since the crafts of making 
these instruments are different from the crafts of playing them.  The former crafts 
produce the instruments, the latter use them.  It is the same with the craft of writing 
speeches:  Some know how to write speeches but not how to use them, and some 
know how to use them but not how to write them.  So concerning speeches, the crafts 
of producing and using seem to be distinct (289c-290a).  Then Socrates hits upon what 
he says is likely the correct answer:  the craft of generalship.  But Clinias is skeptical.  
Generalship, he says, is a kind of man-hunting, and no craft of hunting goes beyond 
pursuing and capturing.  Fishermen hand their game over to cooks, quail hunters hand 
their game over to quail keepers, and even geometers, astronomers, and calculators, 
who hunt down diagrams, hand over their game to be used by dialecticians.  Likewise 
generals hand over their spoils to the statesmen, who use the spoils.  So for hunting 
crafts generally, and generalship specifically, the craft of producing is distinct from 
the craft of using (290a-d). 
 The dialogue is now carried on with Crito, though it is strongly implied that 
this exchange between Socrates and Crito closely tracks the exchange between 
Socrates and Clinias the previous day.  Socrates reports that each of the crafts they 
examined failed to be the one they sought.  Finally, they came to the kingly craft.  
Before going through the discussion, he warns that there he and Clinias fell into a sort 
of labyrinth, so that just when they thought they were approaching the end of their 
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search, they found that they had really made no progress at all (291b).  The following 
points are agreed upon:  The statesman’s craft and the kingly craft are the same; it is to 
this craft that generalship and other crafts hand over their products; and it is this craft 
that rules over the state, making all things useful (291c-d).   
Trouble arises, though, when they try to identify the product of the kingly 
craft.  Socrates reminds Crito that if the kingly craft is the one they are seeking, it must 
be something useful and provide us with something good.  But earlier it was agreed 
that nothing is good except some sort of knowledge.  So, while one might be tempted 
to name such things as making the citizens rich and free and unified as the products of 
this craft, this cannot be correct.  For all these things are neither good nor bad, but if 
the kingly craft is the one that constitutes wisdom, then its product must produce 
something good, namely, some knowledge.  But it will not produce just any sort of 
knowledge, such as shoemaking or carpentry.  Rather, if it produces something that is 
good, it must produce none other than itself.  But now it becomes next to impossible to 
say just what this knowledge is and how we are to use it.  (Recall that one requirement 
of the craft they are seeking is that it use what it makes.)  Socrates suggests that it is 
that by which we make others good.  But then the question recurs:  How will these 
others be good and useful?  The only available answer seems to be that they will make 
still others good, and these still others, and so on.  But then any specification of what 
this good is and how it is used just keeps receding before us, like a lark in a field.  And 
so, professing to be at a loss as to what sort of knowledge will make us happy, 
 
 48 
Socrates implores the sophists to make plain the answer (292a-293a).  So begins the 
third and final eristic episode, in which the brothers do nothing of the sort. 
Rather than complying with Socrates’ request, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
launch into a series of ever more ridiculous arguments.  Ctessipus, who is enamored 
with Clinias and has already been offended by some of the things the sophistic 
brothers have said about Clinias, quickly picks up on the brothers method of arguing 
and turns it back on them.  Here we see most vividly that the sophistic concern is for 
verbal victory and not for concluding what is true.  A sampling of two arguments in 
this section will suffice to give the flavor.  At 298d7-e5, Dionysodorus argues, 
addressing Ctessipus, that since this dog is both yours and a father, the dog is your 
father.  And at 301c6-d8, Dionysodorus again argues that since chopping up and 
skinning and cooking is appropriate for the cook, it is appropriate to chop up and skin 
and cook the cook.  The latter argument plays on the fact that nouns in the accusative 
case can serve as either the subject or object of an infinitive.  The third eristic episode 
is full of such arguments. 
Socrates concludes by telling Crito how the crowd went wild for Euthydemus 
and Dionysodorus, and he encourages Crito to attend the brothers’ classes with him.  
Crito reveals that the previous day, shortly after the conversation Socrates has just 
reported, someone who had heard it approached him and disparaged philosophy and 
philosophers.  How is he to persuade his sons to pursue education and philosophy, if 
the educators and philosophers are like Euthydemus and Dionysodorus?  Socrates 




Pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad.  
Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself:  if it seems to you 
negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons.  But if it seems to 
you to be what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and 
yours, as the proverb says.  (307b6-c4; Sprague trans.) 
 
 
2.3.  The date of the Euthydemus 
 The absolute dating of the Euthydemus has little bearing for its interpretation.  
As its authenticity has not been seriously questioned, it must of course be dated 
sometime within Plato’s adult life.  Ryle has dated it to the late 370s;12 Hawtrey 
tentatively prefers sometime from 387-380.13  But this is a dating game that is hard to 
play, and I neither want nor need to make a commitment to any particular date. 
 The dramatic date of the dialogue is also of little importance for its 
interpretation.  Hawtrey plausibly suggests a dramatic date between 420 and 404, 
since there is evidence that Protagoras is dead (286c2), which sets the early limit, and 
evidence that Alcibiades is alive (275b1), which sets the late limit.  Some evidence for 
an even earlier date comes from Xenophon’s Symposium, the dramatic date of which 
is 422.  There, Critobolus is old enough to attend the symposium and to be quite taken 
with Clinias.  In the Euthydemus, Critobolus is still young enough for Crito to be 
concerned about how to arrange for his education.14  I see no clear way in which a 
                                                
12 See Ryle 1966, pp. 217ff (as reported by Hawtrey 1981, p. 4). 
13 Hawtrey 1981, p. 10. 
14 On the absolute dating of the Euthydemus, see Hawtrey 1981, p. 10.  Ausland 2000 provides a 
summary of nineteenth century views on both absolute and relative dating. 
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more precise conjecture of the dramatic date will significantly affect the interpretation 
of the dialogue. 
 More important is the relative date of the Euthydemus – relative, that is, to 
Plato’s other dialogues.  It has been common to place the Euthydemus in a group of 
so-called ‘Socratic dialogues’, a list which often additionally includes the following: 
Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, 
Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I.  These dialogues are often thought to have 
been written earlier than the ‘middle’ dialogues like the Republic, Phaedo, and 
Symposium, which in turn were written earlier than ‘late’ dialogues such as the Laws.  
It has also been common, following Vlastos, to date the Euthydemus, Lysis, and 
Gorgias as the last in the early Socratic group, written near the time of the transitional 
Meno.15 
 There are three primary ways of establishing the relative dating of the 
dialogues.  References or clear allusions to historical events or, more importantly, to 
other dialogues,16 are rare, and there is none that bears directly on the Euthydemus.17  
Stylometric analysis is widely acknowledged to mark off a relatively small set of late 
dialogues – Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws – of which the 
Euthydemus is not a member.  Many take stylometric evidence to mark off a second 
                                                
15 Vlastos 1991, pp. 46-7. 
16 The apparent allusion at Phaedo 72e-73b to the Meno is one such case. 
17 There is one possible exception to this claim, though it is not a particulary clear one.  At Lysis 211b-c 
Socrates says that Ctesippus teaches eristic.  Yet in the Euthydemus, Ctesippus appears to learn eristic.  
This is perhaps some evidence that the dramatic date and date of composition of the Euthydemus is 
earlier than the Lysis. 
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‘middle’ group:  Republic, Parmenides, Phaedrus, Theaetetus.18  That would leave the 
earlier list of Socratic dialogues, plus Meno, Symposium, Phaedo, and Cratylus, as a 
third group, often thought to be earliest.  But stylometric analysis makes little clear 
headway in ordering the dialogues within each group relative to one another. 
Establishing the relative dating of the Euthydemus, then, depends mostly on the third 
way:  analysing the philosophical content and fitting it into a plausible developmental 
story.  Where the Euthydemus is thought to fit into such a story may make a difference 
to its interpretation.  For example, it may determine whether Plato already has, and 
perhaps is even pointing to, an answer to the puzzles that arise in the second protreptic 
episode.   
Evidence that the Euthydemus belongs to the Socratic dialogues can be 
approached in several ways, but one way is through Aristotle.  Aristotle seems to 
distinguish between views of Socrates the historical figure and Socrates the character 
of Plato’s dialogues; references to the character (e.g., Generation and Corruption 
335b10, Politics 1342a32-33), but not the historical figure (e.g., Topics 183b7-8, 
Metaphysics 987b1-2), are typically preceeded by a definite article.  On the basis of 
Aristotle’s remarks about the historical Socrates, Terrence Irwin picks out six 
characteristics of Socratic dialogues:19 
 
(1) Their concerns are entirely or predominantly ethical. 
(2) Socrates disavows knowledge. 
                                                
18 See esp. Brandwood 1990, both his analysis of the history of scholarship on this matter and his own 
conclusions at pp. 250-251.  See also Kahn 1996, pp. 42-48. 
19 Irwin 1995, p. 10 (see pp. 8-11 for the fuller discussion). 
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(3) He looks for definitions and does not find them; the conclusion is often 
aporetic. 
(4) They are characteristically exploratory rather than dogmatic or expository.  
(5) They express Socratic [as opposed to Platonic] views about virtue and 
knowledge. 
(6) They do not contain the doctrines that Aristotle connects with the belief in 
non-sensible Forms. 
 
Irwin picks out the following dialogues as having these six characteristics:  Laches, 
Charmides, Euthyphro, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Euthydemus, and Ion.  The Protagoras 
and Gorgias also have these characteristics, except that they are more ‘elaborately 
constructive’ than the others.  And the Apology and Crito have all the characteristics 
except for (3).  Add to Irwin’s list Republic 1, which is only part of a dialogue, and 
Hippias Major, which has more of these characteristics than most of the dialogues not 
on Irwin’s list, and we have the standard set of dialogues listed above as Socratic.   
The Euthydemus plainly shares many of these six characteristics, though it is 
premature at this stage to count the fifth characteristic among them, since the views 
about virtue and knowledge expressed in the Euthydemus are the subject of the present 
study.  Furthermore, in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle, speaking of the Socrates the 
historical figure rather than Socrates the character of the dialogues (!"#$%&'( rather 
than ) !"#$%&'(), apparently alludes to a view Socrates expresses at Euthydemus 




But when the same event follows from indefinite and undetermined 
antecedents, it will be good or evil, but there will not be the science that comes 
by experience of it, since otherwise some would have learned to be lucky (!"#$ 
!µ%&'(&)& *+& ,$&#- #.,/0#1-), or even – as Socrates said – all the sciences 
would have been kinds of good luck (2 3(4 "56($ 7& (8 !"$6,9µ($, :6"#; 
<=> ?@3;%,>-, #.,/0A($ B6(&).  (Eudemian Ethics 1247b11-15; Solomon 
trans.) 
 
This is some evidence that Aristotle took at least some of the views Socrates expresses 
in the Euthydemus to express those of the historical Socrates, and this adds to the case 
for classifying the Euthydemus as a Socratic dialogue. 
 There are two primary pieces of evidence that the Euthydemus is among the 
latest of the Socratic dialogues.  First, at 300e-301c there is an argument that seems to 
discuss the nature of the participation relation between forms and ordinary objects.  
But such a discussion would be more in keeping with dialogues in which Plato 
develops a robust theory of forms.  Those dialogues are generally thought to include 
none from the ‘Socratic’ and some from the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ lists, above, and so are 
thought to postdate the Socratic dialogues.  This suggests that the Euthydemus was 
written near the time when we see the introduction of Plato’s mature theory of forms. 
Second, there is a passage in the second protreptic that seems strongly to 
prefigure Republic 7, and so it is thought that it must not have been written too long 
before the Republic.  At Republic 7 we find an educational system where calculation, 
geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics are propaedeutic for dialectic.  




And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in 
a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they simply discover those 
which already exist), since they themselves have no idea of how to use their 
prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to 
the dialecticians – at least, those of them do so who are not completely 
senseless.  (290b-c; Sprague trans.) 
 
That this apparent connection to the Republic may affect our interpretation of the 
Euthydemus is evident from what Hawtrey writes about the passage: 
 
“If . . . 290b-c contains a demonstrable reference to the higher education 
program sketched in Republic 7, including a subject “dialectic” that studies 
first principles, then it may be considered likely that Plato was already at the 
time of the composition of the Euthydemus considerably advanced towards the 
theory of the Form of the Good, and this supposition has interesting 
implications for our assessment of his purpose in writing the earlier dialogue, 
with its apparent failure to come to a satisfactory conclusion.”20 
 
 Because the Gorgias is often taken to be one of the latest of the Socratic 
dialogues as well, and the Meno is sometimes taken to be transitional between the 
Socratic and middle dialogues, one disputed question involves the relative dating of 
the Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Meno.  As we will see, there are many characteristics 
that the Euthydemus shares with one or both of these dialogues.  However, it does not 
seem to me that there is much to be gained interpretively by deciding this issue, and 
the arguments for various orderings of the three are largely tenuous, speculative, a 
based on the smallest of details.  Hawtrey gives a fine overview and discussion, 
suggesting that the Gorgias probably predates both the Euthydemus and the Meno, and 
that the evidence for and against the priority of the Euthydemus over the Meno is 
                                                
20 Hawtrey 1981, p. 120. 
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evenly balanced.21  But even with this relative caution, Hawtrey is a good example of 
the tendency to let small details and large speculations carry great weight.  In a 
footnote, he goes so far as to speculate as follows:  “On a more frivolous note I 
mention the question of the quails.  They occur at Lysis 211e and 212d, and also at 
Euthyd. 290d and Hip. Ma. 295d; nowhere else, as far as I know, in Plato.  Did Plato 
go through a period when he was particularly fond of quails?”22  Fortunately, we need 
wade no further into this debate.  Suffice it to say that the Euthydemus is often placed 
among the later of the Socratic dialogues. 
 Since Vlastos argued for a detailed developmental account of Plato’s dialogues 
which gave a fairly definite relative order for the dialogues, there has been a strong 
reaction against developmental accounts of the dialogues, along with the detailed 
dating schemes that tend to accompany them.  So, for instance, John Cooper, Debra 
Nails, and Charles Kahn have each expressed serious doubts about the project of 
ordering the dialogues chronologically, at least beyond identifying a group of six ‘late’ 
dialogues.  Challenges to the chronological project might be thought to cast doubt on 
the more general project of identifying the philosophy of the so-called Socratic 
dialogues.  But, as Brickhouse and Smith have argued, they do not undermine the 
general project.23  Despite their scepticism concerning chronology, each identifies a 
group of dialogues that pretty closely matches the list of Socratic dialogues above.  So 
Cooper identifies a group that we may call “the Socratic dialogues – provided that the 
term is understood to make no chronological claims, but rather simply to indicate 
                                                
21 Irwin (1995, p. 362 n.1) gives priority to the Euthydemus. 
22 See Hawtrey 1981, pp. 4-10. 
23 Brickhouse and Smith forthcoming, chapter 1. 
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certain broad thematic affinities.”  The Socratic dialogues form a group because “the 
topics and manner of the conversation conform to what we have reason to think, both 
from Plato’s own representations in the Apology and from other contemporary literary 
evidence, principally that of the writer Xenophon, was characteristic of the historical 
Socrates’ own philosophical conversations.”24  Cooper goes on to say that “in these 
dialogues Plato intends not to depart, as he does elsewhere, from Socratic methods of 
reasoning or from the topic to which Socrates devoted his attention.”25 
 Nails, likewise, is sceptical of robust chronological claims, and argues that we 
can group the dialogues in two groups:  one in which Socrates has conversations in the 
agora, and one in which the style of conversation is more like we might expect to find 
in Plato’s Academy.  But the former group of dialogues is nearly coextensive with our 
above list of Socratic dialogues.26 
 Kahn, too, proposes a method of grouping the dialogues, though he is sceptical 
of most chronological claims.  He identifies a group of dialogues that are proleptic, or 
introductory, for the classical Platonism of the Republic.  This group is pretty much 
the same as the Socratic dialogues above (but including the Meno), except for the 
notable addition of the Symposium, Phaedo, and Cratylus.  This addition is not 
surprising giving that stylometric analysis has been thought to group these three with 
our Socratic dialogues.  Even here, though, Kahn marks off on the basis of their 
content the Symposium, Phaedo, and Cratylus as the last of this large group of 
                                                
24 Cooper 1997, p. xv. 
25 Cooper 1997, p. xvi. 
26 Nails 1995, p. 203.  The differences are the inclusion of Alcibiades I, Meno, Phaedo, and Theaetetus 
as ‘Socratic’, and the identification of the Apology as ‘mixed’ (that is, mixed between ‘Socratic’ and 
‘didactic’).   
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dialogues to be read before the Republic.  So, even on Kahn’s view, our standard list 
of Socratic dialogues forms a coherent grouping, and the Symposium, Phaedo, and 
Cratylus form the final bridge to the Republic.27 
 The lesson in all this is that we need not subscribe to a particular detailed 
chronological account to think that there is a group of Socratic dialogues the 
philosophy of which is worth investigating.  Nor need we be sceptical of chronology 
to do so.28  Whatever we think about chronology and developmentalism, we are likely 
to find the dialogues naturally falling into various groupings, and one of those 
groupings is likely to largely coincide with our initial list of Socratic dialogues.  
Whether on Irwin’s view, or on Cooper’s, Nails’, or Kahn’s, the Euthydemus fits into 
that group.  If we are interested in the philosophy of the Socratic dialogues, the 
Euthydemus is one of the places we should look, and, as I argued in §2.1, if we are 
interested in the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Socratic dialogues, 
the Euthydemus is one of the first places we should look.  So, to the text.29 
                                                
27 For an overview on Kahn’s position on this issue, see his 1996, pp. 42-48. 
28 So, even though I cannot affirm it on exactly the grounds that he does, I am in at least partial 
agreement with Ausland’s (2000, p. 20) stated thesis, which is “not that the Euthydemus is of any 
particular date or period in Plato’s life, but that making this question prerequisite to understanding 
Plato’s dialogues is mistaken and perhaps itself becoming rather dated.” 
29 For a thorough and, in my judgment, successful defense of the project of studying the philosophy of 
the Socratic dialogues, see Brickhouse and Smith forthcoming, chapter 1.  They discuss Cooper, Nails, 
Kahn, and a variety of other arguments and positions, and both the discussion above and my own views 
on the matter have been significantly influenced by them. 
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Chapter 3:  Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 277-282 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 Plato’s Euthydemus garners far less attention than it deserves among non-
specialists, but for scholars of Platonic ethics it has long been a focal point due to its 
extended discussion of the connection between wisdom and happiness.  For example, 
Terence Irwin, in one of the most influential and provocative works on Platonic ethics 
in recent decades,1 relies primarily on Euthydemus 277-282 to establish the following 
claims, all of which are both central to his interpretation and points of controversy 
among scholars:  Every action performed by some human is aimed at promoting her 
own happiness (often called psychological eudaimonism); Wisdom is purely 
instrumental for, rather than partially or wholly constitutive of, happiness; Wisdom is 
necessary for happiness; Wisdom is sufficient for happiness. 
 I want to focus on the last of these claims, that wisdom is sufficient for 
happiness (henceforth the sufficiency thesis), for three reasons.  The first is that Irwin 
is merely one of a number of prominent scholars who have turned to the Euthydemus 
to establish the sufficiency thesis.2  Indeed, Mark McPherran reminds us just how far 
back the impressive pedigree of the view stretches: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Irwin 1995, esp. chapters 4-5. 
2 See, e.g., Annas 1999, ch. 2; Panos Dimas 2002; Hawtrey 1981; Kraut 1984, pp. 211-212; McPherran 
2005; Russell 2005, ch. 1; Vlastos 1991, pp. 227-231. 
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[T]he Euthydemus began to be seen as the locus classicus for the sufficiency of 
virtue thesis beginning no later than with the Stoics, for in its key, initial 
protreptic section (277d-282e) they found a Socratic endorsement for their own 
central tenet that virtue is the only good-in-itself.  Stoics were attracted, in 
particular, to the protreptic’s condensed and, consequently, intriguingly 
problematic argument for the thesis that the possession of wisdom guarantees 
eudaimonia for its possessor no matter how much apparent bad luck that 
person might encounter (280a6-8).3 
 
The second reason to focus on this claim is that there is perhaps no 
philosophical thesis that has more often been thought to be most central to or most 
distinctive of the philosophy of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues4 than the thesis that 
wisdom is sufficient for happiness.  The sufficiency thesis amounts to the claim that 
no matter how things go in your life, if you are wise then you are happy, either 
because being wise somehow infallibly gives you the resources to become happy or 
because happiness just amounts to being wise.  Hence its centrality for Socrates:  The 
sufficiency thesis explains why Socrates is so interested in wisdom (which is the same 
as being interested in virtue, according to Socrates), and why he is always trying to 
acquire it and always trying to persuade others to acquire it, too.  But the sufficiency 
thesis is a deeply counterintuitive one.  Aristotle famously wrote that no one would 
maintain it unless forced to it by his other philosophical commitments.  Hence its 
distinctiveness for Socrates:  Few others have been willing to go so far.  
The facts that a topic is central to and distinctive of Socratic philosophy and 
has attracted the attention of many scholars are not sufficient to motivate a fresh paper 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 McPherran 2005, p. 49. 
4 And this is the philosophy I am interested in here, the philosophy expressed by the character named 
Socrates who appears in Plato’s Euthydemus. 
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on it.  But they are sufficient when conjoined with the third reason to focus on the 
sufficiency thesis:  Socrates does not hold it.  The standard interpretation, central to 
many accounts of the philosophy of Socrates, is false.  Or so I suspect.  Here I will 
argue for a somewhat more modest thesis, but one that still poses a significant 
challenge to standard interpretations:  The so-called locus classicus for the sufficiency 
thesis, Euthydemus 277-282, provides no evidence for, and even some evidence 
against, Socrates’ commitment to the sufficiency thesis.  This, at the very least, forces 
those who would attribute the sufficiency thesis to Socrates to look elsewhere for their 
primary evidence.  But my interpretation of the Euthydemus potentially has much 
further reaching implications as the first step in a reevaluation of the nature of and 
relationships between the most important concepts in Socratic philosophy:  wisdom 
and happiness.  
 
3.2.  Alleged arguments for the sufficiency thesis in Euthydemus 277-282 
 On the standard reading, Socrates argues for the sufficiency thesis in 
Euthydemus 277-282. Irwin nicely illustrates this way of reading the passage: 
Socrates takes it to be generally agreed that we achieve happiness by gaining 
many goods (279a1-4), but he argues that the only good we need is wisdom.  
He argues in three stages:  (1) Happiness does not require good fortune added 
to wisdom (279c4-280a8).  (2) Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for the 
correct and successful use of other goods (280b1-281b4).  (3) Wisdom is the 
only good (281b4-e5).  From this Socrates concludes that if we want to secure 




5 Irwin 1995, p. 55. 
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In support of this reading, Irwin identifies three arguments, one for each of the three 
stages.  First, Socrates argues: 
(1) In each case the wise person has better fortune than the unwise (280a4-5). 
(2) Genuine wisdom can never go wrong, but must always succeed (280a7-8). 
(3) Therefore, wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).6 
 
Socrates is arguing, then, that “wisdom guarantees success whatever the 
circumstances.”7  But if wisdom alone is sufficient for success no matter what one’s 
situation, then wisdom must be sufficient for happiness no matter what one’s situation. 
 In the second stage, Irwin reconstructs Socrates’ argument as follows: 
(1) It is possible to use assets well or badly (280b7-c3), 280d7-281a1). 
(2) Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness (280d7-
281e1). 
(3) Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281a1-b2). 
(4) Therefore, wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness (281b2-4).8 
 
Socrates final argument “is meant to secure Socrates’ previous claim that 
wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness, for it claims to show that wisdom is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ibid., p. 55 
7 Ibid., p. 56. 
8 Ibid., p. 56 
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the only good, and it has been agreed that happiness requires the presence of all the 
appropriate goods.”9  Irwin reconstructs the argument as follows: 
(1) Each recognized good [e.g., health, wealth] is a greater evil than its 
contrary, if it is used without wisdom, and each is a greater good than its 
contrary, if it is used by wisdom (281d6-8). 
(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is in itself (auto 
kath’hauto) neither good nor evil (281e3-4). 
(3) Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil (281e3-4). 
(4) Therefore, wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil.10 
 
There are, then, no fewer than three arguments that are purported to demonstrate the 
necessity and sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.  Contrary to Irwin’s interpretation, 
and others that may differ in detail but endorse the general point that Socrates argues 
for the sufficiency thesis,11 I will argue that Socrates in no way demonstrates or 
attempts to demonstrate the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.  I agree with Irwin 
that the passage divides naturally into three stages and I will treat each in turn, 





9 Ibid., p. 57. 
10 Ibid., p. 57 
11 I have in mind those interpretations on which some part or all of Euthydemus 277-282 is meant to 
support the sufficiency thesis.  See note 2. 
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3.3.  Stage 1:  “Wisdom is good fortune.” (Euthydemus 279c-280b) 
At Euthydemus 279d6-7, Socrates makes a shocking claim, saying, “Wisdom 
(!"#$%) surely is good fortune (&'()*$%); even a child would know that.”  Two related 
interpretive issues immediately arise.  First, are we to take this as a serious identity 
claim, that wisdom and good fortune just are the very same thing?  This certainly does 
not seem like something even a child would know, but it is the natural way to read 
Socrates’ claim.  And second, what exactly does ‘good fortune’ mean?  Is it some kind 
of success we might achieve, as when we wish someone good luck before some event 
in which they must use their skills to try to achieve a certain outcome?  If so, then it is 
the sort of thing we wish a physician before surgery when we say, “Good luck,” or an 
actor before a performance when we say, “Break a leg.”  Or is good fortune rather a 
matter of having things outside of our control work out in our favor, as when we say 
that someone was lucky to have won the lottery or that it was fortunate that no one 
was in the building when the faulty wiring started the fire.  I leave this second 
interpretive issue, the meaning of “good fortune”, for the next section.  Here I will 
argue that “Wisdom is good fortune” is not an identity claim. 
Certainly the most natural way to read the claim that wisdom is good fortune 
is, at least in isolation, as an identity claim.  And Socrates makes the claim in the 
context of giving a list of goods the possession of which will make us happy.  He lists 
various goods of the body (health, wealth, good looks, and a sufficient supply of 
things the body needs), then goods had in relation to others (noble birth, power, and 
honor among one’s countrymen), and finally goods of the soul (temperance, justice, 
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courage, and wisdom).  But, just when it looks like they have completed the list, 
Socrates exclaims that they have left off the most important item, “good fortune 
(&'()*$%), which everyone, even the lowliest, says is the greatest of the goods” 
(270c7-8).  Having put the last two goods, wisdom and good fortune, on the list with 
his young interlocutor Clinias’ consent, Socrates reconsiders: 
And reconsidering the matter I said, “You and I have nearly become 
ridiculous in front of the strangers, son of Axiochus.” 
“How so?” he asked. 
“Because by putting good fortune in the previous list, we have said the 
same thing again.” 
“How is this?” 
“It is most ridiculous to add again what was already mentioned, and to 
say the same things twice.” 
“What do you mean?” 
“Wisdom surely is good fortune,” I said.  “Even a child would know 
that.”   
And he was surprised, for he is still so young and naïve.  (279c9-d8)12 
 
So, not only is it most natural to read the claim that wisdom is good fortune as an 
identity claim, the immediate context of the claim also suggests that it is an identity 
claim.  To add good fortune to a list that already includes wisdom is to “say the same 
thing again” and to “add again what was already mentioned and to say the same things 
twice.” 
 But the argument that follows in this passage shows decisively that Socrates 
does not intend to put forward an identity claim.  Here is the argument in full: 
And recognizing that he was surprised, I said, “Clinias, don’t you 
know, then, that flautists have the best fortune (&'()*+!(%("$ &,!-.) concerning 
playing flutes well?”  
He agreed. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Translations are my own throughout the chapter.  I follow Burnet’s text. 
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“And,” I said, “don’t grammarians have the best fortune concerning the 
writing and reading of letters?” 
“Very much so.” 
“Well then, with respect to the dangers of the sea, do you think that 
anyone has better fortune (&'()*&!(+/")0) than the wise pilots, for the most 
part?”   
“Clearly not.” 
“Well then, would you prefer when campaigning to share the danger 
and the luck with a wise general or with an ignorant one?”   
“With the wise one.” 
“Well then, with whom would you rather risk danger when sick, with 
the wise physician or the ignorant one?”  
“The wise.”   
“So then,” I said, “you think that it is more fortunate (&'()*+!(&/".) to 
do things with a wise person than with an ignorant person?”   
He agreed. 
“Then wisdom makes people fortunate (&'()*&1. 2"-&1 ("30 
4.5/62")0) in every case.  For wisdom would never err, but necessarily does 
rightly and is fortunate (4.789: ;/5<0 2/7((&-. 9%= ()8*7.&-.); for otherwise 
it would no longer be wisdom.”  
We agreed finally – I don’t know how – that in sum things were like 
this:  When wisdom is present, in whom it is present, there is no need of good 
fortune (&'()*$%0) in addition.  (279d8-280b3) 
 
 When Socrates sums up the results of his argument at 280b1-3, he puts it in a 
way that is not, at least in isolation, naturally read as an identity claim:  “When 
wisdom is present, in whom it is present, there is no need of good fortune in addition.”  
A few lines earlier (280a6) he had drawn the conclusion that “wisdom makes people 
fortunate”.  At 281b2-4 he again recalls this conclusion and says that wisdom provides 
men with good fortune.  Again at 282a4-5 he recalls this conclusion and says that 
wisdom is the source of good fortune.13  At 282c8-9 Socrates again says that wisdom 
is the only existing thing that makes a person fortunate.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Strictly speaking, at 281b2-4 and 282a4-5 Socrates uses the term ‘knowledge’ (>2-!(?µ:) rather than 
‘wisdom’ (!"#$%).  But it is plain that ‘wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’ are being used equivalently.  Socrates 
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 These summations of the conclusion of the argument for the claim that wisdom 
is good fortune are not naturally read as identity claims.  Nevertheless, they are not 
strictly inconsistent with the claim that wisdom is identical to good fortune.  Assuming 
the identity of wisdom and good fortune, the conclusion at 280b1-3 seems to follow:  
When wisdom [= good fortune] is present, in whom it is present, there is no need of 
good fortune [= wisdom] in addition.   But, of course, as it is formulated in the text 
(without the bracketed bits), 280b1-3 does not entail the identity claim.   
 Likewise the other three formulations, which seem to amount to variations of 
the claim that wisdom makes people fortunate, are consistent with, but weaker than, 
the identity claim.  Given the identity claim, we should read the three later 
summations as claims that wisdom makes people wise, or alternatively that fortune 
makes people fortunate.  This sounds Platonic; think of the famous passage at Phaedo 
100d where Socrates says that all beautiful things are beautiful by the beautiful.  But it 
seems to miss the point here.  After all, at 281b2-4 and 282a4-5 Socrates says that 
wisdom is the source not only of good fortune but also of correct use, but there is no 
hint that correct use is identical to wisdom.  Indeed, correct use and good fortune seem 
to have the same relation to wisdom in this passage and they seem to be distinct from 
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is plainly summing up again the results of the argument at 279d-280b, which concerns wisdom and 
good fortune.  Were ‘wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’ being used to refer to distinct things, this summation 
would misrepresent the earlier argument.  But there is no hint in the text that any conflict arises.  And at 
282a1-6, Socrates easily slides between ‘wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’ in summing up the results of the 
entire passage:  
“Then let us consider the consequence of this.  Since we all want to be happy, and since we 
appear to become happy by using things and using them correctly, and since it is knowledge 
that provides the correctness and good fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to prepare 
themselves in every way for this:  how they will become as wise as possible.”  (282a1-6) 
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one another.  But if wisdom is identical to good fortune, we would expect it to be 
identical to correct use as well, and so good fortune and correct use would be identical. 
 Regardless of whether we can force these various expressions of the 
conclusion of the argument into the identity mold, there is a more telling feature of the 
argument that counts against taking the claim that wisdom is good fortune to be an 
identity claim.  Socrates begins the argument by claiming that various experts – 
flautists, grammarians, and pilots – have the best fortune when it comes to matters in 
their field of expertise, and generalizes from these examples to the claim that experts 
quite generally have the best fortune concerning matters in their field of expertise.  
Their expertise is clearly meant to count as a kind of wisdom, and so some connection 
between wisdom and good fortune is established.   
But then Socrates adds to his list of examples that it is preferable to act with a 
wise general or physician rather than an ignorant one.  He generalizes from the choice 
to act with the wise general and physician:  “So then, you think that it is more 
fortunate to do things with a wise person than with an ignorant person?”  The 
proposition is that it is more fortunate for you to do things with a wise person.  It is 
more fortunate for you to be under the command of a wise general, or under the care 
of a wise physician.  That is why you should choose it.  But it is not you who is acting 
wisely in the situation; it is the general or the physician.  So your good fortune is a 
result of someone else’s wisdom being operative.  The important point here is that the 
wisdom is the physician’s (but not yours) and the good fortune is yours (but not the 
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physician’s)14.  But this means that wisdom and good fortune are not identical, for you 
can have one without the other.  The point Socrates is making is that the wise 
physician causes your good fortune, whereas the ignorant physician will likely not 
bring you good fortune.  But this very point entails that the identity claim cannot be 
true. 
Not only that, but even in the experts wisdom and good fortune sometimes 
come apart.  Notice that Socrates qualifies his claims when talking about pilots.  
Expert pilots have better fortune at sea than non-experts, for the most part (@0 >2= 2A. 
&,2&1.).  To say that experts have better fortune than non-experts for the most part is to 
imply that sometimes they do not.  Success for a pilot consists in, roughly, getting 
one’s ship safely to the desired port.  Skilled pilots will generally have the most 
success at getting ships safely to their destinations.  But in the case of pilots, the 
possibility that a non-pilot might have greater success than a pilot becomes more 
salient.  In the case of flautists and grammarians, there are not many obvious external 
influences on their success.  A good flautist plays her flute and beautiful music comes 
out.  A good grammarian reads accurately and writes effectively.  But for pilots, one 
external influence looms particularly large:  the weather.  Imagine that I, whose 
information about piloting is gleaned only from a few movies that are set on ships, am 
to pilot a ship from Port A to Port B.  At the same time, a skilled pilot is to pilot a ship 
from Port B to Port C.  It is easy to imagine a case where I have more success than the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14Though the physician might be said to have good fortune, too.  Nevertheless, it is not identical to your 
good fortune, and even if it were, that you can possess good fortune without possessing wisdom is 
enough to make the point. 
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skilled captain.  Suppose that I set sail with my crew from Port A, with fair skies and 
friendly winds.  This fair weather continues as I follow the coastline for some days 
and finally dock successfully at Port B.  The skilled captain leaves Port B at the same 
time, sailing toward Port C with equally fair skies and friendly winds.  However, 
midway to Port C, he encounters an unpredictable and fierce storm.  Despite the best 
efforts of this expert pilot and his crew, the ship is tossed around by the severe wind 
and waves and finally capsizes.  I, unskilled though I am, have successfully guided my 
ship to the desired port, while the skilled captain has failed to achieve this.   
Socrates recognizes that these scenarios become salient in the case of pilots, 
and he qualifies his question in their case: “Well then, with respect to the dangers of 
the sea, do you think that anyone has better fortune than the wise pilots, for the most 
part (@0 >2= 2A. &,2&1.)?”  Socrates is not asking whether in every case pilots have 
better fortune than non-pilots when it comes to sailing.  Rather, he is asking whether, 
taking all the cases together, pilots have the best fortune at sailing.  This allows that 
there could be infrequent cases of non-pilots having better fortune than pilots, so long 
as pilots have the most fortune most of the time.  And this is a perfectly sensible 
position, to which Clinias finds it easy to add his consent. 
The consequence of all this for the claim that wisdom is good fortune is to add 
another reason it cannot be an identity claim, for wise pilots retain their wisdom, even 
in cases where they fail to have good fortune.  Sometimes they possess wisdom but 
not good fortune, and so wisdom cannot be identical to good fortune.  Add to this the 
fact that I can be fortunate though it is not I but my physician who is wise, and we 
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begin to see why Socrates repeatedly – at 280a6, 280b1-3, 281b2-4, 282a4-5, and 
282c8-9 – expresses his conclusion in ways that are not naturally taken as identity 
claims.  He is not arguing that wisdom is identical to good fortune, but rather that 
wisdom produces good fortune. 
 
 
3.4.  Good fortune and outcome-success 
 I now turn to the second interpretive issue concerning the claim that wisdom is 
good fortune:  the meaning of the term ‘good fortune’.  As noted above, ‘good fortune’ 
is ambiguous between at least two senses:  things that happen to us that are largely out 
of our control, and things we achieve.15  The former could be described as having 
favorable circumstances in which to live one’s life.  Being born into a wealthy family, 
living in a stable political climate, and winning the lottery all fall into this category.  
Call this sort of good fortune antecedent good luck. 
 This cannot be the sort of good fortune at issue in this passage for a number of 
reasons.16  First, and most obviously, antecedent good luck is not the sort of thing one 
pursues, for it is by definition outside of one’s control.  It happens to one; it constitutes 
the circumstances in which one has to act; but it is not itself an object of pursuit.  One 
does not try to be born into a wealthy family or a stable political climate, or try to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 I do not mean to suggest that it is only the English ‘good fortune’ that is ambiguous in this way.  On 
the contrary, the Greek ‘&'()*$%’ is ambiguous in the same way. 
16 That is not to say that Clinias might not hear Socrates’ initial claim that wisdom in good fortune as 
the claim that wisdom is antecedent good luck.  Perhaps that partially explains his surprise at the claim.  
But the argument that follows makes clear that Socrates does not have antecedent good luck in mind 
when he makes the claim. 
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make one’s lottery numbers come up.  Insofar as one could make one’s family 
wealthy, one’s city political stable, and one’s lottery ticket a winner, this would 
amount to the other kind of good fortune; it would be an achievement or success rather 
than an antecedent condition outside of one’s control.  But Socrates makes this claim 
in the context of a protreptic argument, or an argument aimed at persuasion to action.  
Socrates is attempting to pursuade Clinias that he ought to pursue wisdom.  A primary 
reason to pursue wisdom is that it enables its possessor reliably to have good fortune.  
But then good fortune is something largely within the control of the wise person.  
A second reason to think that antecedent good luck is not the sort of good 
fortune at issue is Socrates’ heavy reliance on the idea that experts have better fortune 
(at least for the most part) than non-experts.  It would be strange to think that experts 
generally have better antecedent luck than non-experts.  Wise and ignorant pilots sail 
the same seas in the same types of ships.  Wise and ignorant physicians treat the same 
sorts of diseases with the same sorts of medicine at their disposal.  What distinguishes 
them is not the antecedent circumstances in which they act, but their level of success 
when they act in those circumstances.  Suppose, though, that wise pilots encounter 
fewer serious storms per trip than ignorant pilots encounter.   Even this would not 
show that wise pilots have better antecedent luck than ignorant pilots, for the different 
rates of storms encountered can be attributed to the skill of the wise pilots.  Part of 
their skill is the ability to avoid serious storms unless it is absolutely necessary to go 
through them.  Avoiding storms is to be credited to wise pilots as a success, and so 
does not count as antecedent good luck. 
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It is clear, too, that when Socrates asks us to compare actions taken with the 
wise and unwise general or physician, he is asking us to make this judgment on the 
assumption that the antecedent fortune is the same for both the wise and the unwise.  
Consider how hesitant Clinias and Socrates should have been to agree on the point, if 
the question included instances like the following two:  Would you rather risk danger 
with an ignorant general who commands an army 100 times larger than his enemy, or 
with a wise general who commands an army 1/100th the size of his enemy?  Would 
you rather risk danger with an ignorant physician when you have a common cold, or 
with a wise physician when you have lung cancer?  In each case, not only would we 
not give an immediate answer in favor of acting with the wise person, but I, at least, 
find it obvious that it is better to act with the ignorant.  But Socrates and Clinias 
immediately agree in favor of acting with the wise, so this must not be the sort of 
question they are considering.  The difference in the two questions I provided was that 
each involved a significant difference in the antecedent fortune between the wise and 
the ignorant.  Socrates and Clinias, though, are considering cases where the antecedent 
fortune is the same for the wise and the ignorant.  So, rather than asking questions like, 
“Would you rather risk danger with an ignorant physician when you have a common 
cold, or with a wise physician when you have lung cancer?” Socrates is asking 
questions like, “Would you rather risk danger with an ignorant or a wise physician, 
when you have a common cold?” and “Would you rather risk danger with an ignorant 
or a wise physician, when you have lung cancer?”  In these cases, we would 
immediately choose to act with the wise.  
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If, then, by ‘good fortune’ Socrates means ‘antecedent good luck’, it is difficult 
to explain why he and Clinias so readily agree that experts have the best fortune 
concerning matters within their field of expertise.  This claim lacks obvious 
plausibility; at best it requires extended argument, but all we get is a series of 
examples that are readily accepted as supporting the claim.  It is also difficult to 
explain, on this view, why Socrates encourages Clinias to pursue something that is 
outside of his control.  Rather, Socrates must mean to be talking about a kind of 
achievement or success. 
 But concluding that Socrates is talking about a kind of success does not yet 
settle the matter.  Some scholars17 have argued that good fortune is a sort of success 
that amounts to acting well, rather than achieving a certain result.  This sort of success 
is different from, say, breaking 80 in a round of golf or saving enough to retire; these 
are cases of achieving a certain successful result.  Playing golf with a high degree of 
focus, an adequate understanding of the game, and a practiced swing, or being 
disciplined at saving money and investing with an adequate understanding of various 
investment vehicles are cases of achieving success at acting well:  acting as the skilled 
golfer or investor would act.  One may act well in these ways without achieving the 
desired result:  the ball may take an unexpected bounce of an ill-placed sprinkler head, 
or the stock market may crash and the local bank fail.  Call this sort of success – the 
success that is a matter of how one plays the game rather than what the final score is – 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See Russell 2005, ch. 1, for an especially clear articulation of the view; see also Dimas 2002. 
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internal-success.  Call the sort of success that amounts to achieving certain results 
outcome-success. 
 The appeal of taking Socrates to be talking about internal-success rather than 
outcome-success results mainly from taking Socrates’ claim that wisdom is good 
fortune to be an identity claim.  Given that wisdom is neither omniscience nor 
omnipotence, the wise will not always achieve the results at which they aim.  But, 
plausibly, they can always act well in the pursuit of these results.  And so Socrates is 
taken to be arguing that wisdom guarantees internal-success, and that internal-success 
is the important kind to achieve. 
Insofar as this line of interpretation depends on taking Socrates’ claim that 
wisdom is good fortune to be an identity claim, it is undermined by the argument of 
the previous section.  Additionally, and relatedly, it fails to make sense of Socrates’ 
qualification that the wise have better fortune than the ignorant for the most part.  To 
say that experts have better fortune than non-experts for the most part is to imply that 
sometimes they do not.  But internal-success is always available to the wise.  They can 
always control the way they act when they act.  It is the outcomes of their actions that 
they may not be able to control.  And non-experts will never act well in this internal 
sense to the degree that the wise do, for they will never act out of understanding.  They 
may try hard; they may choose correctly; they may achieve their aims.  But they will 
not act well in the same internal sense as the wise.  “For the most part” makes no sense 
if good fortune is internal-success. 
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 Taking good fortune to be outcome-success, however, allows us to make 
excellent sense of this qualification.  Socrates recognizes that external factors may 
hinder success, preventing even the wise pilot from reaching port safely.  The wise 
pilot is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, and must deal with the circumstances in 
which he finds himself.  Sometimes these circumstances include unpredictable 
weather patterns or unexpected problems with crew or ship.  Even while never failing 
to act as a skilled pilot would act, the wise pilot may fail to achieve the result of 
getting to port safely.  But in general wise pilots do get to port safely more often than 
ignorant pilots, for the wise are best able to deal with the circumstances in which they 
find themselves. 
To sum up the results so far, Socrates, when he uses the term ‘good fortune’, 
has in mind outcome-success, rather than antecedent good luck or internal-success, but 
he does not mean to identify wisdom and good fortune.  We are now in a position to 
see exactly what he is arguing.  Wisdom produces good fortune.  This is established by 
appeal to the examples of the experts, who produce better fortune than non-experts.  
But the wise do not infallibly produce good fortune, for external factors (antecedent 
luck, both good and bad) influence the degree of success agents have. Both wisdom 
and antecedent fortune affect outcome-success.  Even the wise pilot may encounter 
storms that cannot be weathered.  But the wise pilot will handle each situation as well 
as it can be handled.  The wise pilot will have the best outcomes possible given the 
antecedent conditions.  And this is due entirely to his wisdom, the only thing that 
differentiates him from the ignorant pilot who will have worse outcomes on the whole 
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given the same antecedent conditions.  So, wisdom is the cause of the greater 
outcome-success.  Socrates claims that “wisdom would never err” (280a7).  In every 
circumstance, wisdom produces the greatest outcome-success possible given that 
circumstance.  So, wisdom entails all the possible outcome-success in every situation.  
Since Socrates just means outcome-success by ‘good fortune’, wisdom entails all the 
good fortune possible in any circumstance.  So, to put good fortune on the list below 
wisdom is to add something that is already there implicitly.  Socrates sums up the 
argument by making just this point:  “We agreed finally – I don’t know how – that in 
sum things were like this:  When wisdom is present, in whom it is present, there is no 
need of good fortune in addition.”  Wisdom is good fortune in the sense that it 
provides whatever good fortune is possible given the circumstances.  But it is neither 
identical to good fortune, nor can it provide good fortune that goes beyond what is 
practically possible given the circumstances.  Here is a reconstruction of the basic 
argument that wisdom produces good fortune (WPF): 
(WPF-1)  Experts usually have the best fortune when it comes to matters in 
their field of expertise. 
(WPF-2)  Nevertheless, experts can fail to have good fortune and non-experts 
can accidentally have good fortune. 
(WPF-3)  So, wisdom is neither necessary nor sufficient for good fortune. 
(WPF-4)  Wisdom never errs. 





 Notice that this account requires that we read two lines in a way that may have 
initially seemed implausible.  The easier case is Socrates’ summation:  “When wisdom 
is present, in whom it is present, there is no need of good fortune in addition.”  We 
might have been tempted to read this as the claim that wisdom entails good fortune, 
but the argument that leads to this summation does not warrant that reading.  Instead, 
we must read this summation in its protreptic context.  Socrates is trying to show 
Clinias what he should pursue, and what he has argued is that the only thing under 
Clinias’ control that will contribute reliably to good fortune is wisdom.  Good fortune 
is not something separate to be pursued, some additional item to be put on the list 
behind wisdom, for good fortune is properly pursued only through the pursuit of 
wisdom.  This is not to say that antecedent luck plays no role, but only that antecedent 
luck is not something to be pursued. 
 The more difficult line is the surprising statement that started the argument:  
“Wisdom surely is good fortune; even a child would know that.”  This certainly looks 
like an identity claim when read in isolation.  But the argument that follows does not 
allow that reading, and so we must conclude that it is an attention-grabbing and as yet 
unqualified claim to the effect that good fortune duplicates something already on the 
list – wisdom – in the sense that pursuing wisdom amounts to doing everything one 
can properly do to pursue good fortune.  So wisdom is not identical to good fortune 
nor does wisdom entail good fortune, but the pursuit of wisdom exhausts the ways one 
can properly pursue good fortune. 
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3.5.  Stage 1 and the sufficiency thesis 
 Earlier I emphasized that it is common to read this passage as an argument for 
the sufficiency thesis.  I see two different lines such an argument might take.  First, if 
good fortune is, as Socrates calls it, “the greatest of the goods,” then good fortune 
might be good enough to suffice for happiness all by itself.  But then if wisdom is 
identical to or entails good fortune, wisdom suffices for happiness.  Good fortune 
might even itself entail the other goods like health and wealth, provided it is not 
simply internal-success.  Second, the highest sort of good fortune might be thought to 
be the achievement of success in one’s life as a whole.  But achieving success in one’s 
life as a whole just is happiness.  So, if wisdom is identical to or entails good fortune, 
then wisdom suffices for happiness.   
The problem with each of these lines of argument, if my interpretation of the 
passage is correct, is that Socrates is not committed to the crucial premise, in each 
version, that wisdom is identical to or entails good fortune.  So we are left without an 
argument that wisdom suffices for happiness.  Indeed, though Socrates does not give it 
and so I forward it tentatively, there are resources to construct an argument that 
wisdom does not suffice for happiness.  For surely some success at achieving one’s 
aims is necessary for happiness.  This, after all, is identified as the greatest of the 
goods.  Further evidence that achieving one’s aims is of great importance is that one of 
the main reasons Socrates gives Clinias for pursuing wisdom is that wisdom is 
conducive to achieving one’s aims.  But wisdom is not sufficient for success at 
achieving one’s aims.  Even the wise may be frustrated in their endeavors.  But if 
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wisdom is not sufficient for a necessary condition of happiness, then it is not sufficient 
for happiness. 
 
3.6.  Stage 2:  Wisdom and correct use (Euthydemus 280b-281d) 
The first stage of the argument fails to demonstrate, or even to attempt to 
demonstrate, that wisdom is sufficient for happiness.  Indeed, the first stage gives us 
reason to doubt the sufficiency thesis.  But what of the second stage?  Does it justify 
the standard view that the passage as a whole constitutes a ringing endorsement of the 
sufficiency thesis?  I will argue that it does not, but rather provides an argument only 
for the necessity of wisdom for happiness. 
Initially, Socrates and Clinias agreed on some basic assumptions:  Everyone 
wants to be happy; happiness comes from having many good things; things like health, 
honor, courage, wisdom and good fortune are good things.  Having already 
reconsidered the last of these assumptions by arguing that good fortune need not be 
added to a list which already includes wisdom, Socrates now revisits the second of 
these assumptions, that happiness comes from having many good things.  He argues 
that happiness requires not only the possession of good things, but that these goods be 
used as well. 
 
“We agreed, I said, that if we possessed many good things, we would 
be happy and do well.” 
He agreed. 
“Then would we be happy through possessing good things if they 
didn’t benefit us, or if they did benefit us?” 
“If they benefitted us,” he said. 
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“Then would they provide some benefit, if we only had them, but did 
not use them?  For example, if we had much food, but didn’t eat any, or 
drink, but didn’t drink any, would we benefit from these things?” 
“Clearly not,” he said. 
“Well then, if every craftsman had all the requisite provisions for his 
own work, but never used them, would they do well through the possession, 
because they possessed everything which a craftsman needs to possess?  For 
example, if a carpenter were provided with all the tools and enough wood, 
but never built anything, would he benefit from the possession? 
“In no way,” he said. 
“Well then, if someone possessed wealth and all the good things we 
just said, but did not use them, would he be happy through the possession of 
these good things?”   
“Clearly not, Socrates.” 
“Then it seems,” I said, “that the one who is going to be happy must 
not only possess such goods, but also use them.  Otherwise, there is no benefit 
from the possession.” 
  “That’s true.”  (280b5-d7) 
 
 The passage licenses two principles.  First, things contribute to our happiness 
just in case they provide some benefit to us.  That this is a biconditional is a fairly 
clear implication of 280b7-8:  If things benefit us they make us happy, and if they do 
not benefit us they do not make us happy.  Second, things provide some benefit to us 
only if we not only possess them, but also use them.  From these two principles we 
can infer a necessary condition for things that contribute to our happiness:  Things 
contribute to our happiness only if we not only possess them, but also use them.  But 
this condition is still too weak, and Socrates strengthens it. 
 
 “So then, Clinias, is this now sufficient to make someone happy, to 
possess good things and to use them?   
 “It seems so to me.” 
 “If,” I said, “he uses them correctly, or if not?”   
 “If he uses them correctly.” 
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 “Well said.  For I think it is a greater harm, if someone uses something 
incorrectly than if he leaves it alone.  For in the former case there is evil, but in 
the latter cases there is neither evil nor good.  Or don’t we say this?” 
He agreed.     (280d7-281a1) 
 
Now our second principle has been modified:  Things provide some benefit to 
us only if we not only possess them, but also use them correctly.  That correctness is 
part of the consequent is demonstrated by considering the consequences when 
correctness is lacking.  When correctness is lacking, harm results rather than benefit.  
So, correctness is required for benefit.  And the necessary condition for things that 
contribute to happiness has thereby been strengthened:  Things contribute to our 
happiness only if we not only possess them, but also use them correctly.   
Two other advances are made at 280d7-281a1.  Socrates introduces the idea 
that in cases where something is used incorrectly, it would have been better had it not 
been used at all.  This will become a key point in the argument momentarily, and we 
can set it aside until then.  More importantly, up until 280d7 we had no explicit 
indication that Socrates was looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something’s contributing to our happiness.  Indeed, to this point we had arrived only at 
severally necessary conditions.  But here he makes it clear that he is after jointly 
sufficient (B9%.C.) conditions as well.  So, our strengthened necessary condition for 
things that contribute to our happiness can now be strengthened even further, this time 
by making it a biconditional:  Things contribute to our happiness just in case we not 
only possess them, but also use them correctly. 
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Socrates goes on to consider what provides for correct use.  Just as he argued 
that wisdom provides good fortune, he now argues that wisdom provides correct use.18 
 
“Well then, in working and using things concerning wood, surely there 
is nothing else that produces correct use than knowledge of carpentry?”   
“Clearly not,” he said. 
“And also in work concerning utensils the producer of the correctness 
is knowledge.”   
He agreed. 
“Then,” I said, “also concerning the use of the first of the goods we 
spoke of – wealth and health and beauty – was it knowledge which directed 
and made our action correct with respect to using all such things correctly, or 
something else?”   
“Knowledge,” he said. 
“It seems then that knowledge provides men not only with good fortune 
but also with well-doing, in all possession and action.”   
He agreed.  (281a1-b4) 
 
Socrates again begins by considering craftsmen, and proceeds by induction to a 
general conclusion.  When it comes to using correctly the materials of carpentry, it is 
the expertise of the carpenter that produces correct use.  The carpenter’s expertise 
allows him to make proper use of each tool and material.  A non-expert, one who does 
not understand the carpenter’s craft, will not be able to make correct use of each tool 
and material.  Likewise for the expert-maker of utensils.  The point is perfectly 
parallel to the argument that wisdom provides good fortune, and so we should still 
have in mind that it is the expert pilot (or general, or physician) who makes correct use 
of ships (or troops, or medicine).  In every case, it is knowledge that provides both 
success and correct use. 
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18 The shift from speaking of wisdom (!"#$%) to knowledge (>2-!(?µ:) is unproblematic; see note 13. 
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Socrates then generalises the claim for all the goods on the initial list.  It is 
knowledge that provides for the correct use of goods such as wealth and health and 
beauty – and so, too, we should infer, with goods like power and honor and bravery.  
Knowledge provides men with correct use “in all possession and action.”  It is difficult 
to determine strictly from the passage at 281a1-b4 whether this is meant to be a 
necessary condition, a sufficient condition, or both.  But if we recall from 280a7-8 the 
principle that “wisdom would never err, but necessarily does rightly” we can see that it 
must at least be a sufficient condition.  Knowledge, whenever present, guarantees 
correct use of whatever falls under its domain.  The next part of the argument confirms 
that this is also meant to be a necessary condition:  Correct use is provided for just in 
case knowledge is present.19 
“Then, by Zeus,” I said, “is there any benefit from other possessions 
without intelligence and wisdom?  Would a man benefit more from possessing 
many things and doing many things without sense, or from possessing and 
doing little with sense?  Examine it this way.  Doing less, wouldn’t he err less?  
And erring less, wouldn’t he do less badly?  And doing less badly wouldn’t he 
be less miserable?”   
“Certainly,” he said. 
“Then would someone do less if he were poor, or wealthy?” 
“Poor,” he said. 
“And if weak or strong?” 
“Weak.” 
“And if honored or dishonored?” 
“Dishonored.” 
“And would he do less if courageous and temperate or cowardly?” 
“Cowardly.” 
“So then also if he were lazy rather than hard-working?” 
He agreed. 
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19 (Again, it is clear that the words I am translating as ‘wisdom’ (!"#$%), ‘knowledge’ (>2-!(?µ:), 
‘intelligence’ (#/D.:!-0), and ‘sense’ (."E0) are being used interchangeably throughout.  Otherwise, 




“And if slow rather than fast, and dull of sight and hearing rather than 
sharp?” 
With all such things we agreed with one another.  (281b4-d2) 
 
 For the person without knowledge, doing less means erring less.  In other 
words, without knowledge, a person will not correctly use their possessions.  The main 
point of this passage is that there is no benefit in possessions apart from knowledge.  
Knowledge, then, is both necessary and sufficient for correct use.  Indeed, one who 
lacks wisdom would be better off the less he has, and the wise will always be better 
off than the ignorant.  Having reached this conclusion, we are now in a position to sum 
up the argument of this second stage of the first protreptic – the argument that wisdom 
provides correct use (AWC).    
(AWC-1)  Our possessions (broadly construed to include all such things as 
those on the initial list of goods) contribute to our happiness just in case they 
provide some benefit to us.  (280b7-8) 
(AWC-2)  Our possessions provide some benefit to us just in case they are 
used correctly.  (280b5-281a1) 
(AWC-3)  So, our possessions contribute to our happiness just in case they are 
used correctly. 
(AWC-4)  Correct use of possessions is provided for just in case knowledge is 
present.  (281a1-d2) 
(AWC-5)  If possessions are not used correctly, positive harm (and not simply 
lack of benefit) results.  (281b4-d2) 
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(AWC-6)  So, wisdom guarantees that one’s possessions contribute to one’s 
happiness, and ignorance guarantees that one’s possession fail to contribute 
(and, if used, even detract from) one’s happiness. 
 
AWC-6 remains implicit at this stage, but it is entailed by the explicit claims that are 
defended.  But notice that AWC-6 does not entail that wisdom suffices for happiness.  
Rather, it entails that any possessions (broadly construed to include all such things as 
those on the initial list of goods) we have, provided that we are wise, will contribute to 
our happiness.  But this is just a conditional statement:  For anything on our list of 
goods, if we possess it, then it will contribute to our happiness.  There are two 
problems with thinking that this conditional expresses the sufficiency of wisdom for 
happiness.  First, there is little reason to think that, if something contributes to my 
happiness, it follows that I am happy.  For example, I have a one-dollar bill on my 
desk.  It seems true to say that this one-dollar bill contributes to my wealth.  But it 
does not follow that I am wealthy.  Its contribution hardly suffices to make me 
wealthy.  Likewise, even if something contributes to my happiness, it may leave me 
far short of being happy.  So, even if wisdom did guarantee contributions to happiness, 
it would not follow that it guarantees happiness. 
Second, there is no claim anywhere in the first protreptic that wisdom 
guarantees the satisfaction of the antecedent of this conditional.  That is, nowhere is it 
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suggested that wisdom guarantees the possession of the things on our list of goods.20  
Given that we possess them, wisdom guarantees their correct use.  But there is no 
evidence that wisdom guarantees their possession.  And if wisdom does not guarantee 
their possession, then wisdom does not even guarantee contributions to happiness.   
Perhaps, though, wisdom does guarantee the possession of the things on our 
list of goods.  Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith21 have argued that wisdom not 
only confers on things their goodness (which, as we will see, is the main point of the 
next stage of the protreptic), but also is productive of some good things.  An example 
they give is temperance being productive of health, when temperance leads you to stay 
out late less often and to drink less, and so to get enough sleep and have fewer 
headaches.  Indeed, this may be exactly the sort of cure Socrates recommends for 
Charmides’ headaches.  And we have already seen that Socrates thinks that wisdom 
will bring about, or produce, whatever good fortune is possible in the circumstances.  
So, perhaps wisdom can produce all the items on our list of goods.22 
Brickhouse and Smith do not make their case in order to argue for the 
sufficiency of virtue for happiness.  Rather, they interpret the Euthydemus in light of 
their general argument against the sufficiency thesis.23  But whether we accept their 
general argument against the sufficiency thesis or not, there are at least four reasons 
why their claim that wisdom can produce goods should not lead us to think that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 One exception is discussed above in section 3.3:  Socrates claims that wisdom produces eutuchia, and 
eutuchia is on the list of goods. 
21 Brickhouse and Smith 2000. 
22 Ibid. 
23 For the general argument, see Brickhouse and Smith, Plato’s Socrates, (Oxford: 1994), ch. 4.  
Brickhouse and Smith are rare defenders of the view that Socrates denied both the necessity and the 
sufficiency of wisdom for happiness. 
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Socrates endorses the sufficiency thesis.24  First, as I noted above, even if wisdom 
could guarantee a variety of contributions to happiness, it would not follow that it 
guarantees happiness.  Second, good fortune is unique among the listed goods in being 
singled out as guaranteed or produced by wisdom.  This, I suggest, is because good 
fortune has to do with the outcomes of action, while wealth, health, honor, etc. are 
conceived of as part of the circumstances in which one acts.  Wealth and the others are 
materials for action, things to be used correctly, whereas it is difficult to conceive of 
good fortune (understood as outcome-success) as a material to be used correctly, 
except insofar as it simply amounts to acquiring useful materials (as, for example, 
success with a physician amounts to acquiring health).  Third, even if we accept the 
Charmides case as showing that virtue can produce good things, this production 
appears to be quite limited.  It is because of Charmides’ vice that he has headaches.  
So, removing the vice – the cause of the headaches – and replacing it with virtue 
should eliminate the headaches.  Likewise, if a man is poor precisely because he is 
profligate, then replacing this vice with virtue should alleviate his poverty.  Perhaps 
this licenses the general principle that harms directly caused and sustained25 by vice 
are eliminated when vice is replaced by virtue.  But it does not license the general 
principle that virtue can make one healthy (or wealthy, or honored) when the cause of 
one’s illness (or poverty, or dishonor) is not vice.  So, virtue will not produce health if 
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24 To emphasize the point, I am not giving an argument against Brickhouse and Smith.  Indeed, they 
explicitly endorse at least the fourth point that follows. 
25 The ‘and sustained’ is necessary because some harms simply caused by vice cannot be eliminated by 
replacing vice with virtue.  Think of an intemperant drunk who injures himself badly in an accident, or 
a promiscuous womanizer who contracts an incurable sexually transmitted disease. 
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you have contracted the plague, or been seriously wounded on the front lines of the 
battle.  The virtuous, then, still run the risk of lacking the various goods, though they 
may run less of a risk than the vicious because they will not have frequent hangovers 
and the like.  Fourth, there are some listed goods that virtue does not seem capable of 
producing at all.  For example, it is difficult to see how virtue could produce good 
looks or noble birth. 
The second stage of the protreptic clearly supports the necessity of wisdom for 
happiness.  If wisdom is necessary for correct use, and correct use is necessary for 
benefit, and benefit is necessary for happiness, then wisdom is necessary for 
happiness.  However, as in the first stage, nowhere in the second stage do we find 
support for the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.  To be sure, we do not find an 
explicit argument against the sufficiency thesis, but we do not find support for the 
sufficiency thesis either. 
 
3.7.  Stage 3:  Wisdom as the sole good (Euthydemus 281d-e) 
We have seen that the first and second stages of the first protreptic do not 
constitute an argument for the sufficiency thesis, though the second stage is meant to 
secure the necessity thesis.  But the third and final stage has sometimes been taken to 
be a nearly explicit endorsement of the sufficiency thesis.  For happiness requires 
good things, and Socrates says at 281e3-5 that wisdom is the sole good and ignorance 
the sole bad.  From this it appears to follow that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for 
happiness.  Here is this short but important passage in its entirety, which follows 
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immediately the examples meant to prove that one does more if one has the listed 
goods, and so these goods are actually harmful for the ignorant.   
 
“In sum, Clinias,” I said, “it is likely that concerning all the things that 
we first called goods, the account of them is not that they are goods in 
themselves by nature, but rather it seems to be this:  If ignorance leads them, 
they are greater evils than their opposites, insofar as they are better able to 
serve the evil master; but if intelligence and wisdom lead they, they are greater 
goods, though in themselves neither sort is of any value.”   
 He said, “Apparently, it seems to be just as you say.” 
 “Then what follows from the things we’ve said?  Is it anything other 
than that none of the other things is either good or evil, but of these two, 
wisdom is good, and ignorance is evil?”  
 He agreed.  (281d2-e5) 
 
 
Irwin reconstructs the argument as follows: 
 
(1) Each recognized good [e.g., health, wealth] is a greater evil than its 
contrary, if it is used without wisdom, and each is a greater good than its 
contrary, if it is used by wisdom (281d6-8). 
(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is in itself (auto 
kath’hauto) neither good nor evil (281d3-5, d8-e1)26. 
(3) Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil (281e3-4). 
(4) Therefore, wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil (281e4-5).27 
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26 Irwin’s argument cites 281e3-4 as evidence for premise (2).  I think he must mean to refer to 281d3-5 
or 281d8-e1 instead, but if the reader has doubts about this she can judge for herself by examining 
Irwin’s text and the relevent passages in the Euthydemus. 




Irwin distinguishes two views we might attribute to Socrates from this passage: 
 
The Moderate View:  “When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not 
goods ‘in themselves’, he means that they are not goods when they are 
divorced from wisdom.  When he concludes that wisdom is the only good, he 
means simply that only wisdom is good all by itself, apart from any 
combination with other things.” 
 
The Extreme View:  “When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not 
goods ‘in themselves’, he means that they are not goods; any goodness belongs 
to the wise use of them, not to the recognized goods themselves.  When 
Socrates concludes that wisdom is the only good, he means that nothing else is 
good.”28 
 
Commentators have divided over these two readings.  Recent commentators who 
accept The Moderate View include Brickhouse and Smith, Reshotko, and Vlastos.  
Recent commentators who accept The Extreme View include Annas, McPherran, and 
Russell.29  Irwin argues for The Extreme View on the grounds that The Moderate 
View cannot explain the inference to (3) and (4).  After all, The Moderate View 
licenses calling the recognized goods ‘goods’ when they are conjoined with wisdom.  
But (3) and (4) rule out calling the recognized goods ‘goods’.  So, Socrates must have 
in mind The Extreme View rather than The Moderate View.30 
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28 Ibid., p. 57 
29 See Brickhouse and Smith 2000; Reshotko 2006, pp. 98-103; Vlastos 1991, pp. 227-231; Annas 
1999, ch. 2; McPherran 2005; and Russell 2005, ch. 1. 
30 The Stoics also interpreted Socrates as expressing The Extreme View, and so took this passage to be 
evidence for the Socratic origin of their view that wisdom is the only good.  Even within the Stoic 
school, however, there was room for disagreement about what the passage implies.  Orthodox Stoics 
would have found in the passage room for a doctrine of preferred indifferents, according to which the 
conventional goods (health, wealth, etc.) are valuables but not goods.  Aristo, on the other hand, would 
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 Contrary to Irwin, I believe Socrates is expressing The Moderate View here.  I 
agree that the inference to (3) and (4) is illicit on The Moderate View.  But we can 
solve this problem by reinterpreting (3) and (4) in light of the whole passage.  At the 
same time, we can avoid a problem for The Extreme View.  The problem is that if we 
suppose that in (3) and (4) Socrates is telling us that the recognized goods are in no 
way goods at all, then he directly contradicts what he has just said in (1), that the 
recognized goods can be ‘greater goods’ than their opposites.  But if Socrates is telling 
us in the same argument that the same things are both greater goods and not goods at 
all, then the argument appears to be incoherent.  We can avoid this problem by 
supposing that in (3), Socrates is not drawing an inference but rather restating (2).  
‘Neither good nor evil’ in (3) is then to be read, in light of (2), as a contraction of ‘in 
itself neither good nor evil’.31  (4), in turn, should be read as, ‘Wisdom is the only 
good in itself and folly the only evil in itself.’  Not only does this avoid the apparent 
contradiction, but it prevents us from being confronted with a claim for which the 
argument to this point has not prepared us, that the recognized goods are neither good 
nor evil in any way.  This claim, the extreme one, does not follow at all from what has 
come before.  But if (3) is a restatement of (2), and (4) just takes the conclusion a step 
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have found support for the view that nothing but wisdom is good or valuable at all, and nothing but 
ignorance is bad or disvaluable at all.  For a useful discussion, see Long 1986, esp. pp. 164ff. 
 Diogenes Laertius (2.31) clearly has this passage in mind when he attributes The Extreme 
View to Socrates:  “There is, [Socrates] said, only one good, that is, knowledge, and only one evil, that 
is ignorance.”  It is, of course, a point of debate whether this is the correct view to attribute to Socrates.  
But Diogenes Laertius plainly misinterprets Socrates when he immediately goes on to write, “Wealth 
and good birth bring their possessor no dignity, but on the contrary evil.”  (Hicks trans.)  (FG&8& HI 9%= 
J. µDKK.". 48%5C. &L.%-, (M. >2-!(?µ:., 9%= J. µD.". 9%9D., (M. 4µ%5$%.N  2G"E(". HI 9%= &'8+.&-%. 
"'HI. !&µ.C. F*&-.N  2A. HI ("'.%.($". 9%9D..)   
31 See Vlastos 1991, pp. 229-230, for a defense of reading ‘neither good nor evil’ as a contracted form 
of ‘in itself neither good nor evil’. 
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further, then we have a perfectly reasonable explication of the text on which Socrates 
holds The Moderate View. 
 Perhaps someone would object that (3) and (4) are introduced with an 
inference-term, !)µO%$.&-, and so must be inferences rather than restatements.32  This 
is a fair observation, but it should be noted that what follows is, strictly speaking, not 
two inferences given separately, but a conjunction in which the conjuncts are being 
contrasted with one another by use of a µI. . . . HI construction.  If someone insists 
that we read (3) and (4) as inferences, defenders of The Moderate View can insist back 
that (3) and (4) must be read rather as an inference.  On this understanding, the 
conclusion of the argument is a conjunction:  “None of the other things is either good 
or bad, but of these two, wisdom is good, and ignorance is bad.”  Granted, the first 
conjunct has already been made explicit in its uncontracted form, but it is restated in 
order to contrast it with the second conjunct, which is here made explicit for the first 
time.  The Moderate View makes sense of the entire passage, while The Extreme 
View cannot. 
 If The Moderate View provides the most plausible reading of the text, then we 
can see that it reinforces the necessity thesis.  If the goodness of all other things 
requires wisdom, and if happiness requires goodness, then happiness requires wisdom.  
But the sufficiency thesis does not seem to be in view here.33  Again, wisdom confers 
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32 Long (1988, p. 167 n. 62) objects on similar grounds:  “In 281d3-5, Socrates has already asserted that 
‘the things we first said were good are not good just by themselves.’  If this is all that he is asserting in 
the first part of his conclusion, ‘none of these other things is either good or bad’, his ostensible 
conclusion is reduced to a summary, which contributes nothing new.” 
33 Contra Zeyl 1982, p. 231, who takes Socrates to be expressing the Moderate View – “all of the 
candidate goods but wisdom are demoted from the status of being goods ‘in their own right’ to being 
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goodness on whatever so-called ‘recognized goods’ like health and honor we possess.  
But nowhere in this third stage is it suggested that wisdom guarantees the possession 
of the recognized goods.  The focus is entirely on necessity rather than sufficiency.   
 We are now in a position to sum up the argument that wisdom is the only good 
(WOG): 
(WOG-1) Each recognized good [e.g., health, wealth] is a greater evil than its 
contrary, if it is used without wisdom, and each is a greater good than its 
contrary, if it is used by wisdom. 
(WOG-2)  So, each recognized good other than wisdom is in itself neither 
good nor evil. 
(WOG-3)  So, wisdom is the only good in itself and folly the only evil in itself. 
 
3.8.  Conclusion 
Together, the arguments in the first stage that wisdom provides good fortune 
(WPF), in the second stage that wisdom provides correct use (AWC), and in the third 
stage that wisdom is the only good (WOG) present a potent protreptic for wisdom.  
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neither good nor bad in themselves, but good, bad or indifferent only under the direction of knowledge, 
ignorance or the absence of any such direction” – yet concludes, “Wisdom alone survives as the only 
good whose mere possession guarantees its usefulness: it is thus the possession of wisdom which 
constitutes happiness.”  But this is a non sequiter for at least two reasons.  First, nothing in the passage 
decides the issue whether wisdom constitutes happiness or contributes to it in some other way.  Second, 
by “it is thus the possession of wisdom which constitutes happiness”, Zeyl clearly means to express the 
sufficiency thesis.  But, for the reasons expressed above, the sufficiency thesis does not follow from the 
Moderate View endorsed by Zeyl.  Were Socrates expressing the Extreme View, the sufficiency thesis 
would seem to be in play, for happiness consists in having (or correctly using) good things, and wisdom 
would be the only good thing.  Thus, to have wisdom would be to have everything required for 
happiness.  We should, then, for the reasons I have given in the main text, go along with Zeyl in 
endorsing the Moderate View, though we should not follow him in nevertheless drawing conclusions 
that can at best be drawn only from the Extreme View. 
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Clinias should pursue wisdom because with it he will have a good chance of being 
happy, while without it he will have no chance at all.  Since Clinias shares with all of 
us the single dominant goal in life of attaining happiness, this conclusion is all 
Socrates requires to accomplish his protreptic aim.34  Contrary to a long and dominant 
interpretive tradition, I have argued that this conclusion is all that Socrates aims to 
establish.  Specifically, I have argued that Socrates is not making the case for the 
sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.  Wisdom is necessary for and conducive to 
happiness, but nowhere in this passage does Socrates claim or reveal that he is 
committed to the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.  Indeed, what he says about 
wisdom and good fortune is suggestive against the sufficiency thesis.  The summation 
of the passage reinforces this interpretation, as it appeals only to the necessity, but not 
the sufficiency, of wisdom for happiness: 
 
Then let us consider the consequence of this.  Since we all want to be happy, 
and since we appear to become happy by using things and using them 
correctly, and since it is knowledge that provides the correctness and good 
fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to prepare themselves in every 
way for this:  how they will become as wise as possible.  (282a1-6) 
 
So much for what I take myself to have established.  It is equally important to 
be clear about what I do not take myself to have established.  While Euthydemus 277-
282 does not provide evidence that Socrates endorses the sufficiency thesis, I do not 
take myself to have demonstrated that what Socrates says in this passage is flatly 
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34 Or, at least, it is all the rational argument he requires.  The question whether Clinias’ acceptance of 




inconsistent with the sufficiency thesis.  Certainly, some of what he says here will be 
difficult to reconcile with the sufficiency thesis, but I make no claim that, with enough 
philosophical ingenuity, it cannot be done.  Furthermore, I do not take myself to have 
shown that Socrates nowhere endorses the sufficiency thesis.  Perhaps there is strong 
evidence in other passages that he does endorse this thesis.  My claim is only that such 
a case will have to find its impetus in passages other than Euthydemus 277-82.  
Champions of the sufficiency thesis will need a new locus classicus, for the old one 





Chapter 4:  Wisdom As a Craft in Euthydemus 288-292 
 
 In my explication of the first protreptic of the Euthydemus, I argued that the 
thesis that virtue1 is sufficient for happiness was nowhere to be found, despite the fact 
that this thesis is commonly attributed to Socrates and is often thought to be most 
clearly and forcefully expressed in the first protreptic.  In this chapter, I examine the 
aporetic second protreptic section, in which we find Socrates making much of another 
thesis that is commonly attributed to Socrates, that virtue is, or is very much like, a 
craft (techne).  This thesis is thought to be so central to Socratic philosophy and has 
been so discussed by scholars that it has developed a standard name:  the craft analogy 
(or, sometimes, techne analogy).  According to the craft analogy, virtue shares at least 
most of the central and common features of, among others, cobblery, medicine, and 
generalship.  If the craft analogy is correct, then it makes sense to think about the 
characteristics of cobblery, medicine, and generalship in the hope of learning 
something about virtue. 
 These two theses, the sufficiency thesis and the craft-analogy, have been the 
focus of the great majority of scholarship on the protreptic sections of the Euthydemus.  
With respect to the sufficiency thesis, most commentators have taken the character 
Socrates to have endorsed it in the Euthydemus (particularly in the first protreptic), 
and insofar as they have speculated on the matter they have generally supposed that 
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1 Recall that ‘virtue’ and ‘wisdom’ are equivalent in the Euthydemus.  See chapters 2 and 3.  Recall also 
that various knowledge words including !"#$%, &'(!)*µ+, #,-.+!(/, and ."0/ (which I have translated 
as ‘wisdom’, ‘knowledge’, ‘intelligence’, and ‘sense’, respectively) are used equivalently in these 
passages.  See chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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the author Plato means to endorse it as well.  I have argued against this prevailing 
view.  But with respect to the craft analogy, there is little doubt that Socrates makes 
heavy use of it, and so seems to endorse it, in the second protreptic.  Unlike with the 
sufficiency thesis, however, commentators have tended to suppose that Plato, as 
author, has different motivations for giving the craft analogy such prominence than 
does the character Socrates who propounds it.  Indeed, it has become common to read 
Plato as having crafted the second protreptic for the very purpose of criticizing the 
craft analogy, much as it has become common to read the Meno as Plato’s criticism of 
the limitations of the Socratic elenchos with respect to inquiry.2  This reading of the 
second protreptic fits naturally with a  developmentalist account of the Platonic 
corpus, the broad outlines of which involve Plato initially endorsing and then 
gradually moving away from some of the distinctive commitments of his teacher.  The 
Euthydemus, on this view, is the point where we see Plato reject, or perhaps radically 
revise, the craft-analogy prevalent in the Socratic dialogues.  While the view that Plato 
crafted the second protreptic in order to criticize the craft analogy fits nicely with such 
a developmentalist view, it is not essentially tied to a particular strain of 
developmentalism, or even to developmentalism generally.  Perhaps Plato is 
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2 This is not the only way in which the Euthydemus has been thought to represent a departure from the 
philosophy of the historical Socrates or the Socrates of the so-called “elenctic dialogues”.  Consider the 
following claims of Vlastos 1991, pp. 116-7:   
 
The change is no less marked in the Euthydemus. . . .  Here for the first time in Plato’s corpus 
we see Socrates unloading his philosophizing on an interlocutor in the form of protreptic 
discourse expounded in flagrantly non-elenctic fashion as a virtual monologue. . . .  So here, as 
in the Lysis and the Hippias Major the elenchus has been jettisoned.  Moral doctrine of the 
highest import – the core of Socrates’ moral philosophy – is propounded in the Lysis and the 
Euthydemus unchallenged by an opponent.  I submit that to make sense of so drastic a 
departure from what Plato had put into his protrayals of Socrates from the Apology to the 
Gorgias, we must hypothesize a profound change in Plato himself. 
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clarifying, or exploring, or suggesting a deeper explanation of his view of the craft 
analogy, without changing his position on it.  
 As in the case of the sufficiency thesis, I will argue that this standard 
interpretation is incorrect.3  But unlike the sufficiency thesis, for which I argue the 
Euthydemus offers little support, with respect to the craft analogy I will argue that not 
only does the character Socrates endorse it, but we have little reason to think that Plato 
rejects or radically revises it.  Indeed, the two theses are connected.  I will offer a fresh 
interpretation of the second protreptic according to which the passage provides 
additional support for the craft analogy, and additional evidence against the 
sufficiency thesis.  Specifically, I argue that the second protreptic is a reductio of the 
conjunction of a specific principle and the craft analogy, that rejecting the principle 
and retaining the craft analogy is the best way to avoid the reductio, and that the 
offending principle is closely tied to the sufficiency thesis. 
 
4.1.  Socrates’ appeals to the craft analogy in the Euthydemus 
 That Socrates appeals to the craft analogy in the Euthydemus is in little doubt.  
Consider the first protreptic, where Socrates justifies the claim that wisdom is good 
fortune by appealing to the fortune of various experts:  flute players, writing masters, 
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3 By “standard interpretation” I mean the view that Plato is sharply criticizing the craft analogy.  I mean 
my argument against the standard interpretation, on the one hand, to apply equally to both 
developmentalist and non-developmentalist accounts of this alleged criticism of the craft analogy, and I 
mean my own positive interpretation, on the other hand, to be neutral between developmentalist and 
non-developmentalist accounts of the Platonic corpus as a whole. 
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pilots, generals, and physicians.4  Each of these has mastered a craft, and it is by virtue 
of this mastery that they are considered wise (!"#$%) with respect to their field of 
expertise.5  Since it is the wise who have the best fortune, it appears that someone who 
wants to have good fortune should seek wisdom.  In the following section, Socrates 
appeals to craftsmen (&'µ)$*+,$-) generally, and carpenters and makers of utensils 
specifically, to show that it is knowledge that provides not only good fortune, but also 
correct use.6  Again, since it is knowledge of a craft that produces correct use, and 
since correct use is necessary for benefit, we should seek knowledge.  It is on precisely 
this basis that Socrates sums up the results of the first protreptic: 
 
Then let us consider the consequence of this.  Since we all want to be happy, 
and since we appear to become happy by using things and using them 
correctly, and since it is knowledge that provides the correctness and good 
fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to prepare themselves in every 
way for this:  how they will become as wise as possible.  (282a1-6) 
 
 
Whatever this wisdom that we should seek is, the first protreptic seems to 
indicate that it is the same kind of thing that constitutes the carpenter’s or pilot’s or 
physician’s mastery of his particular field.  But while the first protreptic does not tell 
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4 These are, to some degree, stock examples for Socrates.  See, e.g., Republic I.341c-d, where Socrates 
uses physicians and pilots as examples.  See also Gorgias 491a1-3, where an exasperated Callicles 
exclaims to Socrates:  “By the gods!  You simply don’t let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and 
cleaners, cooks and doctors, as if our discussion were about them!”  (Zeyl trans.) 
5 In the case of generals and physicians, Socrates explicitly distinguishes between wise and ignorant 
ones to highlight the distinction between those who merely profess to have mastered a craft, and those 
who really have it.  Only the wise physician actually has the craft of medicine; the ignorant “physician” 
is no real physician at all.  In the other cases (flute players, writing masters, and pilots), it is simply 
assumed that we are talking about genuine experts.  In the following discussion, I mean to refer to 
genuine physicians, generals, etc., rather than to anyone who professes to be a genuine expert. 
6 The appeal to the carpenter ()12)3.) and to knowledge of carpentry (&'(!)*µ+ 4 )52)".(2*) is 
interesting, if only because it harkens back to the roots of the term )16.+.  See Roochnik 1996, pp. 19-
21 for a discussion of the etymology.  [See also Philebus 56b.] 
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us exactly what this wisdom is, we can infer something it cannot be.  It cannot be 
simply the knowledge of carpentry, or the knowledge of medicine, or the knowledge 
of any of the other of the crafts mentioned.  For carpentry produces things like beds 
and houses, and medicine produces health, but a central lesson of the first protreptic 
was that things like beds, houses, and health make us worse off unless we know how 
to use them correctly.  We need a craft that goes beyond the ability to make these 
things to the ability to know whether to pursue them at all and how to use them 
correctly when we have attained them. 
The second protreptic, as we will see, picks up the question of identifying the 
wisdom we should seek.  The important point at the moment is that Socrates and 
Clinias proceed by laying down constraints on the nature of this wisdom, and then 
investigating many different crafts to see whether they meet these constraints.  So they 
consider some hypothetical crafts (knowledge of how to discover where the greatest 
quantities of gold are buried, alchemy, knowledge of how to make men immortal), as 
well as a great variety of actual crafts (money-making, medicine, lyre-making, lyre-
playing, flute-making, speech-writing, speech-giving, enchanting (snakes and the 
like), generalship, hunting, fishing, cooking, geometry, astronomy, calculation, 
dialectic, statesmanship, quail-hunting, quail-keeping, and ruling).  None of these meet 
the constraints they have laid down, and they can think of no alternative craft that 
would meet their constraints.  Because of this, the passage ends unsuccessfully, with 
Clinias and Socrates apparently no closer to identifying the wisdom they seek than 
they were at the beginning. 
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Because of this lack of success, some commentators have thought that Plato 
means to repudiate the craft analogy by showing how fruitless it is.  Wisdom must be 
of a certain character, and no craft could have that character.  I shall set that issue 
aside for now.  Instead of speculating about Plato’s intentions, here I want to be clear 
about what Socrates is doing.  Socrates is plainly relying on the craft analogy 
throughout both the first and the second protreptic passages.  He makes his central 
points about wisdom in the first protreptic by appealing to crafts, and in the second 
protreptic when he seeks to identify that wisdom, he looks for it among the crafts.  
When he fails to find it, he has no back-up plan.  He does not say, “Perhaps, Clinias, 
we were wrong to look for wisdom among the crafts.  Where else should we search for 
it?”  Instead he throws up his hands and professes to be at a loss.  Clearly, then, unless 
Socrates is being extremely disingenuous throughout, he is committed to the craft 
analogy.  To flesh out the analogy a bit, he is committed to the claim that wisdom is 
(or is very much like) a craft, where a craft has at least the following features: 
1. Crafts are kinds of knowledge.  For example, carpentry is (roughly) 
knowledge of how to make things with wood; medicine is (roughly) 
knowledge of how to maintain or restore health. 
2. Crafts have a specified domain.  For example, carpentry is knowledge of 
how to make things with wood; medicine is knowledge of how to maintain 
or restore health.  Building houses does not fall under the physician’s 
domain, nor does restoring health fall under the carpenter’s domain. 
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3. Crafts have one or more specified products.  For example, carpentry 
produces a variety of products like beds and houses; medicine produces 
health. 
4. Crafts tend to be arranged in hierarchies.  For example, a smith produces 
horseshoes for the horse trainer; the horse trainer trains horses for the 
cavalry leader; the cavalry leader trains and deploys his cavalry for the 
general; and the general deploys his forces for the ruler.  In this case, 
smithery is for the sake of horse training, which is for the sake of cavalry 
strategy, which is for the sake of strategy in general, which is for the sake 
of ruling (expanding or defending a kingdom). 
5. A craft is value-neutral in the sense that it does not itself guarantee that its 
product will be used correctly and so produce benefit.  For example, the 
smith may produce horseshoes, which are ultimately used by a general for 
the sake of winning a war.  But whether they are used in a just war, using 
effective military strategy, for the sake of producing actual benefits for the 
kingdom, is up to the general and/or the ruler, not the smith.  A physician 
may produce health in a patient, but whether the patient uses his health to 
produce good or evil is not up to the physician.  Similarly, a physician 
herself may use her skill to produce disease rather than health.  So, the craft 
itself guarantees neither that the craftsman will produce something good 
rather than something bad, nor that even if the craftsman produces 
something good, that good will be used appropriately. 
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6. A craft is teachable.  For example, a carpenter or a physician can take on 
an apprentice, and thereby pass on his mastery of his craft. 
 
Each of these features of crafts finds support in the Euthydemus.  
 
1. That crafts are a kind of knowledge is evident from the fact that Socrates 
calls genuine experts “wise” (279e-280a); that knowledge of carpentry 
(./)!01µ' 2 0340$5)41) or of other crafts produces correct use (281a-b); 
that clear examples of crafts like money-making (6+'µ70)!0)48%) and 
medicine (970+)48%) are explicitly called knowledge (289a), as are 
cobblery (!4*0$0$µ)415) and carpentry (292c); that the kingly craft (2 
:7!);)4< 0=65') conveys a knowledge which is none other than itself 
(292d); and many similar passages.  Note, too, the easy movement between 
./)!01µ' and 0=65' at 289c1-2, 289d9-e1, 291a8-b5, and 291c7-9. 
2. That crafts have a specified domain is evident from that fact that flute 
players are concerned with flute music, writing masters with reading and 
writing, pilots with the sea, generals with campaigns, physicians with the 
sick (279e-280a), and carpenters with working wood (280c, 281a).  
Medicine rules over a certain domain (/>50?5 @+6$*!7 2 970+)4< A5 
@+63)), as do Crito’s own craft of farming (2 Bµ30=+7 0=65' 2 ,3?+,-7) 
and (by induction from these cases) the kingly craft (291e-292a).   
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3. That crafts have one or more specified products is especially clear at 291e-
292a, where Socrates presses Crito to name the product of the kingly craft 
by giving analogies to medicine, which produces health, and farming, 
which produces nourishment from the earth.  But “product” must be 
understood relatively loosely.  Of the many crafts listed in the second 
protreptic some have tangible products that they have made (e.g. lyre-
making produces lyres, cooking produces meals, carpentry produces 
houses and the like); some have tangible products that they have acquired 
(e.g. money-making produces coins (but not like minting does), fishing 
produces fish, quail-hunting produces quail); some have intangible 
products that they have made (e.g. lyre-playing produces music, medicine 
produces health, speech-making produces persuasion); and some have 
intangible products that they have acquired (or, perhaps better, have 
discovered) (e.g. geometry, astronomy, and calculation produce 
diagrams).7  It is important to keep in mind that products can be of any of 
these sorts. 
4. That crafts tend to be arranged in hierarchies is evident throughout the 
second protreptic, as we encounter example after example of one craft 
handing over its product to another craft, so that the second craft can use 
this product as a means for producing its own product.  For example, lyre-
makers produce lyres, which are then handed over to lyre-players who use 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Those crafts that can be said to acquire rather than make their products are categorized as species of 
hunting at 290b-d). 
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lyres to produce music;  speech-writers produce speeches, which are then 
handed over to speech-makers who use speeches to produce persuasion 
(289c-290a).  In each case, the second craft is in some sense higher than 
the first craft, for without the production of music and persuasion there 
would be no point to the production of lyres and speeches. 
5. That crafts are value-neutral is one of the central themes of the 
Euthydemus.  It is an assumption of the second protreptic:  Knowledge (i.e. 
a craft) of how to produce some product (of any of the four sorts discussed 
above) is not valuable unless one has the further knowledge of how to use 
that product correctly (288e-289b).  The assumption is grounded in the 
argument of the first protreptic.  Knowledge of how to produce some 
product just is knowledge of how to produce one of the conventional goods 
(health, money, material goods like tables and houses, etc.).  But these 
products themselves are not valuable, and may even be harmful, unless 
wisdom guides them.  Knowledge of how to produce some product, taken 
all by itself, is insufficient to guarantee benefit and prevent harm.  Whether 
its product (and therefore the knowledge) is beneficial depends crucially on 
whether it is used with wisdom. 
6. That crafts in general, or wisdom in particular, can be taught is not 
explicitly argued for in the Euthydemus.  However, it would have been 
assumed by both Socrates and Clinias that crafts like carpentry or medicine 
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could typically be taught, and it is explicitly assumed (while pointedly not 
argued) that wisdom can be taught (282c). 
Since the investigation into wisdom proceeds on the assumption that wisdom will be 
found among the crafts, and since each of these six features are clearly attributed to 
crafts in general in the Euthydemus, we must suppose that the investigation into 
wisdom proceeds on the assumption that wisdom has each of these six features.  To 
the details of that investigation we now turn. 
 
4.2.  The aporia of the second protreptic 
 Recall that the first protreptic ends with Socrates concluding, with Clinias’ 
enthusiastic endorsement, that it is necessary to pursue wisdom above all else (282a-
d).  But the first protreptic never gives us a clear specification of exactly what this 
wisdom that is worth pursuing is.  It is clear that it is a kind of knowledge: !$#-7, 
./)!01µ', #+"5'!)%, and 5$C% are all used to describe it.  It is also clear from the 
discussion of the previous section that wisdom is, or is very much like, a craft.  But 
this is not to go very far toward explicating the nature of wisdom.  In particular, we 
might wonder at the end of the first protreptic what the specific domain and the 
specific product of wisdom is.  There is, to be sure, some indication of this in the first 
protreptic.  Wisdom’s domain seems to be something like the correct use, or guidance, 
of the conventional goods listed at 279a-d, which are able to be used beneficially or 




[S]ince we all wish to be happy, and since we appear to become so by using 
things and using them rightly, and since knowledge was the source of rightness 
and good fortune, it seems to be necessary that every man should prepare 
himself by every means to become as wise as possible.  (282a; Sprague trans.) 
 
Now then, since you believe both that it can be taught and that it is the only 
existing thing which makes a man happy and fortunate, surely you would agree 




But we should like something more specific than this, and so Socrates 
encourages Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to “start where I left off and show the boy 
what follows next:  whether he ought to acquire every sort of knowledge, or whether 
there is one sort that he ought to get in order to be a happy man and a good one, and 
what it is” (282e; Sprague trans.). They are happy to resume control of the discussion, 
but fail to comply with his request.  Instead, in this second eristic episode (282d-288a) 
they produce a number of additional arguments of the same sort they produced in the 
first episode.  These arguments of the second eristic episode center on the 
impossibility of false speech or contradiction.  Some conclusions in the episode are:  
Nobody speaks what is not; it is impossible to contradict; there are no ignorant men.  
Socrates highlights the fact that if these conclusions are true, then it is impossible for 
the sophists to refute him, for he cannot speak falsely and they cannot contradict.  He 
then takes control of the discussion again for a second protreptic episode, contrasting 
the seriousness with which he will investigate the problem at hand with the brothers’ 
lack of seriousness.  I will argue (i) that Socrates introduces two constraints on the 
nature of wisdom, (ii) that the second constraint is too strong, and (iii) that it is 
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precisely this overly strong second constraint that leads to the aporia with which the 
second protreptic section ends. 
 
4.2.1.  Two constraints on the nature of wisdom 
Socrates begins by reminding Clinias where they left off.  They had agreed that 
it was necessary to love wisdom, and the love of wisdom (#);$!$#-7) is the 
acquisition of knowledge (408!)% ./)!01µ'%) (289d).  But it won’t be just any sort 
of knowledge, for we have already seen in the first protreptic that some sorts of 
knowledge don’t provide benefit in the absence of wisdom.  For example, medicine 
produces health, but health (and so the medicine that produces it) is not beneficial in 
the absence of some further thing, namely wisdom.  So, the problem at hand is to 
discover just what sort of knowledge it is necessary to seek (289d).  There must be 
some constraints on what sort of knowledge we are seeking, and the first comes from 
this very argument in the first protreptic: 
(C1)  Wisdom is a kind of beneficial knowledge.  (288e1-2) 
This constraint immediately rules out a great many kinds of knowledge as 
candidates for the title of ‘wisdom’.  For example, suppose we possessed knowledge 
of how to discover where the greatest quantities of gold are buried, or even the 
knowledge of how to make stones into gold.  The first protreptic established that this 
sort of knowledge would be of no value, unless we also knew how to use the gold 
correctly (288e-289b).  Indeed, such knowledge could be positively harmful in the 
absence of wisdom.  But this seems to rule out any of the sorts of knowledge that 
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produce the conventional goods, including money-making, medicine, or even the 
hypothetical knowledge of how to make men immortal (289a-b).  For money, health, 
and immortality can be extremely harmful in the absence of wisdom.  Socrates sums 
this idea up for crafts generally: 
“Nor does there seem to be any value in any other sort of knowledge which 
knows how to make things, whether money making or medicine or any other 
such thing, unless it knows how to use what it makes.”  (289a; Sprague trans.) 
The “unless”-clause suggests a second constraint on the nature of wisdom.  The 
second constraint is complementary to the first, for it articulates a specific way that a 
candidate for wisdom might meet the first constraint.  A craft that knew how to 
correctly use what it makes would, by the argument of the first protreptic, be 
beneficial.  Recall from 280b-281d the Argument that Wisdom Provides Correct 
Use (AWC).8     
  
[AWC]  
(AWC-1)  Our possessions (broadly construed to include all such things as 
those  
on the initial list of goods) contribute to our happiness just in case they provide  
some benefit to us.  (280b7-8)  
(AWC-2)  Our possessions provide some benefit to us just in case they are 
used  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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correctly.  (280b5-281a1)  
(AWC-3)  So, our possessions contribute to our happiness just in case they are  
used correctly.  
(AWC-4)  Correct use of possessions is provided for just in case knowledge is  
present.  (281a1-d2)  
(AWC-5)  If possessions are not used correctly, positive harm (and not simply  
lack of benefit) results.  (281b4-d2)  
(AWC-6)  So, wisdom guarantees that one’s possessions contribute to one’s  
happiness, and ignorance guarantees that one’s possession fail to contribute 
(and, if used, even detract from) one’s happiness. 
 
By AWC, a craft that knew how to use its product could guarantee that its 
product provides benefit and so contributes to the happiness of its possessor.9  In light 
of this, Socrates concludes, and Clinias agrees, “Then what we need, my fair friend, is 
a kind of knowledge which combines making and knowing how to use the thing which 
it makes” (289b).  This, then, is the second constraint on what sort of knowledge we 
are seeking: 
 
(C2)  Wisdom is a kind of knowledge that combines (a) making something and 
(b) knowing how to use it correctly.  (289b) 
!
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9 Strictly speaking, this result follows simply from AWC1-AWC4. 
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The argument proceeds on the basis of these two constraints.  But I shall linger here 
for a moment, for I hope to show that (C2) is too strong, and that this dooms the 
investigation from the beginning. 
!
4.2.2.  (C2) is too strong . . . 
Why think that (C2) is too strong?   Recall that (C2) is motivated because it 
provides a way to satisfy (C1), which is the more fundamental constraint.  The crucial 
point is to recognize that it provides a way to satisfy (C1), not the (only) way.  That is, 
satisfying (C2) is sufficient, but not necessary, for satisfying (C1).  The problem arises 
because the following investigation assumes that (C2) is a genuine constraint, or 
necessary condition, on the nature of wisdom.  But the principle that motivates (C2) 
guarantees, at most, that finding that something satisfies (C2) is a sufficient condition 
for identifying that thing as wisdom.  Consider the reasoning that leads from (C1), 
understood as a constraint (i.e. necessary condition) on the nature of wisdom, to (C2), 
understood as a constraint (i.e. necessary condition) on the nature of wisdom. 
1. Wisdom is a kind of beneficial knowledge.  (C1) 
2. Knowledge simply of how to produce conventional goods is not beneficial. 
3. So, wisdom is not simply knowledge of how to produce conventional 
goods.  
4. Knowledge of how to produce and correctly use some conventional 
good(s) is beneficial. 
5. So, wisdom is knowledge of how to produce and correctly use some 
conventional good(s).  (C2) 
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The inference to (5) is patently invalid.  From the fact that wisdom is a kind of 
beneficial knowledge, and the fact that we can identify a kind of beneficial knowledge, 
it does not follow that wisdom is that kind of beneficial knowledge we have identified.  
After all, miniature schnauzers are a kind of small animal, and Burmese cats are a kind 
of small animal, but it does not follow that miniature schnauzers are Burmese cats.     
Perhaps, though, we have understated the first premise.  After all, a few pages 
earlier (281e) Socrates summed up the conclusion of the first protreptic by stating that 
wisdom is the only good:  “Then what follows from the things we’ve said?  Is it 
anything other than that none of the other things is either good or evil, but of these 
two, wisdom is good, and ignorance is evil?”  In light of this, shouldn’t we understand 
(1) to mean that wisdom is the only kind of beneficial knowledge?  But if wisdom is 
the only kind of beneficial knowledge, then as soon as we identify some kind of 
beneficial knowledge, we can conclude that it is wisdom.  The argument from (C1) to 
(C2), then, is valid after all.10 
Unfortunately, this way of remedying the argument will not work, for it relies on 
an implausible interpretation of 281d-e.  In chapter 3, I argued that at 281d-e, Socrates 
is expressing what Irwin calls ‘The Moderate View’: 
The Moderate View:  “When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not  
goods ‘in themselves’, he means that they are not goods when they are 
divorced from wisdom.  When he concludes that wisdom is the only good, he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Even ignoring the textual considerations below, this would not guarantee a valid inference.  Perhaps 
there are two or more distinct descriptions of beneficial knowledge, only one of which is satisfied by 
some actual kind of knowledge.  If so, there is no guarantee that, having arrived at one description of 
beneficial knowledge, we have arrived at a description of beneficial knowledge that is satisfied by some 
actual kind of knowledge.  We may yet need to search for another description of beneficial knowledge. 
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means simply that only wisdom is good all by itself, apart from any 
combination with other things.”11 
 
 
On this view, there are two different ways something can be good (and so beneficial).  
One is to be “good all by itself”, as wisdom alone is.  But the recognized goods (and 
so the various kinds of knowledge that produce them) can be good when they are 
conjoined with wisdom.  So, merely identifying a beneficial kind of knowledge does 
not rule out the possibility that this knowledge is good only when it is conjoined with 
wisdom, rather than simply being wisdom. 
 
 This points to a scope ambiguity in the crucial fourth premise:   
 
 (4)  Knowledge of how to produce and use some conventional good(s) is 
beneficial.   
 
For the premise to lead to (C2), it must be read as follows:   
 
(4*)  Only a sort of knowledge that is of both how to produce some conventional 
good(s) and how to use that (those) very same good(s) is beneficial.  (The ‘only’ 
is added to get to the necessity claim in (C2).)  
 
But The Moderate View suggests that this reading is false.  Alternatively, we might 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Irwin 1995, p. 57. 
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read this premise as follows: 
 
(4**)  Knowledge of how to produce some conventional good(s), together with 
knowledge of how to use that (those) very same good(s), is beneficial. 
 
On this reading, not only is knowledge of how to use some conventional good 
valuable, but also knowledge of how to produce some conventional good is valuable 
(when conjoined with wisdom).  For example knowledge of how to use health 
correctly (i.e. wisdom) is valuable, but so is knowledge of how to produce health (i.e. 
medicine), when it is conjoined with wisdom.  The difference between (4*) and (4**) 
is that (4*) allows only one sort of knowledge which ranges over both making and 
using, while (4**) allows for one sort of knowledge to range over making, and another 
over using.  The trouble is that only (4*) entails (C2), but only (4**) could be true on 
the most plausible reading of 281d-e. 
 (C2), then, is not motivated by the argument up to this point.  The argument up 
to this point suggests that (4*) is false, for it suggests that wisdom is valuable by 
virtue of guaranteeing correct use, while other crafts are valuable by virtue of 
providing the things which are correctly used by wisdom.  This entails that the making 
and the correctly using of some thing can fall under different crafts.  But (4*) entails 
that the making and correctly using of some thing must fall under the same craft, and 
so runs counter to the earlier argument.  Since (4*) is required for the inference to 
(C2), (C2) is not motivated by the argument to this point.  Indeed, since the argument 
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has so far suggested precisely that the making and correctly using of some thing can 
fall under different crafts, it thereby suggests that (4*) is false.  But if (4*) is false and 
is a necessary condition for (C2), then (C2) is false as well.  (4**), on the other hand, 
allows for making and correct use to come apart, but does not support (C2).  Since it is 
(4**), rather than (4*), which is supported by the whole argument to this point, we 
should be sceptical of (C2).  (C2) is far stronger than the argument warrants; so strong, 
that it seems false in light of the argument that is supposed to entail it. 
 
4.2.3.  . . . and leads to aporia. 
Not only is (C2) too strong, but it is precisely the introduction of (C2) that 
leads to the aporia of the second protreptic.  That this is so is easily seen if only we 
recognize that there is a single investigative strategy through the rest of the passage:  
Find a craft that satisfies (C2).  Not surprisingly, given what we have learned in the 
Euthydemus so far, none is to be found.  When this strategy fails, Socrates and Clinias 
throw up their hands and return control of the discussion to the brothers.  Here I want 
to substantiate the claim that it is precisely this strategy – to find a craft that satisfies 
(C2) – that is employed in the entire investigation. 
Having agreed on (C2), Socrates gives an example of the sort of craft that will 
obviously not satisfy this constraint. 
Then it seems not at all needful for us to become lyre makers and skilled in 
some such knowledge as that.  For there the art which makes is one thing and 
that which uses is another; they are quite distinct although they deal with the 





And it is equally obvious that we stand in no need of the art of flute making, 
since this is another of the same kind. 
He said yes.  (289c; Sprague trans.) 
 
Neither lyre making nor flute making satisfies (C2), for in each case the craft 
of making a thing is clearly different from the craft of using that same thing.  Now that 
the obvious has been set out as an example, Socrates turns to a variety of less obvious 
cases.  First, he puts the craft of speech writing as a candidate, later saying that “it was 
in this connection [to speech writing] that I expected the very knowledge we have 
been seeking all this time would put in an appearance” (289d; Sprague trans.).  But 
Clinias points out that the crafts of making (i.e. writing) speeches and using (i.e. 
delivering) speeches are distinct.  As proof, he explains that some people are skilled at 
writing speeches but not at delivering them, while others are skilled at delivering the 
speeches others have written, but are unable to write their own.  And in this respect 
speeches are just like lyres, for some people are skilled at making lyres but not at 
playing them, while others are skilled at playing the lyres others have made, but are 
unable to make their own.  Thus, concerning speeches the crafts of making and using 
are distinct, and so speech writing fails to satisfy (C2).  Socrates grants that by 
showing that it fails to satisfy (C2), Clinias (who is notably taking a more and more 
active role in the discussion) has given “sufficient grounds for stating that the art of 
speech writing is not the one a man would be happy if he acquired” (289d; Sprague 
trans.). 
Speech writing having failed the test, Socrates forwards another candidate:  
“The art of generalship seems to me, I said, to be the one which, more than any other, 
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a man would be happy if he acquired” (290b; Sprague trans.).  Again, Clinias objects.  
Generalship, is a species of hunting:  man hunting.  Clinias argues that generalship 
fails to satisfy (C2) because:  (I) no hunting craft will satisfy (C2); and (II) generalship 
is a hunting craft.  Just in case we missed the point, he explicitly identifies the problem 
as a failure to satisfy (C2) in passage (III). 
(I) No art of actual hunting, he said, extends any further than pursuing and 
capturing:  whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are 
incapable of using it, but they and the fishermen hand over their prey to 
the cooks.  And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who 
are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they 
simply discover those which already exist), since they themselves have 
no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the 
task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians – at least, those of 
them do so who are not completely senseless.  (290b-c; Sprague 
trans.)12 
(II) And the same is true of the generals, he said.  Whenever they capture 
some city, or a camp, they hand it over to the statesmen – for they 
themselves have no idea of how to use the things they have captured – 
just in the same way, I imagine, that quail hunters hand theirs over to 
quail keepers.  (290d; Sprague trans.) 
(III) So, he said, if we are in need of that art which will itself know how to 
use what it acquires through making or capturing, and if it is an art of 
this sort which will make us happy, then, he said, we must look for 
some other art besides that of generalship.  (290d; Sprague trans.) 
 
 
So, two apparently likely candidates have been dismissed.  Crito breaks into 
the conversation to express his doubt that Clinias said such sophisticated things, and 
the conversation, while clearly meant to parallel the one with Clinias, is now carried 
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12 This reference to mathematicians and dialecticians has garnered attention for several reasons, on 
which I cannot here elaborate beyond merely mentioning two.  First, it is reminiscient of Republic 7.   Is 
this a reference back to the Republic passage?  Or is it an early expression of an idea that later gets 
developed in the Republic?  (On the relevance of this passage to the dating of the Euthydemus, see 
chapter 2.)  Second, it raises questions about whose ideas are really being expressed at this stage of the 
dialogue.  Crito expresses scepticism a few lines later that it was really Clinias who said these things.  
Did the young Clinias, who has had little to say until now, really express such a sophisticated position?  
Or was this Socrates’ idea, put into the mouth of Clinias only during the retelling? 
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on between Socrates and Crito.  Rather than going through the whole story, Socrates 
gives the short version, confessing to Crito that they never found the craft they were 
looking for and that every time they thought they were about to find it, it escaped from 
them as if they were just children chasing larks in a field.  Finally, though, they came 
to the craft of ruling, thinking that “it might be the one which both provided and 
created happiness” (291b; Sprague trans.).  But there they fell into a “labyrinth”, 
finding at what they thought would be the ending of their investigation that they were 
really just back at the beginning.  Here is how their investigation of the craft of ruling 
went. 
First, they agreed that the statesman’s craft and the craft of ruling are the same.  
This craft seemed a likely candidate for wisdom because generalship and other crafts 
handed over their products to the craft of ruling, as if the craft of ruling alone knew 
how to use these products and was the cause of right action in the state.  So far, so 
good:  The parallels to wisdom in the first protreptic are clear, since wisdom there 
appeared as the knowledge which guarantees the right use of conventional goods (i.e., 
the products of other crafts).  But problems arise when we consider the craft of ruling 
in light of (C2). 
The craft of ruling, as a craft, must have a specifiable product.13  If it is 
identical to wisdom, then its product must be good, for unlike medicine and money-
making, wisdom is always good.  So, it cannot simply provide us with conventional 
goods, for these are not always good.  Notice that the craft of ruling already runs the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See characteristic 3 in section 4.1, above. 
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risk of violating (C2), for it was just agreed that the other crafts hand their products 
over to this one to be used, but it is clear that the product of the craft of ruling cannot 
simply be those conventional goods that were handed over to it.  We might think, 
based on the first protreptic and on the continued talk of wisdom making people 
happy, that its product is happiness.  But this cannot be, because happiness just isn’t 
the sort of thing that can be used, and so if happiness is the product of the craft of 
ruling, this craft will never be able to use what it makes.  So down this route, too, we 
risk violating (C2).  Given (C2), the product of the craft of ruling cannot be either 
conventional goods or happiness. 
This forces the investigators into an odd position.  If the craft of ruling cannot 
produce either conventional goods (because they are only conditionally good) or 
happiness (because it cannot be used), yet must nevertheless produce something good, 
then what else could it produce besides itself?  What other good is left on the table, 
besides wisdom itself?  If the craft of ruling is wisdom, then its product must be none 
other than itself.   
But this, too, is an unhappy path, for how can we give any content to this idea?  
If I am already wise, then it does me no good for wisdom simply to be producing itself 
in me.  That neither adds to my own state, nor does it look much like the wisdom that 
was described in the first protreptic.  So, perhaps we should understand wisdom 
producing itself to mean that the wise make others wise.  Now it might appear that by 
the wise making others wise, some benefit has been added to the world.  And it might 
appear that this is a case that satisfies (C2):  Wisdom uses itself to produce itself.  But 
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setting aside for the moment the general worry that this too looks little like the wisdom 
described in the first protreptic, a more immediate worry arises.  Scratch beyond the 
surface and it is clear that there is little content to this characterization of wisdom.  
What do the wise give to others?  Apparently, only the ability to make still others 
wise?  And what do these get?  Only the ability to make still others wise.  But what 
good wisdom does for any individual is left completely unexplained, and perhaps even 
unexplainable.  To go back to the more general worry, all the apparent good-making 
properties of wisdom from the first protreptic have disappeared from view, and it is no 
longer clear how it could be good at all.  As Socrates puts the problem: 
And in what respect will they be good and in what respect useful, as far as we 
are concerned?  Or shall we go on to say that they will make others good and 
that these others will do the same to still others?  But in what conceivable way 
they are good is in no way apparent to us, especially since we have discredited 
what are said to be the results of the statesman’s art [conventional goods like 
making the citizens rich and free and without faction].  It is altogether a case of 
the proverbial “Corinthus, son of Zeus”, and, as I was saying, we are in just as 
great difficulties as ever, or even worse, when it comes to finding out what that 
knowledge is which will make us happy.  (292d-e; Sprague trans.) 
 
 
Here the second (and final) protreptic section ends, as Socrates hands the 
conversation back to the brothers with a plea to show him which craft wisdom is.  
Every plausible candidate for wisdom has been tried and found lacking, including the 
most plausible craft of ruling.  The failure to identify wisdom is quite serious, for it is 
not simply that a few candidates for wisdom have failed.  Rather, the whole project 
has been cast into serious doubt.  The point I want to emphasize at this stage is that in 
every case, including the final one, (C2) played the decisive role in ruling out each 
candidate, and thereby in casting doubt upon the whole project. 
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4.3.  For the craft analogy and against the sufficiency thesis 
I have argued that Socrates (a) employs the craft analogy throughout the 
second protreptic and (b) adopts (C2) – the constraint that wisdom must make and use 
the same thing – despite the fact that it is stronger than the argument warrants and 
figures decisively in the unsuccessful result of the investigation.  But what should we 
make of this?  Should we reject one or both of the craft analogy and (C2)?  Should we 
suppose that the character Socrates and/or the author Plato is tangled in a problem that 
he cannot see his way out of?  Or should we suppose that we are purposefully being 
led to discover our own way out of the problem?  Clearly on Platonic grounds the 
answers to these questions are very important, for they concern the possibility of 
achieving wisdom and the character of wisdom, and thereby are fundamental to how 
we ought to order our lives. 
Perhaps the most common interpretation is to suppose that Plato is rejecting 
the craft analogy.  Though such an interpretation is not inextricably tied to a 
developmentalist view of the Platonic corpus, it is also common to suppose that in 
rejecting the craft analogy, Plato is rejecting a position that was wholeheartedly 
endorsed by the Socrates of the “early” dialogues.  Furthermore (though, again, not 
tied inextricably to these other positions), it is natural on such a view to suppose that 
the character Socrates is still wholeheartedly endorsing the craft analogy throughout 
the Euthydemus, but that Plato is showing us the unresolvable problems to which his 
teacher’s view leads. 
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 The most important part of this general interpretation is that the second 
protreptic is Plato’s critique of the craft analogy, for without this the theses about 
developmentalism and about the motives and commitments of author and character 
never get off the ground.  So, I shall narrow my focus to the claim that here Plato is 
rejecting the craft analogy.  Paradigmatic of this interpretation is Rosamond Kent 
Sprague’s work on the Euthydemus.14  Sprague distinguishes first-order and second-
order crafts.  First-order crafts like carpentry and shoemaking have an easily 
identifiable product.  The products of second-order crafts like politics are less obvious, 
if they are productive at all.  The problem with the second protreptic, then, is that it 
tries to force the characteristics of first-order crafts on the craft of ruling, which is 
second-order.  Since first-order crafts are productive, it is concluded that the craft of 
ruling must be productive.  And since first-order crafts fail to be beneficial by virtue of 
not being able to use correctly what they produce, it is concluded that the craft of 
ruling must correctly use what it produces.  But second-order crafts do not, in fact, 
share all the characteristics of first-order crafts, according to Sprague, and it is just this 
demand to make the craft of ruling share all the characteristics of first-order crafts that 
leads to the failure of the second protreptic.!!
!
 Hawtrey15 follows Sprague here:   
In fact Plato is here [in the requirement that “the required art/branch of 
knowledge must be one that both makes something and knows how to use 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Sprague 1976, ch. 4.  For the same general view, though incorporating a variety of different details, 
see also Hawtrey 1981, p. 122; Chance 1992, pp.126-9; Roochnik 1996, pp. 150-177; and Parry 2003, 
p. 15; but see p. 22ff. 
15 Hawtrey 1981, 122. 
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what it itself makes”] setting up the failure of the search, which will end in a 
regress because of the impossibility of finding an object for the supreme 
./)!01µ' (292d8 $D 0- E!$507) 2µF5 G,7H$I 47I 0- 6+1!)µ$);).  Doubtless 
one of the lessons that the reader is expected to infer from this conversation is 
that it is a mistake to expect this supreme form of knowledge to be in all 
respects parallel to ordinary crafts.” 
 
Chance16 also seems to follow Sprague here in putting the emphasis on the failure of 
the  craft of ruling to produce:  “[W]e can foresee where the kingly art is in danger of 
running aground.  As a using science, it depends upon its subordinate arts for its 
products, but to meet the agreed-upon formula, it must also produce.” 
Sprague usefully points to the idea that the requirement that the craft of ruling 
produce and use what it produces causes problems.  Indeed, I think it presents the 
central problem.  But I see little reason to think that a distinction between first- and 
second-order crafts is at issue in the Euthydemus.  Neither wisdom nor the craft of 
ruling is ever described as a craft of crafts, nor in any other way that suggests that it is 
of an entirely different order.  Wisdom is higher than the other crafts, in that all the 
other crafts turn over their products to wisdom for correct use.  But the fact that it is 
higher does not entail that it is of a different order any more than lyre-playing is 
shown to be of a different order than lyre-making because lyre-makers turn over their 
product to be used by lyre-players.  Lyre-playing is higher by virtue of this fact, but 
not thereby second-order. 
While Sprague, Hawtrey, and Chance are each hitting around the idea that the 
problem with the investigation is that no craft satisfies (C2), each of them thinks that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Chance 1992, 125. 
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this is because the supreme craft – the craft of ruling – has no product.  That is, it fails 
because it is unlike ordinary crafts.  It is thus the assumption of the craft analogy that 
leads to the failure.  I will argue instead that it fails to satisfy (C2) not because (C2) 
requires production, but because it requires that the same craft produce and use the 
very same thing.  But this is not a requirement that comes from the craft analogy.  
Indeed, the craft analogy suggests quite the opposite, and points to a relatively 
straightforward solution.  I will suggest instead that the thesis that virtue is sufficient 
for happiness motivates (C2), and it is thus the sufficiency thesis, and not the craft 
analogy, that leads to trouble. 
 
4.3.1.  The craft analogy points to a solution . . . 
Recall the six features of crafts supported by the Euthydemus and other 
dialogues:17 
1. Crafts are kinds of knowledge. 
2. Crafts have a specified domain.   
3. Crafts have one or more specified products. 
4. Crafts tend to be arranged in hierarchies. 
5. A craft is value-neutral in the sense that it does not itself guarantee that its 
product will be used correctly and so produce benefit. 
6. A craft is teachable. 
Wisdom has each of these features. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See section 4.1. 
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1. That wisdom is a kind of knowledge is clear from the fact that throughout 
the protreptic sections of the Euthydemus ‘wisdom’ (!$#-7) and 
‘knowledge’ (./)!01µ') are used interchangeably. 
2. Just as medicine is set over the domain of human health and illness, so 
wisdom is set over the domain of human well-being and ill-being 
generally.  Or, to put it as it is frequently expressed outside the 
Euthydemus, wisdom is set over good and evil.18  Additional support that 
this is the domain of wisdom also comes from the next feature. 
3. Wisdom has a specific product:  human happiness.  This idea is pervasive 
in both protreptic sections.  Wisdom “makes men fortunate in every case” 
(280a); “provides men not only with good fortune but also with well-doing, 
in every case of possession and action” (281b); makes other things good 
(i.e., makes them contribute to human happiness) (281d); is “the source of 
rightness and good fortune,” which is in turn the source of happiness 
(282a); “is the only existing thing which makes a man happy and fortunate 
(282c); “is the [craft] which, more than any other, a man would be happy if 
he acquired” (290b);19 is “the [craft] which both provides and creates 
happiness” (291b); is “the [craft] that benefits them and makes them 
happy” (292c); is “the knowledge which will make us happy” (292e).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See chapter 1, section 1.3.2, for the argument that wisdom is the whole of virtue, and that the whole 
of virtue is knowledge of good and evil. 
19 This is said of generalship in support of its candidacy as wisdom. 
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4. Wisdom is arranged at the top of the hierarchy of crafts.  Its product is the 
ultimate goal of all humans (278e); it provides correct use of (281a-b) and 
“controls” (281e) the products of all other crafts; it is the craft which does 
not hand over its product to a higher craft (289c-291c); to it the other crafts 
“hand over the management of the products of which they themselves were 
the craftsmen. . . . It is the cause of right action in the state and . . . sits at 
the helm of the state, governing all things, ruling all things, and making all 
things useful”20 (291c-d).   
 
These four features give us the resources to find a solution to the failure.  (I 
will return to the last two features momentarily).  The principle that leads to failure, 
(C2), requires that wisdom use and make something.  Does it?  We can get clearer on 
the answer by considering ordinary crafts.  Consider carpentry.  Does it both make and 
use something?  The question suffers a scope-ambiguity (and so would make a perfect 
set-up for an eristic argument).  If the question is whether carpentry makes and uses 
the same thing, then the answer is surely ‘no’.  But if the question is whether carpentry 
makes something and uses something, where the two things are not necessarily the 
same, then the answer is surely ‘yes’.  For carpentry uses tools and wood to make 
things like tables that are handed over to others for use.  Likewise the smith’s craft 
uses fire and raw materials to make things - hammers, weapons, etc. - which are then 
handed over to carpenters and generals for use.  In general, we can conclude in good 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 This is said of the craft of ruling in support of its candidacy as wisdom. 
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Socratic fashion, every craft uses one thing (or more than one) and makes something 
different, handing over what it makes to other crafts to be used.  This alone should 
lead us to suspect (C2), given that we have endorsed the craft analogy. 
 There are two places where we might expect the pattern to break down a bit.  
Since this sort of making and using is compatible with, and even suggestive of, a 
hierarchical arrangement of crafts, with lower crafts handing over their products to 
higher crafts to be used, it is possible that there would be one or more crafts at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and one or more crafts at the top.  If a craft is at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, then it would not use the product of another craft.  Instead, it might use 
a product of nature.  Some species of hunting might be such crafts.  For example, 
‘noodling’ is still practiced in parts of the southern United States.  Noodling is the 
practice of catching rather large catfish using one’s fingers as bait.  One’s fingers are 
used and a fish is produced, and then handed over to the cook to fry.  Whether or not 
there are actually proper crafts at the bottom of the hierarchy is not important.  What is 
important is the possibility of a craft at the top of the hierarchy.  Such a craft would be 
productive and useful, like all the other crafts.  But while it would use the products of 
lower crafts, its product would not in turn be used by other crafts.  Indeed, we should 
expect that a craft that is at the top of the hierarchy not merely accidentally but by its 
nature will make a product that is by nature not of a sort to be usable.   
 We are now in a position to see that the craft analogy leaves open the 
possibility of a craft which is by nature at the top of the hierarchy, uses the products of 
lower crafts, and makes a product which is not usable.  So, let us return to wisdom.  
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Suppose that wisdom is at the top of the hierarchy of crafts.  It would, then, use the 
products of the other crafts - health, wealth, etc. - to produce something.  And both 
protreptic sections are saturated with claims that indicate that the product of wisdom is 
happiness.  Just as we would expect from our above consideration of the crafts, 
happiness is not the sort of thing that is usable.  That is, with happiness we have 
reached the ultimate goal which need not in turn be employed in the service of some 
higher goal.  Happiness is, by nature, the highest goal. 
 So, to sum up the results so far, a way out of the aporia is suggested by a 
serious consideration of the craft analogy.  The way out is to reject (C2).  This clears 
the way to understand the things which wisdom uses to be the conventional goods 
listed in the first protreptic, while the product of wisdom is happiness.  Happiness is 
what was sought all along, and it is not the sort of thing to be handed over to be used 
by another craft.  So, the aporia can be avoided.  This is not, of course to say that the 
investigation can be concluded.  This leaves much about wisdom yet to be discovered.  
But it specifies what wisdom is in the same sense that we can specify what medicine is 
by saying it is the craft (i.e., knowledge) whose domain is human health and illness; 
whose product is health; which uses the products of (at least) smithery (surgical tools), 
cookery (nutrition), and pharmacy (therapeutic drugs); and which hands its product 
over to be used by wisdom or ignorance, for benefit or harm, as the case may be.  
Likewise, wisdom is the craft (i.e., knowledge) whose domain is human well-being 
and ill-being generally (i.e. good and evil) ; whose product is human happiness; which 
uses the products of a great variety of crafts including medicine, money-making, and 
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many others; and which does not hand over its product for use by any other craft, 
because its product is by nature the highest end and not of a sort to be used.  
 Though the first four features of wisdom as a craft are enough to show a way 
out of the aporia, it is worth showing that wisdom has the final two features as well.  
After all, if wisdom lacks these two features, that might be taken to cast doubt on 
whether wisdom really has the other features.  Moreover, it might be thought that 
these two features are among the most problematic to attribute to wisdom.  How could 
wisdom, the only unconditional good, be value-neutral?  And what evidence do we 
have that wisdom is teachable?  Though each of these questions is worthy of (and has 
many times been the subject of) its own extended treatment, I address each question 
only briefly here. 
5. Wisdom itself is value-neutral.  Crafts are value-neutral in two related 
senses.  First, crafts cannot guarantee that their products which are handed 
over to other crafts will be used for good rather than evil.  This sort of 
value-neutrality does not apply to wisdom, for wisdom does not hand over 
its product to other crafts, and since its product is not something usable, it 
is not subject to misuse.  But this, far from being a violation of the craft 
analogy, is exactly what we should expect, since a central feature of crafts 
is that they are arranged hierarchically.  But wisdom is properly value-
neutral in a second sense.  Knowledge is knowledge of opposites.  For 
example, a skilled carpenter not only knows best how to make a sturdy bed, 
but also knows best how to make a bed that will fall apart the first time 
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someone lies on it.  And a skilled physician is not only best able to cause 
health, but also best able to cause disease.  Likewise, a wise person not 
only knows how to produce happiness, but also how to produce misery.  
This should be unsurprising:  the same knowledge of good and evil is 
required in each case, just as the same knowledge of health and disease is 
required to produce either one.  Health and disease are two sides of the 
same knowledge-coin, as are good and evil.  So, wisdom itself is equally 
capable of producing happiness or misery, and so counts as value-neutral.   
How, then, is wisdom an unconditional good?  Is it not sometimes good 
and sometimes bad, depending on whether it produces happiness or 
misery?  It is not, but rather always good.  This is because of an additional 
psychological fact about humans.  As a matter of unchangeable 
psychological fact, all humans always aim at happiness above all else, and 
therefore aim away from misery above all else.  Wisdom just is the 
knowledge of how to produce the former and the latter.  As a matter of 
psychological fact, then, (and not as a matter of something strictly internal 
to the craft of wisdom itself), no wise person would ever aim at misery 
rather than happiness.  Wisdom itself is value-neutral, though given 





6.  In the Euthydemus, wisdom is simply assumed to be teachable.  This is 
explicit at 282c.  But someone might think that this assumption is stated in 
such a way as to leave it open to later revision.  For any sort of general 
case, we have to turn outside of the dialogue.  Here I limit myself to three 
considerations that make it plausible to think that wisdom is teachable.  
First, Socrates’ actual method in the Socratic dialogues of attempting to 
acquire knowledge, including moral knowledge or wisdom, is to find 
someone who knows and learn from them.  Second, in the Republic we still 
find evidence that wisdom is teachable, for philosopher-kings are required 
to go through a rigorous and highly structured program of education in 
order to acquire the wisdom to rule the city.  Finally, much of the argument 
in the last third of the Meno proceeds from the claim that something is 
knowledge just in case it is teachable.  While this section of the Meno is 
perhaps the passage that has garnered the most attention for suggesting that 
wisdom/virtue is not teachable, never is the biconditional that something is 
knowledge just in case it is teachable questioned.  Indeed, arguments that 
virtue is not knowledge are based on this biconditional.  But in the 
Euthydemus, wisdom is clearly taken to be knowledge, and so should be 






4.3.2.  . . . but the sufficiency thesis leads to aporia. 
 Now that we understand how the aporia arises, it will be useful to ask why it 
arises at all.  What is its function in the dialogue?  Why does Plato write this episode?  
A first suggestion is that, just as Socrates directed the first protreptic about pursuing 
knowledge in response to the sophists’ contradictory conclusions about learning, he 
directs the second protreptic in response to their claims that there is no false speaking, 
contradiction, or ignorance.  We frequently see Plato’s Socrates knocking down 
interlocutors’ false pretensions to wisdom.  Hugh Benson has argued that this is a key 
part of his fulfillment of his divine mission.21  Before the ignorant will pursue wisdom, 
they must become aware of their need to do so.  Perhaps, then, in the wake of a 
number of eristic arguments for the impossibility of error or ignorance, Socrates thinks 
it appropriate to remind Clinias of how little he knows. 
 There is a more important insight to be gained, though, by asking what 
motivation Plato might have for having Socrates make the specific claim that wisdom 
must make and know how to use the same thing.  While it does arise in the context of 
considering other crafts like finance and medicine, nothing to this point entails this 
principle.  And this principle is the very one that leads to trouble.  So why have 
Socrates accept it? 
 I propose the following way to understand this passage.  In the first protreptic, 
Plato has argued that wisdom is necessary for happiness.  It is so because happiness 
requires having many conventional goods and using them rightly, while using them 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Benson 2000, ch. 2. 
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rightly requires wisdom.  But notice that the first protreptic does not entail that having 
wisdom is sufficient for happiness.  One might be wise but possess little which 
wisdom can use.  In this case, one will be worse off than one who is wise and has 
much.  Indeed, for all we know from the first protreptic, a man who is wise but 
possesses very little - i.e. is poor, ill, ugly, etc. - in addition to not being extremely 
happy, may even fail to meet the minimum standards for happiness.   
 But if wisdom could guarantee possession of the things it knows how to use, 
then it would be sufficient for happiness.  It could guarantee possession of the things it 
knows how to use if it knew how to make them.22  So, I suggest that the principle that 
wisdom must make and use the same thing functions to test whether wisdom is 
sufficient for happiness.  We find in the second protreptic that it is the adoption of this 
principle leads to failure.  This gives us reason to reject the principle. 
 Whether Plato meant (C2) to function as a test of the sufficiency thesis, and 
whether he meant for us to discover this and as a result reject the sufficiency thesis, 
are issues that are beyond me.  As much as I like to think that I have special access to 
the inside of Plato’s head, in my soberer moments I recognize how elusive any such 
access is.  As I see it, there are two main possibilities.   
 Perhaps Plato introduces (C2) with the intention of using it to test the 
sufficiency thesis.  If so, then in showing us that (C2) results in failure, Plato is 
showing us that we should reject the sufficiency thesis.  Why would he not come right 
out and make explicit the connection between (C2) and the sufficiency thesis?  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 And how to produce the tools required to make them, and how to produce the tools required to make 
these tools, and so on all the way down. 
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Perhaps because he recognizes the value of readers figuring it out for themselves, or 
perhaps because he takes the sufficiency thesis to be the historical Socrates’ view, and 
he hesitates to criticize his teacher in a blunt and open manner.  This is hardly a rock-
solid argument for the view that Plato intentionally, but not explicitly, shows how the 
sufficiency thesis results in aporia so that careful readers will reject the sufficiency 
thesis.  But it is on just as solid ground as the standard view, according to which Plato 
intentionally, but not explicitly, shows how the craft analogy results in aporia so that 
careful readers will reject the craft analogy.  Indeed, it is on more solid ground, for far 
from resulting in the aporia, the craft analogy provides the resources to avoid it. 
 Alternatively, perhaps Plato is working through an issue that really is puzzling 
to him.  Even though the sufficiency thesis does not seem to be in view in the first 
protreptic, and not only fails to follow from the arguments of the first protreptic but 
actually seems in tension with them, something very much like the sufficiency thesis 
pervades the air.  Socrates says things in other dialogues that many have taken to 
suggest or actually express the sufficiency thesis, and it is highly probable that the 
historical Socrates said similar things.  Aristotle was keen to emphasize the self-
sufficiency of happiness and the happy man, even while he rejected the sufficiency 
thesis.  But this is a fairly subtle distinction, and certainly the average Athenian would 
have praised the self-sufficiency of the virtuous, perhaps expressing it in language that 
seemed to express the sufficiency thesis.  Plato himself is quite enamored with the 
power of wisdom, and perhaps this coupled with the general philosophical and culture 
background of the times led him unwittingly to overreach in stating (C2).   
!
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 By temperment, I prefer the first alternative – that Plato is, with eyes wide-
open, testing the sufficiency thesis and finding it lacking.  But temperment is perhaps 
a poor guide to truth, and here I will say only that those who felt justified in accepting 
the methodology of the standard view should feel no less justified in accepting the 
methodology embodied by the first alternative.  At least they will now enjoy the added 
bonus of having correctly identified the source of the aporia.  And those who accept 
the second alternative, or remain agnostic between the two, should not hestitate to join 
the rest of us in drawing an important philosophical conclusion:  Whatever Plato’s 
actual motivation, it is clear at least that the sufficiency thesis would motivate (C2).  
And (C2) leads to the aporia.  Or, perhaps more fairly, (C2) in conjunction with the 
craft analogy leads to the aporia.  But we have abundant evidence in the Euthydemus 
for the craft analogy, and very little evidence for the sufficiency thesis.  This is good 
reason to think that, whatever Plato actually does, he should retain the craft analogy 





Chapter 5:  Felix Socrates? 
 
 
5.1.  Felix Socrates 
 In his justly acclaimed Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Gregory 
Vlastos included a brief epilogue titled “Felix Socrates”.1  It is worth quoting at some 
length. 
Confronting an imaginary detractor who reviles him for having lived in a way 
which now puts him in danger of being executed as a criminal, [Socrates] 
replies: 
 
Ap. 28b-d:  “Man, you don’t speak well if you believe that someone worth 
anything at all would give countervailing weight to danger of life or death or 
give consideration to anything but this when he acts:  whether his action is just 
or unjust, the action of a good or of an evil man.  Mean, on your view, would 
be those demigods who died in Troy, the rest of them and the son of Thetis . . .  
Do you think he gave any thought to life or death?” 
 
. . . Achilles gambles happiness for honor, prepared to lose.  And lose he does.  
He dies grief-stricken. . . .  So too other heroic figures in the tragic imagination 
of the Greeks die overwhelmed by grief.  Antigone goes to her death in 
unrelieved gloom, fearing that even the gods have forsaken her.  Alcestis is so 
devastated, she thinks of herself as having already “become nothing” before 
her death.  But not Socrates. 
 
In the whole of the Platonic corpus, nay in the whole of our corpus of Greek 
prose or verse, no happier life than his may be found.  He tells the court how 
happy he has been plying daily his thankless elenctic task, expecting them to 
think what he tells them too good to be believed: 
 
Ap. 38a:  “And if I were to tell you that there can be no greater good for a man 
than to discourse daily about virtue and about those other things you hear me 
discuss, examining myself and others – for the unexamined life is not worth 
living by man – you will believe me even less.” 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Vlastos 1991, pp. 233-235. 
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If we are to “count no man happy before the end,” we have Plato’s assurance 
that his hero’s happiness would meet that test: 
 
Phd. 117b-c:  “He took the cup most cheerfully, O Echecrates, without any 
change of color or expression on his face . . .  He drained it very easily, in good 
humor.” 
 
Is this surprising?  If you say that virtue matters more for your own happiness 
than does everything else put together, if this is what you say and what you 
mean – it is for real, not just talk – what is there to be wondered at if the loss of 
everything else for virtue’s sake leaves you light-hearted, cheerful?  If you 
believe what Socrates does, you hold the secret of your happiness in your own 
hands.  Nothing the world can do to you can make you unhappy. 
 
In the quest for happiness the noblest spirits in the Greek imagination are 
losers:  Achilles, Hector, Alcestis, Antigone.  Socrates is a winner.  He has to 
be.  Desiring the kind of happiness he does, he can’t lose. 
 
 The lengthy quote is justified not only by Vlastos’ characteristically flowing 
prose, but also by how well he articulates a view that many readers of Plato have 
found compelling.  Plato’s Socrates, contrary to what the majority of the jury thinks of 
him, contrary to what many of his interlocutors like Callicles and Thrasymachus think 
of him, and, indeed, contrary to what some later readers of Plato’s dialogues think of 
him, is – far from a misguided or misfortunate failure – a grand success.  He has 
achieved happiness.  Indeed, the central lesson to be learned from Socrates’ life is that 
happiness is achieved through the single-minded and relentless pursuit of virtue.  It is 
precisely through his own practice of philosophy, of the pursuit of virtue, that Socrates 
achieved happiness.  
 Vlastos’ confidence in Socrates’ happiness comes primarily from two elements 
of Socrates’ speech in the Apology.  On the one hand, Socrates makes various claims 
to the effect that the pursuit of virtue ought to dwarf all other pursuits.  So at 28b-d 
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(quoted above), Socrates reveals his commitment that the pursuit of virtue ought to 
dwarf even the pursuit of survival.  And this is not the only passage Vlastos could 
have cited.  A bit later, Socrates famously tells the jurors how he would respond if 
they offered to acquit him on the condition that he cease to practice philosophy. 
I will certainly not cease practicing philosophy and exhorting you and pointing 
out to whomever among you I ever happen upon that – speaking in my usual 
way – “You, good man, are an Athenian, of the city that is greatest and most 
esteemed for wisdom and power (!"# $%&'() *(+ "$,-)).  Aren’t you then 
ashamed of your taking care to possess as much wealth as possible, as well as 
esteem and honor, while you take no care or thought for wisdom (&.%)/$!0#) 
and truth and the best condition of your soul (12# 34,2# 560# 7# 8!91'$1: 
;$1(<)?”  And if one of you disputes this and claims to care, I will not let him 
go or leave him immediately, but I will question, examine, and test him; and if 
it doesn’t seem to me that he has acquired virtue (*!*12$=(< >.!1/)), as he 
claims, I will reproach him because he treats the most valuable things as the 
least, and the inferior as the greater.  I will do these things with whomever I 
happen upon, both young and old, and stranger and citizen, but more so with 
citizens because you are nearer relations to me.  For the god commands these 
things – know that well – and I think there is no greater good for you (%?@A) 
60 BµC) µ!CD%) >E(=F) E!)A$=(<) in the city than my service to the god.  For I 
go around doing nothing other than persuading you, both young and old, to 
care for neither bodies nor wealth before or as zealously as for the most 
excellent condition of your soul (µ/1! $0µG10) H6<µ!9!C$=(< µ/1! ,.:µG10) 
6.I1!.%) µ:@J %K10 $&I@.( 7# 12# 34,2# 560# 7# >.'$1: ;$1(<), saying, 
“Virtue does not come from wealth, but wealth and all the other goods for men 
– both private and public – come from virtue” (L?* H* ,.:µG10) >.!1M 
E'E)!1(<, >99 N HO >.!12# ,./µ(1( *(+ 1P Q99( >E(=P 1%C# >)=.R6%<# S6()1( 
*(+ "@'T *(+ @:µ%$'T)2.   Ap. 29d-30b 
 In this passage, Socrates makes it clear that the pursuit of virtue (the best/most 
excellent condition of the soul) ought to dwarf the pursuit of wealth, esteem and 
honor, and the excellent condition of the body.  To place such things as wealth above 
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2 It is also possible to render this with a somewhat different sense, as in the Grube/Cooper translation:  
“Wealth does not bring about virtue, but virtue makes wealth and everything else good for men, both 
individually and collectively.”  The choice between these translations is important, but does not affect 
the present point. 
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virtue, and to pursue such things more zealously, is to turn the proper value scheme on 
its head.  Attaching the appropriate importance to virtue is such a benefit, and failure 
to do so such a shame, that, as Socrates tells us, he spends all his time going around 
exhorting and persuading people to care for virtue above such things as wealth.  He 
does so in his customary manner of confronting others to elicit their claims to care for 
virtue above such things as wealth.  When they make such claims, he questions and 
tests them, and reproaches them if he finds that their claims do not hold good.  He 
goes so far as to claim that virtue is not only more important than wealth and other 
goods, but is actually the source of them, while they are not in turn a source of virtue.   
Clearly, Socrates does advocate the single-minded pursuit of virtue. 
On the other hand, Socrates also makes various claims to the effect that the 
practice of philosophy, to which he devotes his life, is the greatest good or the thing 
that produces happiness.  So at 38a (quoted above), Socrates says that there is no 
greater good than the daily discussion of virtue, in which Socrates wholeheartedly 
engages and encourages others to engage.  But, plausibly, if this practice is the greatest 
good for humans, then those who engage in it – and thereby attain this highest good – 
are happy.  Indeed, we might think that Socrates expresses this idea quite explicitly at 
41b1-c7, when he describes what life in Hades might be like: 
 
It would be a wonderful (=(4µ($1M) way for me to spend my time whenever I 
met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any other of the men of old 
who died through an unjust conviction, to compare my experience with theirs.  
I think it would be pleasant (%?* U) >:@J# !V:).  Most important, I could spend 
my time testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among 
them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not.  What would one not give, 
gentlemen of the jury, for the opportunity to examine the man who led the 
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great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable 
other men and women one could mention?  It would be an extraordinary 
happiness (>µ/,()%) U) !V: !?@(<µ%)'(#) to talk with them, to keep company 
with them and examine them.  In any case, they would certainly not put one to 
death for doing so.  They are happier (!?@(<µ%)A$1!.%<) there than we are here 
in other respects, and for the rest of time they are deathless, if indeed what we 
are told is true.  (Grube trans.) 
 
 In this passage, Socrates imagines himself continuing in the afterlife in Hades 
his daily practice of philosophy. He imagines himself doing just what he is doing here:  
talking to people about virtue, and testing and examining those who think they are 
wise to see if they really are wise.  The only apparent differences are the notariety of 
his interlocutors and the lack of limitations on how long this practice can continue, 
since the participants would be “deathless”.  But if the limitless continuation of his 
current activities – albeit with more famous interlocutors – would be “extraordinary 
happiness”, then it seems that Socrates must be happy now and in this life, as well.  
For in this life he practices constantly the very same activities that are alleged to bring 
extraordinary happiness in the next life.  If this is what brings happiness in the next 
life, it is plausible to think that this same thing brings happiness in this life, as well.  
 Vlastos is not the only luminary to make an explicit case that Socrates is 
happy.  Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith argue this case as part of a 
comprehensive and original interpretation of Plato’s Socrates.   They argue that 
happiness derives from good activity, and that one activity in particular stands out in 
Socrates’ life:  his practice of philosophy, or the examination of himself and others.   
 
It is precisely this activity, according to Socrates, that has made his life 
worthwhile.  Socrates shows that he regards this activity as necessary for 
happiness when he says, “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human 
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being” (Ap. 38a5-6).  He goes on to show that he thinks it is sufficient for 
happiness when he indicates that so long as he could engage in this activity, 
Socrates would consider himself happy:  he would count it as an 
“inconceivable happiness” (Ap. 41c3-4) if death offers him the opportunity to 
pursue his mission with the dead in Hades.3 
 
There is quite a bit of evidence, then, especially in the Apology, that seems to 
suggest that Socrates is happy.  I count myself among Socrates’ many ardent admirers, 
and I dearly wish that this view of a successful, happy Socrates were accurate.  But it 
is not.  To be sure, it is neither wholly unmotivated nor wholly misleading.  But its 
central claim, that Socrates was happy, is false by Socrates’ own lights.4  Or so, at 
least, I will argue. 
 
 
5.2.  A puzzle 
 So, Socrates is wholeheartedly committed to the practice of philosophy – i.e. 
the pursuit of virtue – and makes various claims that suggest that this practice is the 
greatest good or the thing which provides happiness.  Nevertheless, there is a serious 
problem with concluding that Socrates is happy.  For Socrates believes that virtue 
consists in a sort of moral knowledge, and he repeatedly disavows moral knowledge.  
So, it looks as if there is evidence for the following claim: 
 (1)  Socrates lacks virtue (moral knowledge). 
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3 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, pp. 129-130. 
4 And Socrates’ own lights are the only lights that concern me in this chapter. 
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Furthermore, Vlastos himself attributes to Socrates the belief that virtue is necessary 
for happiness.  And Vlastos is in the company of the majority of scholars on this 
matter.5  So, it looks as if there is evidence for the following claim: 
 (2)  Virtue (moral knowledge) is necessary for happiness. 
 If Socrates accepts both (1) and (2), then by his own lights he cannot be happy.  But 
earlier it appeared from the Apology that we had evidence for the following claim: 
 (3)  Socrates is happy. 
Now we see that (1) – (3) are an inconsistent triad, each of which finds apparent 
support in the dialogues.  Which, if any, shall we jettison?  In the remainder of this 
chapter I will consider the merits of each claim in turn, arguing in the end that the 
weight of the evidence is in favor of jettisoning (3) and retaining (1) and (2).  My 
argument will rely at crucial points on the interpretation of the Euthydemus I have 
articulated in earlier chapters. 
 
 
5.3.  Solution 1:  Deny that Socrates lacks virtue 
 
 
 One possible solution to the puzzle is to deny that Socrates lacks virtue.  If 
Socrates is virtuous, then there is no conflict between supposing that virtue is 
necessary for happiness and that Socrates is happy.  As will become clear in the 
following section, Brickhouse and Smith would not accept such a solution.  Their 
argument against the necessity of virtue for happiness depends on establishing that 
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5 See chapter 1, section 1.3.1, for a discussion. 
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Socrates lacks virtue but is nevertheless happy.  But others, including Vlastos, might 
be inclined to such a solution, so it is worth investigating how it might go.  
Certainly Socrates thinks that moral knowledge is necessary for virtue.  Indeed, 
we can attribute a stronger position than that to Socrates:  Virtue is moral knowledge 
(of a certain sort).6  Evidence for that comes from all over the dialogues, where virtue 
itself, as well as individual virtues, are identified as knowledge of good and evil.7  
That, for Socrates, virtue is knowledge is a commonplace among scholars.8  So one 
who would accept that Socrates is virtuous must suppose that he possesses the relevant 
knowledge.  But there is an immediate problem with supposing such a thing:  Socrates 
is famous for repeatedly disclaiming knowledge or wisdom.  Here is a sampling of his 
disclaimers from his response in the Apology to the Delphic oracle’s proclamation that 
no one is wiser than Socrates: 
 
What is his riddle?  I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then 
does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? . . . So I withdrew and thought to 
myself:  “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows 
anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, 
whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be 
wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not 
know.  (Ap. 21b1-d7; Grube trans.) 
 
The good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets:  each of 
them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other 
most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they 
had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to 
be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both.  The 
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6 I mean this to be compatible with views on which virtue is knowledge plus something else, like a 
certain affective state.  For a defense of a view of affective states as important for Socratic moral 
psychology, see Brickhouse and Smith forthcoming. 
7 See e.g., Laches 199, Charmides 174, Euthydemus 288-292.  
8 See chapter 1, section 1.3.2, for a discussion of virtue as moral knowledge. 
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answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to be as I 
am.  Ap. 22d-e, Grube trans. 
 
What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular 
response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he 
says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said:  
“This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that 
his wisdom is worthless.”  (Ap. 23a-b; Grube trans.) 
 
Insofar as Socrates has any wisdom, it amounts only to a recognition of his own 
ignorance.  It is precisely this that distinguishes him from the great majority of people.  
Such wisdom is worth little or nothing.  If such wisdom is worth little or nothing, then 
it can hardly suffice for virtue, since virtue and wisdom and the best possible state of 
the soul are the “most important things” (Ap. 29d-30b).    
 Vlastos makes a famous distinction that, though he does not use it in this way, 
might be thought to solve this problem for those who would attribute virtue to 
Socrates.9  The distinction arises from comparing passages like those from Apology 
21-23 with passages in which Socrates claims to know something.  For example, a 
little later in the Apology (29b6-c1), Socrates says: 
 
I do know, however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey 
one’s superior, be he god or man.  I shall never fear or avoid things of which I 
do not know, whether they may not be good rather than things that I know to 
be bad.  (Grube trans.) 
 
This is not an isolated case.  Consider, for example, the following two passages, in 




9 Vlastos 1994, pp. 39-67. 
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And the mistaken act done without knowledge you must know is one done 
from ignorance.  (Prot. 357d7-e1, Lombardo and Bell trans.) 
 
Injustice is ignorance (no one could now be ignorant of that).  (Rep. 351a5-6, 
Grube/Reeve trans.) 
 
The passages in which Socrates seems to universally disavow moral knowledge, 
coupled with passages in which Socrates seems to avow some particular moral 
knowledge, led Vlastos to distinguish between certain knowledge and elenctic 
knowledge.  Certain knowledge is what Socrates universally denies.  Certain 
knowledge is distinguished from elenctic knowledge by its infallibility.  Elenctic 
knowledge is true belief justified through the practice of elenctic examination.  Since 
elenctic examination cannot yield certainty, truths justified through this process will 
be fallibly justified.  When Socrates claims to know some particular moral truth, he is 
claiming to have elenctic knowledge of that truth.  Since he is not universally 
disavowing knowledge in the same sense in which he avows knowledge of some 
particular truths, the tension disappears. 
 Such a distinction might appear useful to the one who wants to attribute virtue, 
and therefore moral knowledge, to Socrates, since it would allow one to attribute 
elenctic knowledge to Socrates while explaining away Socrates’ universal disavowals 
as disavowals of certain knowledge.  All that remains is to suppose that elenctic moral 
knowledge is the sort that constitutes (or is a sort sufficient to constitute) virtue, and 




 Vlastos’s distinction faces a variety of problems, and a significant literature 
has been devoted to assessing it.10  Here, I am not concerned with assessing the 
distinction, but rather with assessing its applicability to our present puzzle.  For, I will 
argue, even if the distinction successfully reconciles Socrates’ avowals and disavowals 
of knowledge, it cannot successfully support the claim that Socrates is virtuous.  There 
are at least three reasons to think that the distintion cannot support the claim that 
Socrates is virtuous:  (i) Socrates’ statements in the Apology about the value of his 
own wisdom differ radically from his statements about the value of virtue; (ii) The 
weaker sense of knowledge, elenctic knowledge, seems insufficient for virtue; (iii)  
Repeatedly, after arguing that wisdom is necessary for happiness, Socrates professes 
to be unable to identify what that wisdom is or to explain it to others, suggesting that 
he fails to possess the sort of wisdom that is necessary for happiness. 
 The first reason to doubt that Vlastos’s distinction can solve our puzzle is the 
most straightforward.  If the sort of knowledge or wisdom that Socrates does possess 
is the sort that constitutes virtue and is required for happiness, then we should expect 
that Socrates’ would ascribe a similar value to his own wisdom and to virtue.  But he 
does quite the opposite, ascribing radically different values to his own wisdom and to 
virtue.  Of his own wisdom, he says that it is “worth little or nothing”, attributing to 
the god a claim like the following:  “This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like 
Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless” (Ap. 23b2-4).  What distinguishes 
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Socrates from the majority of people is that he sees his own wisdom for what it really 
is:  something of little value, or perhaps even of no value at all. 
 This is in sharp contrast to the way he describes the value of virtue.  Socrates 
thinks he has been given a divine mission to exhort the Athenians to pursue “wisdom, 
truth, [and] the best condition of the soul” (Ap. 29e).  That is, he encourages them to 
pursue virtue, saying that wealth and all other goods for men come from virtue, rather 
than the other way around (Ap. 30b).  He goes so far as to say that wisdom and virtue 
are “the most valuable things (!" #$%&'!() *+,-)” (Ap. 30a1-2).  But if wisdom and 
virtue merit a divine mission and count as the most valuable things, they can hardly be 
described as “worthless”.  Whatever this virtue and wisdom that Socrates encourages 
the Athenians to pursue may be, it cannot be the same thing that Socrates thinks 
distinguishes him from the majority of people. 
 A second reason to doubt that Vlastos’s distinction can solve our puzzle is that 
weaker knowledge does not seem to be sufficient for virtue.  Hugh Benson makes a 
compelling case for this.11  It is nearly a commonplace among Socratic scholars that 
Socrates is committed to the view that moral knowledge is necessary and sufficient for 
virtue.  Suppose that the moral knowledge in view here is elenctic knowledge, or the 
weaker, fallible sort of knowledge.  We can make good enough sense of the view that 
such knowledge is necessary for virtue; even if the stronger sort of knowledge is 
necessary for virtue, surely the weaker sort would be necessary as well.  But, Benson 
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argues, that the weaker sort of knowledge is sufficient for virtue is not nearly as 
plausible. 
 Take something that Socrates purportedly knows in the weaker sense, that 
disobeying one’s superior is wrong.  This knowledge alone will not suffice for 
virtuous action.  At a bare minimum, argues Benson, Socrates will also need to know 
who his superiors are.  But if this further knowledge is necessary for virtue, then the 
simple, elenctically known proposition that disobeying one’s superior is wrong is not 
sufficient for virtue.  A stronger sort of knowledge is needed if it is to be sufficient for 
virtue.  Moreover, Benson argues that there is no reason to suppose that someone with 
the weaker sort of knowledge will always choose the virtuous action.  For one, one 
often needs to know more than the general moral principle in order to act virtuously.  
For another, someone who has elenctically justified true belief that they recognize to 
be fallible may be overcome by “the lure of competing objects of desire”, thus failing 
to act virtuously.12  In the Protagoras Socrates argues that one would never knowingly 
choose a lesser good over a greater good.  But this position becomes less plausible if 
the weaker sense of knowledge is in view.  Finally, Benson argues that if Socrates 
thinks that the weaker sort of knowledge suffices for virtue, then it is surprising that he 
thinks that there are so few (maybe even no) virtuous people in Athens.  For the oracle 
distinguishes Socrates’ wisdom from that of others solely based on his recognition of 
his own ignorance.  If Socrates does know some things, that knowledge cannot be the 
basis of the oracle’s response, and so others must have the same sort of knowledge.  
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But if such knowledge is sufficient for virtue, then others must be virtuous as well.  
But this does not seem to be Socrates’ judgment of the Athenians virtue.  If Benson is 
correct, then, supposing that Socrates considers the weaker sort of knowledge to be 
sufficient for virtue not only seems philosophically misguided (for it does not seem to 
really be sufficient), but also fits poorly with his view that no one ever chooses a lesser 
good over a greater good and with his low view of Athenian virtue. 
 A third reason to doubt that Vlastos’s distinction can solve our puzzle is that 
Socrates repeatedly argues that wisdom is necessary for happiness,13 and then goes on 
to suggest that he does not have wisdom.  This is evidence that, whatever sort of 
wisdom is necessary for happiness, Socrates does not have it.  So, for example, in the 
Euthydemus Socrates argues that wisdom is necessary for happiness, but then fails to 
be able to say what it is.  But wisdom in the Euthydemus is clearly being conceived of 
as a craft,14 and any true craftsman should be able to say what his craft is.  At least, he 
should be able to identify the product of his craft; a physician would be able to say that 
his product is health, a cobbler that his product is shoes, and so on.  But Socrates 
cannot do this, even after significant effort.  So there is reason to think that Socrates 
does not have the wisdom that he argued was necessary for happiness.  And there is no 
reason to think that Socrates is changing the subject here, talking about one kind of 
wisdom in the first protreptic and another in the second.  Indeed, my analysis in the 
previous two chapters and the strong transitional ties between the protreptic sections 
(the second begins “where we left off” (288d)) demonstrate that it is the same kind of 
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13  See the following section for discussion of some of these texts. 
14  For the argument for this claim, see chapter 4. 
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wisdom at issue throughout.  It is a wisdom that is necessary for happiness, but that 
Socrates lacks.  And the Euthydemus is not an isolated case.  In the Charmides, 
Socrates argues that knowledge is necessary for happiness (esp. 174b-d; more on this 
passage below), but then calls himself a “worthless inquirer” (176a) when he is unable 
to say what this knowledge is.  Again, it seems unlikely that Socrates takes himself to 
have the sort of knowledge that he argues is necessary for happiness. 
 Given all these difficulties with supposing that Vlastos’s distinction can solve 
our puzzle, even granting that it successfully reconciles Socrates’ avowals and 
disavowals of knowledge, I propose we look elsewhere for a solution to the puzzle.  





5.4.  Solutions 2 and 3:  Deny the necessity of virtue or deny that Socrates is happy 
 
     
 Brickhouse and Smith agree that Socrates lacks virtue, but they dissent from 
the majority view and reject (2), that virtue is necessary for happiness.15 It is a clear 
Socratic commitment that moral knowledge is necessary for virtue.  But Socrates 
repeatedly disclaims possessing moral knowledge.  It follows that Socrates himself is 
not virtuous.  But in the Apology Socrates claims to be good, and suggests that his 
goodness is sufficient for happiness.  So, Socrates is happy.  But if all this is correct, it 
follows that virtue is not necessary for happiness.  Since Brickhouse and Smith’s case 
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for rejecting (2) depends on making a positive case for (3), it will be useful to consider 
the second and third potential solutions together.  I will argue that there are strong 
independent reasons to accept (2), but that the alleged independent evidence for (3) is 
much weaker and fails to establish (3). 
 Brickhouse and Smith’s strategy is to argue that the Apology shows that one 
can be good and happy without being virtuous.  Despite claiming at Ap. 21b1-d7 that 
he does not possess moral knowledge, Socrates seems to take himself to be both good 
and impervious to attempts to harm him.  A few pages later, he tells the jury: 
“Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more 
than yourselves.  Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he 
could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be 
harmed by a worse; certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or 
disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think to be great harm, but I do 
not think so.  I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is 
doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly.”  (Ap. 30c-d; Grube 
trans.) 
 
And at the end of his trial, after he has been sentenced to death, Socrates exhorts the 
jury: 
 
You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and 
keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or 
in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods.  What has happened 
to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for 
me to die now and to escape from trouble.  That is why my divine sign did not 
oppose me at any point.”  (Ap. 41c-d; Grube trans.) 
 
Since Socrates’ goodness seems to guarantee that he cannot be harmed, and since one 
who is never harmed (and generally attains what is ‘better’) is plausibly thought to be 
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happy, Brickhouse and Smith conclude that Socrates is happy.  But since Socrates’ 
goodness does not consist in virtue, then virtue must not be necessary for happiness. 
 Despite its initial plausibility, Brickhouse and Smith depend too much, in my 
view, on considering these two brief passages in the Apology in isolation from the rest 
of the Platonic corpus.  For there are several passages that suggest quite clearly that 
virtue is necessary for happiness.  Perhaps the clearest of these is Euthydemus 277-
282, which Brickhouse and Smith recognize is potentially problematic for their view.16  
This passage is standardly taken to be an argument for the necessity and sufficiency of 
virtue for happiness.17  On my interpretation, Socrates does not argue, claim, or 
presuppose that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  But he clearly argues that virtue is 
necessary for happiness.18  Indeed, there seem to be at least two arguments for this 
claim.  At 280b-281d, Socrates argues that wisdom is necessary for correct use, that 
correct use is necessary for benefit, and that benefit is necessary for happiness.  From 
this he concludes that wisdom is necessary for happiness.  And at 281d-e, Socrates 
argues that the goodness of all other things requires wisdom, and he has maintained 
throughout 277-282 that happiness requires goodness.  From this he concludes that 
happiness requires wisdom.  So we seem to have two explicit arguments for the 
second claim in our inconsistent triad. 
 Brickhouse and Smith attempt to downplay the apparent force of this passage 
in the Euthydemus by focusing on the central role of correct use in the argument.  Two 
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17 See chapter 3. 
18 For the details of my interpretation, see chapter 3. 
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points are central to their treatment of the passage.  First, because use is an activity, 
the importance of correct use seems to cohere nicely with Brickhouse and Smith’s 
focus on virtuous activity, rather than virtue itself, as the thing that directly contributes 
to happiness.19  Second, however, they argue that plainly virtue is not necessary for 
correct use, and so apparently we are not licensed to conclude on the basis of this 
passage that virtue is necessary for happiness, even if we are licensed to conclude that 
correct use is necessary for happiness.  As evidence, they imagine a “well-intended, 
but not fully virtuous person who uses his money to buy wheat to sustain his body for 
several more hours of philosophical argument to dissuade someone who is thinking 
about becoming a sophist.”20  Suppose further that a fully virtuous person would do 
exactly the same thing with her money.  Then it seems that both the virtuous and the 
non-virtuous person have used their money correctly, since (a) we can assume that the 
virtuous person has used her money correctly, and (b) both the virtuous and the non-
virtuous person have used their money in exactly the same way.  So, virtue is not 
necessary for correct use. 
 This analysis seems to ignore the strong way that Socrates makes his case: 
Well then, in working and using things concerning wood, surely there 
is nothing else that produces correct use than knowledge of carpentry?”   
“Clearly not,” he said. 
“And also in work concerning utensils the producer of the correctness 
is knowledge.”   
He agreed. 
“Then,” I said, “also concerning the use of the first of the goods we 
spoke of – wealth and health and beauty – was it knowledge which directed 
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19 See chapter 1, section 1.3.3.4 for a discussion of virtue and virtuous activity. 
20 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, p. 130. 
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and made our action correct with respect to using all such things correctly, or 
something else?”   
“Knowledge,” he said. 
“It seems then that knowledge provides men not only with good fortune 
but also with well-doing, in all possession and action.”   
He agreed.  
“Then, by Zeus,” I said, “is there any benefit from other possessions 
without intelligence and wisdom?   (281a1-b6) 
 
Socrates seems to hold that “there is nothing else that produces correct use than 
knowledge” in any given domain; that knowledge “directs and makes our action 
correct” with respect to using goods like wealth and health and beauty; that 
“knowledge provides men with well-doing [i.e., correct action] in all possession and 
action”; and that there is no “benefit from other possessions without intelligence and 
wisdom”.  But these claims appear to be expressions of the necessity of wisdom or 
virtue for correct use, full stop.  In the face of these claims, it is difficult to maintain 
that Socrates would deny that virtue is necessary for correct use. 
 Nevertheless, there is still something persuasive about the counterexample 
Brickhouse and Smith give to this principle.  Let us suppose for a moment that, 
despite the appearances of 281a-b6, Socrates accepts such counterexamples as 
disproving the principle that virtue is necessary for correct use.  Perhaps, then, 
Socrates would confess to having overstated his case.  What he really means is that 
wisdom or virtue is the only thing that reliably produces correct use.  Any other cases 
of correct use will be somehow accidental or lucky.  His overstating the case could 
then be explained by his conviction that wisdom is required for consistent correct use, 
and that a life without consistent correct use is not a happy one.  So, wisdom is 
necessary for the sort of consistent correct use that is necessary for happiness, but is 
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not necessary for every particular instance of correct use.  Such a view would remain 
consistent with the protreptic aims of the passage – it still gives Clinias sufficient 
reason to pursue wisdom – and parallels nicely my interpretation of Socrates earlier 
claim that wisdom produces good fortune.21  This latter parallel is supported by the 
way Socrates puts things in the passage quoted above:  “It seems then that knowledge 
provides men not only with good fortune but also with well-doing, in all possession 
and action.” 
 Would this interpretation give Brickhouse and Smith a way to block the 
argument to the necessity of virtue for happiness?  Not as it stands, for the argument 
has been modified to give it the following form:  Virtue is necessary for consistent 
correct use; consistent correct use is necessary for consistent benefit; consistent benefit 
is necessary for happiness; so, virtue is necessary for happiness.  But perhaps 
Brickhouse and Smith could make an additional modification to the argument, in light 
of an important fact about Socrates’ life to which they give some attention.  Socrates 
has long been blessed with a daimonion, and this daimonion is action-guiding.  
Brickhouse and Smith rely centrally on the daimonion to explain Socrates’ claim at 
Apology 37b that he has wronged no one.  The daimonion turns him away, even in 
small matters, whenever he is about to do something wrong.  Because of this, Socrates 
does not use his possessions incorrectly, that is, in a way that produces harm.  And so, 
because of this divine intervention, Socrates is able to achieve consistent correct use, 
and so consistent benefit, and so happiness, without being virtuous. 
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 This way of accounting for Socrates’ happiness does not fit well with the 
Euthydemus passage, though.  For immediately following the text quoted above, 
Socrates continues: 
 
“Then, by Zeus,” I said, “is there any benefit from other possessions 
without intelligence and wisdom?  Would a man benefit more from possessing 
many things and doing many things without sense, or from possessing and 
doing little with sense?  Examine it this way.  Doing less, wouldn’t he err less?  
And erring less, wouldn’t he do less badly?  And doing less badly wouldn’t he 
be less miserable?”   
“Certainly,” he said. 
“Then would someone do less if he were poor, or wealthy?” 
“Poor,” he said. 
“And if weak or strong?” 
“Weak.” 
“And if honored or dishonored?” 
“Dishonored.” 
“And would he do less if courageous and temperate or cowardly?” 
“Cowardly.” 
“So then also if he were lazy rather than hard-working?” 
He agreed. 
“And if slow rather than fast, and dull of sight and hearing rather than 
sharp?” 
With all such things we agreed with one another.  (281b4-d2) 
 
 
For someone like Socrates who lacks wisdom, doing less is better than doing more, for 
doing less provides less opportunity for harm and thereby makes one less miserable.  
Certainly, to be less miserable is to be further down the continuum toward happiness, 
but one who is properly described as ‘less miserable’ is not properly described as 
‘happy’.  Quite the contrary:  Socrates is here endorsing the idea that happiness 
requires wisdom-guided action, while also allowing that the ignorant may be better off 
– that is, less miserable – by virtue of doing less and so doing less harm to themselves.  
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Socrates’ daimonion acts in a way that is consistent with this picture.  The daimonion 
directs Socrates only away from particular actions, never toward them.  That is, the 
daimonion’s guidance is always for Socrates to refrain from action that would be 
harmful, but is never toward action that would be beneficial.  Given Socrates’ account 
in the Euthydemus, this is exactly the sort of behavior we would expect from a 
benevolent daimonion with an ignorant man in its charge, for an ignorant man is better 
off doing less.  The daimonion is a great blessing to Socrates because it makes him 
less miserable.  But this is not at all to say that it makes him happy.22 
 The next passage in the Euthydemus confirms this view, for here we have the 
argument that goodness requires wisdom. 
 
“In sum, Clinias,” I said, “it is likely that concerning all the things that 
we first called goods, the account of them is not that they are goods in 
themselves by nature, but rather it seems to be this:  If ignorance leads them, 
they are greater evils than their opposites, insofar as they are better able to 
serve the evil master; but if intelligence and wisdom lead they, they are greater 
goods, though in themselves neither sort is of any value.”   
 He said, “Apparently, it seems to be just as you say.” 
 “Then what follows from the things we’ve said?  Is it anything other 
than that none of the other things is either good or evil, but of these two, 
wisdom is good, and ignorance is evil?”  
 He agreed.  (281d2-e5) 
 
Here Socrates argues that health, wealth, and the other recognized goods are greater 
evils than their contraries if used without wisdom, but greater goods than their 
contraries if used with wisdom.  From this he concludes that each recognized good 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
**!Though Brickhouse and Smith make the daimonion central to their account of Socrates’ goodness 
(and so his happiness), they seem to recognize some of the limitations of the daimonion (1994, p.133):  
“But in spite of the enormous benefit afforded him by the daimonic alarms that have warned him away 
from the commission of evil, his daimonion would nevertheless not allow him to draw authoritative 
inferences regarding what course of action would express moral virtue.” 
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other than wisdom is in itself neither good nor evil, and so wisdom is the only good in 
itself.23  The upshot of the argument is, again, that wisdom is required for goodness.  
This is further strong and explicit evidence for the second claim of our inconsistent 
triad – that virtue (moral knowledge) is necessary for happiness.  And this reading of 
these arguments in the Euthydemus is confirmed by Socrates’ summary statements: 
 
Then let us consider the consequence of this.  Since we all want to be happy, 
and since we appear to become happy by using things and using them 
correctly, and since it is knowledge that provides the correctness and good 
fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to prepare themselves in every 
way for this:  how they will become as wise as possible.  (282a1-6) 
 
Now then, since you believe both that it can be taught and that it is the only 
existing thing which makes a man happy and fortunate, surely you would agree 
that it is necessary to love wisdom and you mean to do this yourself.  (282c8-
d2; Sprague trans.) 
 
Again, the explicit focus is on the necessity of wisdom for happiness. 
 Other texts, too, support the necessity of virtue for happiness.  Consider the 
following passage, which occurs near the end of the Charmides.     
Socrates:  All this time you’ve been leading me right round in a circle and 
concealing from me that it was not living knowledgably that was making us 
fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the knowledges put together, 
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*#!Irwin (1995, 57) usefully describes the two main interpretations of this passage: 
 
The Moderate View:  “When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not goods ‘in 
themselves’, he means that they are not goods when they are divorced from wisdom.  When he 
concludes that wisdom is the only good, he means simply that only wisdom is good all by 
itself, apart from any combination with other things.” 
 
The Extreme View:  “When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not goods ‘in 
themselves’, he means that they are not goods; any goodness belongs to the wise use of them, 
not to the recognized goods themselves.  When Socrates concludes that wisdom is the only 
good, he means that nothing else is good.” 
 
As I have put it (and as I argue in dissertation ch. 3), Socrates is expressing the moderate view.  If he is 
instead expressing the extreme view, that only strengthens my case in the present context. 
!
! "+'!
but that we have to have this one knowledge of good and evil.  Because, 
Critias, if you consent to take away this knowledge from the other knowledges, 
will medicine any the less produce health, or cobbling produce shoes, or the art 
of weaving produce clothes, or will the pilot’s art any the less prevent us from 
dying at sea or the general’s art in war? 
Critias:  They will do it just the same. 
Socrates:  But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of these things well 
and beneficially done will have vanished if this is lacking.  (Charm. 174b-d; 
Sprague trans., with changes) 
 
Here Socrates tells us that we “have to have” the knowledge of good and evil – which 
just is virtue24 – in order to “fare well and be happy”.  Without it, our chance of doing 
things “well and beneficially . . . will have vanished”.  This is an explicit claim that 
virtue is necessary for happiness.25  This passage, then, provides strong evidence to 
corroborate the evidence from the Euthydemus that Socrates is committed to the 
necessity of virtue for happiness.  
  There seems to be a great deal of evidence that Socrates is committed to the 
necessity of virtue for happiness.  What, then, should we make of the passages at Ap. 
30c-d and 41c-d, which Brickhouse and Smith take to show that a good man cannot be 
harmed, that Socrates is a good man, and that Socrates is therefore happy.  One 
possible response, which I am not much interested in, is to suppose that Socrates 
simply does not express a consistent view on the matter.  Perhaps this is right, but here 
I take it for granted that this is an interpretation of last resort.  Another response, 
initially more plausible in my view, is to recognize that these passages really do 
provide support for the view that by his own lights Socrates is happy, but to suppose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See, e.g., Laches 199c-e. 
25 See chapter 1 for further analysis of this argument. 
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that he must here be speaking loosely, given the overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary outside of these passages.  Socrates may here express a proposition that goes 
beyond his own considered judgment, perhaps because of the rhetorically charged 
situation of the Apology. 
 While I would be content to retreat to this second response if necessary, it 
would be more satisfying if we could read these passages in a way that shows them to 
be consistent with the accounts of the necessity of virtue for happiness we find in 
many other parts of the Platonic corpus.  I propose just such a reading.  Again, here 
are the passages: 
“Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more 
than yourselves.  Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he 
could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be 
harmed by a worse; certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or 
disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think to be great harm, but I do 
not think so.  I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is 
doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly.”  (Ap. 30c-d; Grube 
trans.) 
 
You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and 
keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or 
in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods.  What has happened 
to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for 
me to die now and to escape from trouble.  That is why my divine sign did not 
oppose me at any point.”  (Ap. 41c-d; Grube trans.) 
 
 
The first thing to notice is what Socrates does not say in these passages.  First, 
Socrates never claims either that he himself is happy or that good men are happy.  
Indeed, he never mentions happiness at all.  Second, he never claims that benefits 
come to him because of his goodness.  As with happiness, he never mentions benefit at 
all, but only harm.  The absence of harm alone is not sufficient to make one happy.  
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Recall that at Euthydemus 280b-281d Socrates argues that benefit is necessary for 
happiness.  He does at one point make a comparative claim, that “it was better for me 
to die now and to escape from trouble”, but it is far from clear that he means to 
endorse the thesis that death is positively a benefit to him.  Perhaps death is just the 
removal of certain harms, or “troubles”.  Put all this together and it is far from clear 
that Socrates is making any claims about happiness or the connection between 
goodness and happiness in these passages. 
 Not only this, but Socrates never even explicitly claims to be good in these 
passages.26  Again, he makes (or rather, strongly implies) a comparative claim:  He is 
better than Meletus and Anytus.  But 30c-d never even mentions a good man.  At 41c-
d, Socrates does mention a good man, but again it is not at all obvious that he means to 
be calling himself good.  Socrates says these things in his remarks to those members 
of the jury who voted to acquit him, and his remarks (as is the case at 30c-d) are aimed 
at encouraging the members of the jury to pursue and fear the right sorts of things.  
They should pursue wisdom and virtue rather than money and power, and they should 
fear ignorance rather than death.  The lesson of the Euthydemus is that the wise and 
virtuous will gain all the happiness available to them in their circumstances, and so 
wisdom is to be pursued over all else, including longer life.  The lesson of 41c-d is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 There is a passage at the end of the first protreptic of the Euthydemus that seems to suggest (though 
not decisively) that wisdom is required for goodness, which may also mitigate against Brickhouse and 
Smith’s attribution of goodness to Socrates:  Socrates encourages Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to 
“start where I left off and show the boy what follows next:  whether he ought to acquire every sort of 
knowledge, or whether there is one sort that he ought to get in order to be a happy man and a good one, 
and what it is” (282e; Sprague trans.).  See also the stretch at 273d-274e, where Socrates seems 
prepared to use ‘teach virtue’, ‘teach wisdom’, and ‘make good’ equivalently.!
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same:  the jury should attend to virtue rather than things like preserving their lives.  
They should fear ignorance rather than death, for if they attain wisdom they will gain 
all the happiness available to them in their circumstances, but if they remain ignorant 
even the very things they care about will bring them harm.  
 Likewise at 30c-d, Socrates is encouraging the jury to give supreme attention 
to virtue, for without virtue even the things one pursues may cause one great harm.  
The passage calls to mind the Gorgias, where Socrates argues that suffering injustice 
is less harmful than acting unjustly (see esp. 469ff).  In the Gorgias, Socrates allows 
that we should try to avoid the harm of suffering injustice (469c), but that above all we 
should try to avoid the great harm of acting unjustly.   
 At 30c-d, Socrates begins and ends the passage with comparative claims:  
“harm me more than yourselves”; “which he and others think to be a great harm” 
(emphasis mine); “he is doing himself much greater harm”.  But in the middle, he 
makes claims that seem to be categorical:  “Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me 
in any way”; “I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse”.  I 
propose that we read the comparative claims throughout, so that the apparent 
categorical claims are not actually categorical.  Some evidence for this comes at 37b-c, 
where Socrates says that imprisonment, a fine, and exile are things that “I know very 
well to be an evil”.  This contradicts the categorical reading of 30c-d.  If Socrates is 
allowing that these may be harms (and harms Meletus and Anytus could inflict on 
him), though not great harms in comparison with acting unjustly, the apparent 
inconsistency is dissolved.  Again, this reading fits well with the surrounding context:  
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30c-d is flanked on one side by the famous passage in which Socrates describes his 
divine mission of exorting the Athenians to care not for wealth, reputation, and honors 
while ignoring wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of the soul (28e-30b); and it 
is flanked on the other side by the famous metaphor of Socrates as gadfly stirring up 
Athens, a great horse (30e-31b).  The point of the larger passage is to exhort the 
Athenians to direct their efforts to the right sorts of pursuits, and the comparative 
reading fits this context nicely. 
 There is another passage that Brickhouse and Smith take to show that Socrates 
is happy:  Apology 41c.27  Here Socrates says that “it would be an extraordinary 
happiness to talk with” the likes of Odysseus or Sisyphus, “to keep company with 
them and examine them” (Grube trans.).  But of course, keeping company with others 
and examining them is precisely what Socrates spends his time doing in this life.  If 
the very same activity that Socrates devotes himself to in this life would be an 
extraordinary happiness in the next, then it would seem that Socrates must be happy in 
this life as well.  But again, Socrates is not virtuous, and so virtue must not (though 
elenctic activity may be) necessary for happiness.  To put it another way, if elenctic 
activity suffices for happiness but not for virtue, then virtue is not necessary for 
happiness. 
 Two observations should serve to undermine the apparent force of this 
passage.  First, this passage, like those considered above, occurs in a context in which 
Socrates is trying to persuade the jurors to fear death less than they fear ignorance or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, pp. 129-130. 
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vice.  The focus here is not so much on the distinctiveness of the activity (elenctic 
activity), but on the superior quality of people with whom Socrates can engage in such 
activity (great heros), and on the lack of obstacles (like hostile juries) to engaging in 
such activity.  Given such a set of interlocutors and an unlimited amount of time to 
talk with them, Socrates may even have high hopes that he will find the wisdom he 
seeks.28  The state of affairs he describes, then, is a “happy” one.  This shift from 
talking of Socrates as happy to talking about a happy state of affairs should not be 
viewed with suspicion.  First, Socrates never says explicitly in this passage that he 
means to describe himself (or rather, his hypothetical future self) as happy.  And 
second, there is precedence in the Apology for this use of the term ‘happy’.  At 25b, 
Socrates says that “it would be a great happiness” were it the case that he alone 
corrupted the youth, while all others improved them.  But clearly he does not mean to 
attribute happiness to himself or any particular individual here.  Rather, he means 
something like ‘a very happy state of affairs’.  Indeed, this is exactly how Grube 
translates it.29 
 Second, and even more tellingly, only one page earlier (40c-d) Socrates claims 
that if “the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything”, then he would count 
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28 Constructivists can allow that Socrates may find this wisdom even if none of his interlocutors is wise 
either.  Non-constructivists, too, may suppose that Socrates could find this wisdom through elenctic 
activity:  Perhaps at least one of these great men and women is wise, and can impart this wisdom to 
Socrates. 
29 In the only other use of !?@(<µ%)'( or one of its cognates in the Apology outside of 41c, Socrates 
again uses it in a way that cannot quite be taken as a straightforward attribution of genuine happiness to 
some individual.  At 36d-e, he tells the entire jury, “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself 
happy; I make you be happy.”  But surely Socrates does not think that many (or perhaps even any) of 
the jurors are happy.  He must mean rather that he brings them closer to attaining happiness, or 
something of the sort.  But then Socrates’ imagined afterlife spent examining the great men and women 




death as “a great advantage”.  In other words, Socrates says that annihilation would be 
a great gain for him.  Plausibly, for someone for whom annihilation would be a great 
gain, life is not worth living.  But a life that is not worth living is not a happy one.  So, 
whatever Socrates means at 41c, he does not mean to suggest that he is now happy.  
Perhaps what he means is to emphasize that, while he values his investigations now, it 
would really be something special if he gained access to the likes of Homer and Ajax 
and Odysseus.  And maybe he even thinks such investigations might lead to his 
happiness.  But we should not infer that he is happy now. 
 I have argued that there is strong evidence that Socrates is committed to the 
necessity of virtue for happiness.  In addition, I have argued that the apparent 
counterevidence – that Socrates in the Apology counts himself as happy – is merely 
apparent.  Add to this the case I made in the previous section that Socrates is not 
virtuous, and it becomes clear which member of our inconsistent triad must go.  
Rather than deny the necessity of virtue for happiness or that Socrates lacks virtue, the 
solution to our initial puzzle is to deny that Socrates is happy.    
Proposition (3), that Socrates is happy, is the only member of the inconsistent 
triad for which there is not strong independent support.  The apparent evidence for (3) 
is merely apparent.  But there is strong independent support for (1) and (2), and 
together these entail that (3) is false.  This is strong evidence that Socrates was not, by 
his own lights, happy. 
This, for me at any rate, is a disappointing conclusion.  But it is no less 
accurate for being disappointing.  There is some consolation to be had, though.  For 
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one, Socrates was, by his own lights, less miserable than most others.  For another, he 
was actively searching for happiness, encouraging others to do the same.  He had 
cleared away many of the impediments to happiness, like ignorance of ignorance.  
And he proved an inspiration to a long tradition of philosophers who followed him in 
trying to achieve and account for happiness.  Furthermore, while I have argued that 
Socrates held that virtue is necessary for happiness and that he lacked virtue, I have 
not argued that Socrates was correct about these matters.  It is even possible Socrates 
was wrong about the necessary conditions for happiness or virtue and that he himself 
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